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In this thesis seven case studies of psychotic 
or borderline psychotic functioning were presented and 
an experimental study was reported and discussed involving 
the participation of 17 previously deluded psychotic 
volunteers and 42 non-psychotic volunteers.
It was theorised that delusional thinking was 
permitted and eventually incited by an amplification 
of "confirmation bias" - the bias to seek and accept 
data and ideas which confirm a hypothesis at the expense 
of that which refutes it. The case study work provided 
supporting evidence for this. In the experimental study 
psychotics, especially paranoid psychotics, were higher 
on confirmation bias in a visual task and markedly higher 
in this bias on a verbal task. The bias was linked with 
high left hemisphere cortical activation and low right 
hemisphere cortical activation. Tentative evidence was 
presented that high confirmation bias was linked with 
low left hemisphere limbic activation and high limbic 
activation in the right hemisphere.
It was also theorised that delusional thinking 
would be encouraged by high creativity given its 
set-breaking character. Scores on tests of creativity
provided evidence that non-paranoid psychotics were more 
creative than paranoid psychotics but not more so than 
non-psychotics. The non-psychotic groups were, however, 
quite talented and may have presented the medicated 
recovering psychotics with quite a stiff challenge.
Parallels (and differences) were drawn between 
delusional and mystical thought and it was argued that 
the two are closely related.
The results of the research were integrated into 
a holistic multi-process theory of delusional thinking 
in which arousal, hemisphere differences and biochemical 
factors were seen as inter-related with more executive- 
guided qualitative aspects of the psychotic's life.
Hence cerebral processes underlying their chief goals, 
needs and attributions were seen as interacting with 
more local brain processes to eventuate the delusional 
state.
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PREFACE
In their attempts to understand schizophrenia, 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists are rather like 
impotent men writing about the joys of sexual intercourse 
using verbal reports and physiological recordings as their 
data. Distanced from the phenomenon, their reports often 
seem contrived and alien. The research presented in this 
thesis differs from this state of affairs because I 
personally have experienced borderline psychotic functioning 
but returned to tell the tale. It is possible, given 
my highly relevant research interests at the time, that 
I unconsciously engineered my own crisis (described in 
Chapter 4) so as to be able to write about it later - 
as Strindberg apparently used to do (Storr 1972, pp.209- 
210; Sprinchorn 1968) - however if I did this (which I 
very much doubt) I in no way found what I expected. The 
edges of sanity turned out to be of a character quite 
beyond my wildest dreams or nightmares.
This research has, therefore, been very much a 
therapeutic exercise for me. I have used an approach 
also advocated by Frankl (1959, 1963) to the management 
of and recovery from extreme crises: I have tried to see 
meaning in it and tried to relate it to my spiritual life. 
This thesis is partly the result of that effort.
To begin: I will preface the body of this work 
by comments first on its form and then on its content.
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The thesis is perhaps rather strange. This is 
because I am, in the spirit of Stack-Sullivanian participant 
observation and observant participation, exploring a strange 
realm: the mystical and psychotic mind. I seek to claim 
epistemological validity for mystical, and for islands 
of the psychotic experience, to show their parallels and 
interrelationships and to suggest how these states are 
achieved or suffered. In doing so I am not only writing 
about them, in a scientific spirit, but relating experiences 
had within them, including my own. Hence we have not 
only knowledge by description of these domains but knowledge 
by acquaintance.
I will adopt a "funnel approach" in the presentation 
of this research. At the beginning the very broad molar 
speculations which led to the investigation are reported 
and the style is very general and light. As the text 
continues the inferences and predictions gradually become 
more detailed and fine-grained and the text more intense.
In Part One we therefore are dealing with the hunches 
derived largely from case studies and my previous research 
whilst in Part Two very specific issues are focussed upon 
experimentally as the impressions presented in Part One 
are gradually hewn into an experimentally testable shape. 
There are however differences between the two parts: In 
Part One I am largely dealing with the 'why' of delusional 
thinking, in Part Two with the 'how'.
Throughout Parts One and Two I will attempt to 
relate real life behaviours to experimental and psychometric
17
measures to bring the psychotic's identity alive. The 
essence and character of the psychotic subject is so easily 
lost or obscured in the, usually, rather dry pages of 
the experimental psychopathology literature - a fact which 
cannot help researchers and practitioners in this field 
to relate their conceptual knowledge to the flesh and 
blood people they daily deal with. In this thesis I hope 
this discrepancy between the representation of the subject 
in the literature and the reality of the actual person 
in everyday life will be reduced.
The thesis is perhaps more personally and "warmly" 
written than traditionally is expected or is the case.
This is because I have deliberately shunned the "author's 
formula" of presenting research in a very terse, obscure 
and cold manner - a manner often used as a means of enhancing 
its apparent scientific respectability. Although I 
sometimes have written in this way myself prior to about 
1980 - as the reader will see, here, from my 1979 diary 
quotes in Chapter 4 - 1  eventually decided: no more.
There is, I feel, too much "alienation from self" (Federn); 
"lack of actuality" (Husserl) and "loss of the sense of 
the real" (Pierre Janet) in social science writing and 
this can surely be of no real value to the endeavour.
This thesis therefore is designed for easy reading.
I hope my approach meets with the reader's approval and 
enhances enjoyment and understanding.
As a final comment on the form of this work (although 
it has content relevance) it is necessary to emphasise 
that I have tried to keep my inferences as close to the
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empirical evidence as is reasonable given the nature of 
the phenomena under study. These remarks are very relevant 
if the reader wishes to understand the general tone or 
flavour of my attitude to much (if not all) psychoanalytic 
thinking in this thesis. In my own on-going self-analysis 
which began in 1967/68 I often used psychoanalytic concepts 
and methods (despite the fact that in my official psychological 
research my approach was experimental and cognitive).
Over the last twenty years of experience with the psychodynamic 
approach I became sensitive to what I now call, rather 
jaundicedly, "the psychoanalytic con'". This is the implicit 
communication to the effect that if one does not accept 
or seek seemingly deep and far-fetched interpretations 
one is vulnerable to the change of shallowness and super­
ficiality, perhaps even timidity, in one's thinking.
This many intelligent thinking men and women cannot bear 
and thus they accept and revere ostensibly more "profound" 
interpretations to avoid the charge. In my research for 
this thesis I therefore have deliberately tempted my potential 
accusers. Having indulged in psychodynamic acrobatics 
and convolutions to a considerable extent over the years 
I eventually became disillusioned with the parochialism, 
the low predictive validity and the massive imbalance 
which usually obtained when interpretations were weighed 
against actual evidence. In the case studies reported 
in Part One my interpretations therefore are well constrained 
and deliberately do not reach to "depths" where my thought 
products would go far beyond the information given.
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The content of the thesis is heavily influenced 
by the ideas of Hermann Lenz (on mysticism, "supersanity" 
and delusion); Hans Eysenck (on arousal and on psychoticism); 
Gordon Claridge (on arousal, psychosis and creativity); 
Fritjof Capra (on physics and mysticism) and Colin Martindale 
(on arousal and creativity), whose work provided the 
foundations on which I tried to build. Apart from 
acknowledging the importance of genetic influences and 
physiological and neurochemical processes in schizophrenia 
I also present an understanding at the cognitive and social 
psychological level. I raise, for example, a social 
psychological perspective on delusional thinking in the 
form of "social class programming" (Chapter 2). This 
enables us to see the context within which the personality 
and the form of the crisis of a paranoid schizophrenic 
developed. It also reveals an additional approach to 
the understanding of personality, so necessary according 
to Brody (1972), to that provided by Eysenckian (1967) 
arousal levels or Grayian (1970, 1972, 1973) reward/ 
punishment sensitivities which attach personality dimensions 
to a biological substrate but which are less productive 
of predictions of social behaviours.
The endeavour to relate the mystical and the 
psychotic is, of course, not entirely original. Previous 
writers (Laing 1969, Lenz 1979) have emphasised that 
psychotics are not denied transcendent experiences during 
their crises that also are had by normal people. In this 
respect then the most original material on this issue
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herein is in Chapter 8 where are described in some detail 
the parallels and the differences between mystical and 
psychotic thought. The theme is also more dominant and 
developed to a greater degree in this thesis than in 
previous research.
It is well known that low social class and 
schizophrenia are linked and that life changes can 
precipitate psychotic states but there is no consensus 
on just how (Davison and Neale 1986) . In Chapter 4 is 
therefore given a reasonably fine grained description 
of one special case: the specific stresses one encounters 
when moving from a middle class intellectual environment 
to a working class non-intellectual one and the kinds 
of confusions and invalidations this can lead to.
Contrary to much previous research I attempt to
present the psychotic in as positive a light as I think
fair and reasonable. Although this long seemed to me
a possibility, I was struck by a particular incident in
1980 which made me feel that it was all the more important.
I was talking to a previously psychotic black man of little
education about my own battles with my previous research 
%
in which I had become disillusioned to the point of 
distraction with the possibility of creating real practical 
suggestions to aid theory building in science from a solely 
experimental analyticaliifoundation in the psychology of 
science which concentrated largely on errors. Far from 
this leaving him speechless, he immediately retorted with 
brilliant analogies: "You're trying to climb rain Peter,
21
or sweep sun off the pavement". My previous predicament 
could not have been better put - and this was from a man 
who once firmly believed that he had been communicating 
with "the water people" by whom he meant people who lived 
under the sea.
In addition to emphasising and assessing the talents 
and limitations of the psychotic I will present the psychotic 
experience not only as an experience which reveals an 
inner self or an inner realm thus to be assimilated and 
"worked through" in the interests of personal growth but 
an external realm beyond the personal and private which 
the brain in the psychotic state has accessed. In 
presenting and attempting to elaborate this radical view, 
the general possibility of which is mentioned by Oliver 
Sachs (1986, p.122), I am essentially linking the three 
domains of mysticism, delusion and physics (Chapters 1,
4, 5 and 8). There is considerable controversy over the 
kinds of physical interpretations which I use in this 
thesis (see for example, Pagels 1982, Chapter 12 and Wilber 
1984, pp.3-29 for alternative views), however I believe 
these interpretations to be viable and to weave a consistent 
pattern with the rest of the material presented here.
They also stimulate research in otherwise unforeseen 
directions (e.g. Josephson 1980, p.120; Capra 1983).
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Mystici, Physic;
Delusion
/^/l///f Researched by Lenz, Laing 
and this thesis
////
Researched by Capra, Zukav 
and Josephson
This thesis
In seeking the positive side of the psychotic 
and the psychotic experience I am however sometimes seeking 
a rather weak signal buried in noise. In order to achieve 
this aim I have had to adopt a risky criterion in signal 
detection terms with the consequent risk of making false 
alarms. Time and future research will, I predict, sift 
this material yet reveal genuine nuggets of lasting value.
It has not been my purposeein writing this thesis 
to present a first draft of a textbook on paranoia and 
delusional thinking. My approach and the content of this 
work is therefore not as systematic or as descriptive 
as such an enterprise would require. My emphasis in on 
ideas and processes rather than on description and diagnostic 
categories. I am also examining delusional thinking, 
in the first instance, as a unity rather than as sub­
classified into so-called "primary" or "out of the blue" 
delusions and "secondary" delusions which traditionally 
(but except in the very simple cases of partial deafness 
I think wrongly) are taken to be post hoc explanations 
by the patient of priorlperceptual or attentional 
disturbances. I believe the label "primary" to be a
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confession of ignorance as to the patient's prior history 
and state at the time of delusion crystallisation.
Students of psychiatry are well versed in examples repeated 
ad nauseam in standard texts where after salt cellars 
or biscuits are whizzed across cafe tables so-called "primary 
delusions" of spectacular form suddenly "appear" in the 
person's mind "explaining" their whole life and/or future 
mission or fate. I very much doubt that these oft^repeated 
examples really accurately describe what actually was 
going on in these cases in all its richness; delusional 
thinking is just not like that. The fact that a 
mathematician may have a brilliant idea while putting 
his foot on the steps of a coach in no way justifies us 
calling this a "primary creative act" as if it were somehow 
qualitatively different from all other creative acts.
The distinction between primary and secondary delusions 
is, I believe, of no theoretical or practical relevance 
and will not be discussed further.
The paranoid/non-paranoid distinction however 
is (at least judging from previous research) much more 
significant and serious and in the experimental phase 
of the enquiry will be used to try to uncover genuine 
causal differences. There were far tooofew volunteers 
for the case studies for me to delve into this distinction 
alas in any detail or with any degree of confidence there - 
although, of course, it was ever present in my mind.
In summary: in Part One I examine the history, 
phenomenology, kinematics and dynamics of delusional
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thinking using a case study approach while in Part Two 
I use experimental and psychometric methods to try to 
prise out some of the mechanisms and processes which might 
predispose a person to develop delusional thoughts, Part 
One, as well as striving for a coherent picture, in its 
own terms, of delusional thinking, also is the soil out 
of which the hypotheses for the experimental enquiry grew.
It uses a family-resemblance-seeking and top-down approach.
In Part Two the hypotheses are tested, the results evaluated 
and generalisations are sought within a basically bottom- 
up approach.
I should like, finally, to express my appreciation 
to my supervisor Dr. John Wilding for his advice and 
encouragement and also for his patience during this long 
study and to Professor Brian Foss for his faith at the 
outset that the angle at which I was coming at this topic 
was likely to be a profitable one. I have alsoobenefitted 
immensely from the reactions of the many students who 
I have taught personality and abnormal psychology, at 
various levels, over the last six years. I am grateful 
for valuable conversations on this topic with Rev. Richard 
Harries; Rev. John Johnson; Dr. Mary Pickersgill; Rosalind 
Phillips; Dr. Robert West, Dennis Shutte and my wife Jill Chadwick. 
Professor Hermann Lenz of the University of Vienna kindly 
read the whole of Part One and made many valuable suggestions
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I will also be eternally grateful to Sylvia 
Greenwood for typing this work and for many discussions 
on its contents.
The research was helped by financial assistance 
from a British Medical Association Exhibition.
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PART ONE: Introduction and Case Studies
27
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
From Rocks to Psychotics
This is my second doctorate thesis and has, via 
a long and winding path, eventually developed from the first 
one. When I tell the reader that the previous thesis was 
in structural geology and rock mechanics (Chadwick 1971) 
and that this is on paranoia and delusional thinking, they
will no doubt be astonished that there could be any
connection at all between the two. To explicate the full 
history of how my previous research identity metamorphosed 
into my present one would take too long but some brief 
comments may be useful as they highlight the early hunches 
on which this investigation was partly based.
As the title of the former thesis reveals, my work 
on rock deformation was not only of a theoretical and
experimental nature but was also observational. During my
field research I realised that there were many biases and 
illusions in perception and thought which could distort 
a geologist's reports and lead to false inferences and 
interpretations. This insight led me to develop a research 
domain which I referred to as "geological psychology" - the 
psychological study of geological work. After early 
investigations on judgement and attentional biases 
(Chadwick 1971, 1972, 1975a, b), and on visual illusions in 
geology and related disciplines (1976b, 1977a, b, 1981, 1982)
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I began work on the interrelationships between memory and 
aesthetic judgement (Chadwick and Hughes 1980), the education 
of interpretation and thinking (1978a, b) and then, critically, 
on distortional influences on thought itself. One early 
road from this research led right back into geology (1976a, 
1977c), one eventually to perception psychology (1983) 
but the work on thought was the road that led me into the 
territory of my current research. One particular problem 
in cognitive psychology captivated me: "confirmation bias" 
(Wason I960; Wason and Johnson-Laird 1968; Mynatt, Doherty 
and Tweney 1977; Tweney, Doherty and Mynatt 1981). This is 
the bias to select and accept data that confirm one’s ideas 
and hypotheses at the expense of data that refute them, 
obviously a very common and pervasive phenomenon! It seemed 
to me that confirmation bias and high creativity often went 
together. Eysenck (1981, p.2) even suggests that in the 
early stages of the development of a paradigm we not only 
do but should preferentially seek confirmation - an idea 
I had often played with. Only in this way, I thought, can 
we elaborate something from the quivering vulnerable status 
of a hunch to that of an edifice to be challenged and 
metamorphosed into something more mature and of more 
general explanatory power. Even good ideas would die young, 
so I speculated, if our cognitive processes were designed 
so as to be dominated by refutation bias.
The popularity of Popperian falsification ideas 
(1959, 1963) in the 1970s therefore greatly troubled me.
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I battled with the literature on the philosophy of 
science and concluded that confirmation bias is a double­
sided coin. The positive side attracted me at the time.
On this side is persistence; steadiness of feeling and 
judgement; courage to stick with an idea to see how far 
it will go; faith and confidence in one’s own decisions 
and a moral sense that one should stand by one’s convictions. 
With hindsight we may see that we were wrong, but in the 
foresight situation our amount of information is less 
and limited. On the starting grid, so it seemed to me, 
the successful and the unsuccessful scientist might not be 
so very different. This attitude, which was never completely 
submerged, very nearly led, as we shall see, to my own 
destruction.
Between 1972 and 1981 my interest in geological 
matters was gradually eclipsed by those of a psychological 
nature; I moved away from geological psychology into the 
field of personality and abnormal psychology. As a 
counsellor between 1978 and 1981 I became impressed also 
by the negative side of the coin of confirmation bias: its 
role in psychological disorders. As is well known, the 
paranoid person holds onto their ideas very tenaciously, 
resists argument against them and selects and distorts 
input so as to confirm their paranoid ideation. They are 
also, and thus, very creative in the sphere of elaborating 
their delusional constructs. These people seemed to me 
to be almost personifications of confirmation bias and
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bore out the ideas of Bennett (1964) and Toulmin (1972) 
that rationality and irrationality should not only be 
assessed on the content of a belief but on the manner in 
which the belief is held. It therefore seemed worthwhile 
to investigate this phenomenon so as to give continuity to 
my research and to perhaps make a small contribution to the 
understanding of the puzzling phenomenon of delusional 
thinking.
As the reader will have noticed, in the mid-1970s 
I worked on visual illusions in perception, mainly in the 
context of scientific research. Just as the phenomenon of 
confirmation bias might, I thought, be relevant to the 
understanding of paranoia so it seemed might some of the 
principles I had obtained from my study of illusions be 
relevant to the understanding of delusions. Illusions 
represent the results of processes which, with certain 
stimulus configurations or in impoverished viewing 
conditions, can lead us astray but usually these processes 
give us a good anchoring in the world at a certain level 
of description. Delusions, so I speculated, might also 
represent the results of processes which usually enable us 
to make sense out of the world and predict accurately - and 
might even lead to valuable creative insights - but under 
certain conditions, such as impoverished external input, 
might lead us into self-defeating, chaotic or confused 
behaviour. This seemed a useful angle to pursue.
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In my counselling work I met a wide range of people 
but they happened to fall mostly into two main categories: 
those with sexual or gender identity problems (homosexuals, 
fetishists, transvestites, transsexuals and masochists) 
and recovering psychotic clients. Apart from the oft- 
encountered confirmation bias it also seemed to me that there 
were other connections and similarities in the mentation of 
these two very broad classes of people. Freud, of course, 
(1911) had previously suggested a connection between paranoia 
and unconscious homosexuality, but this now seems to have 
been largely misguided (see for example Hastings 1941; 
Rosenfeld 1949; Klein and Horwitz 1949; Thornton 1948).
One very unfortunate masochist, for example, said to me that 
he’d eventually reached the stage where he wanted his 
"madame" to control everything he did, the clothes he wore, 
the records he listened to, the cereals he ate. This total 
control is a sexual experience for the submissive yet such 
a longed-for situation is what some paranoids actually do 
believe is happening to them - via the medium of computers 
or hypnotic suggestion at-a-distance. The possibility thus 
presented itself that the whole of the paranoid psychotic 
episode may well be suffused through with a non-overt sexual 
masochism or involve disinhibition of masochistic tendencies. 
Such disinhibition has actually been suggested, by Arieti 
(1974).
Some of the delusional systems which my clients 
articulated to me were also of great interest in their own
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right. If only they had written them out as a story for 
publication they would in some instances have made good 
novels or films. Alas they lived them, believed them totally 
and in some cases were very nearly destroyed by them. 
Nevertheless there was clear evidence in these people of 
talent, perhaps displaced and unappreciated, but there.
Having come from research in the psychology of scientists 
I was therefore more impressed by the similarities between 
scientists and deluded psychotics in their creativity and 
style of thinking than the differences. Table One explicates 
this comparison between the two groups. My first impression 
was that scientists were creative people who were judged as 
’right’; the psychotics I dealt with were creative people 
who were judged ’wrong’. The label ’psychotic’ perhaps was 
socially referenced rather than brain referenced.
The reader will by now be getting some idea of 
’’where we are coming from’’. My academic training at 
university level was in psychology, geology, physics/ 
mechanics, physiology and mathematics; my applied work was, 
as we have seen, in helping people with sexual variations, 
gender identity disorders and psychoses. Clearly my 
background is very different to that of most researchers 
in personality, psychiatry and abnormal psychology and this 
thesis will reflect that. When I tell the reader also that 
I was at first destined at school to be a historian they 
will see that the present approach will attack the 
phenomenon of paranoia and delusional thinking in a multi-
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TABLE ONE: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THINKING IN
DELUSION AND IN SCIENCE
Delusional Thinking 
Thought is often distressing.
Style of thinking tends to distance 
person from all others.
Scientific thinking
Thought not usually distressing 
but certainly can be if conflicts 
greatly with orthodoxy e.g. Darwin, 
Galileo, Jung.
Style of thinking does tend to 
distance scientist off from family 
and friends but not colleagues.
Preoccupation with coincidences. Preoccupation with causality,
Evidence on which thought is based 
seems slender.
Thought often (but not always) 
held with complete certainty, 
a sense of utter and complete 
conviction.
Thought very preoccupying
Thought characterised by hasty 
speculation followed by 
tenatiously hanging onto 
hypothesis.
Thought associated with quite 
basic emotions such as hi^ anger, 
high fear and/or eroticism.
Thought often, but not always, 
seems implausible and unlikely.
Person cannot usually (but 
sometimes can) be argued out 
of belief.
Feelings of grandiosity sometimes 
to often accompany thought.
Evidence on which thought is based 
seems quite substantial.
Thought often (but not always) held 
with complete certainty, a sense of 
utter and complete conviction.
Thou^t very preoccupying.
Thought characterised by hasty 
speculation followed by tenatiously 
hanging onto hypothesis.
Thought associated with more subtle 
emotions such as wonder at the 
harmony of nature but attitude to 
research is usually high on 
aggression.
Thou^t usually seems plausible and 
even when unusual colleagues feel 
person "may have a point".
Person can hardly ever be argued out 
of belief.
Feelings of grandiosity occasionally 
to sometimes accompany thought.
continued
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TABLE ONE (CONTINUED)
Delusional thinking Scientific thinking
Person often not willing to 
talk about thought.
Talking about thought often 
causes considerable emotion to be 
expressed.
Person usually (but not always) 
willing to talk about thought.
Talking about thought often causes 
considerable emotion to be 
expressed.
Person gets angry with people who do Person gets angry with people who 
not accept the validity of their do not accept the validity of their 
thought/system. thougbt/system.
Thinking sometimes sounds like 
that of a mystic.
The delusion promotes a vigilant 
search for evidence and ideas that 
confirm it.
Thinking sometimes sounds like that 
of a mystic.
The hypothesis promotes a vigilant 
search for evidence and ideas that 
confirm it.
Person tends to regard discon­
firma tory evidence as invalid e.g. 
"you’re lying to me" or "you 
don’t understand me".
Person tends to regard discon- 
firmatory evidence as invalid, e.g. 
"your experiment was badly controlled/ 
conceived" , "just an isolated instance" 
or "you don’t understand my theory".
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dimensional, multi-faceted and rather different way to 
those previously articulated.
The Contextual Approach
Before we attack our problem area head on it is 
necessary to outline thé general "philosophy" I have adopted 
in this investigation and the reasons for it. In this section 
and the next ("Holism and reductionism") I may at times 
seem to be diverging some way away from my theme but I will 
gather the strands together before I embark on my first 
case study, that of David B. on page 50.
The first issue we must address is that of complexity. 
A field area of rocks of, say, thirty square miles, and a 
person are more comparable in complexity than are a billiard 
ball and a human being. Field areas, like people, and unlike 
billiard balls, cannot be isolated; cannot be understood 
out of context; cannot be taken apart and put back together 
again. Whenever one analyses a rock one always keeps its field 
context and the broader context of the area on a global 
scale, in mind. Every rock sample is like an intersection 
point in a vast intertwining network of relations. Thus 
to see a rock is to see beyond it.
Rather than taking the methods of classical Newtonian 
physics - which deals very well with the movements of billiard 
balls - as our model of how to approach the study of people, 
which is what usually is done, we will therefore borrow from 
the methods of geology and modern physics. There will be
36
no testing of "subjects" in soundproofed cubicles by an 
experimenter with a cold 1930s style "objective" mentality 
intent : on isolating one small aspect of the person for 
detailed analysis. We will "get in close" and funnel down 
from broad social, even spiritual, levels of understanding 
to narrow molecular brain processes and back up again; 
always keeping the context and the distorting role of the 
investigator (me), in view.
No geologist can map an area with a "distanced off" 
attitude of mind. Good field mapping means engrossing 
oneself in the rocks such that when one’s interpretation 
of an area has gelled, there is a sense of unity between 
oneself and it. Every outcrop "means" something, everything 
is part of a pattern, one does not "observe" the rocks, 
one "reads" them as if gripped by a good story. Movement and 
perception are fluent, there is a sense of harmony between 
inner and outer realms, the model and the reality, the 
psychological and the physical are one. Only when one has 
achieved this state is one confident enough to go into 
print. So I think it should be in psychology. Rather than 
adopting a solely analytical approach, my approach will be 
largely contextual. My training and research in perception 
showed me that we never perceive an object, only a pattern 
of relations in a context. To concentrate on parts or 
minutiae alone can never be worthwhile science.
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Holism and Reductionism
Classical Newtonian mechanics, the intellectual 
spirit of which has threaded its way through "classical" 
psychology, sees the world as made up of parts with forces 
interacting between those parts in a framework of absolute 
space and absolute time. These assumptions still dominate 
psychiatry and abnormal psychology. In this world view 
explanation is acheived by compartmentalising reality, 
seeing how the bits interact and hopefully from that being 
able to predict how the whole will work. This is the 
classical bottom-up style of science which is often claimed 
to give the truly "scientific" kinds of explanations. In 
this spirit people.have tried to explain paranoia and 
delusional thinking as due, for example, to left hemisphere 
overactivity (Gur 1978; Magaro 1981) or to overactivity in 
dopamine pathways in the limbic system and frontal cortex. 
These protagonists take their explanation to be at THE 
core level of understanding, as if an explanation at this 
level is THE most scientifically respectable one. The 
implication being that therapeutic intervention at this 
level, such as by the use of drugs, should be the treatment 
of choice.
Newtonian physics has however long since collapsed 
as an adequate theory of the nature of the material world 
and as a procedure for deeply understanding it. We need 
new assumptions on which to build our study of the seemingly 
disturbed mind.
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At the turn of the century there were said to 
be only two clouds on the horizon for the classical 
Newtonian physics of heat and light. Its incorrect 
predictions for a black body radiator and the invariance 
of the speed of light irrespective of the relative movement 
of the measuring device. Lord Kelvin predicted in 1900 
that these would soon be resolved. They were, the 
explanation of black body radiation seeded quantum physics 
(Planck 1913) and'the explanation of the invariance of 
the speed of light was a core concept in the creation 
of relativity theory (Einstein 1905, 191&J. With these 
two theories Newtonian physics collapsed back into being 
a special case useful for predicting consequences at speeds 
slow compared to the speed of light and for bodies large 
compared to the size of the atom.
Whereas Newtonian physics is particularistic and 
isolationist both quantum mechanics and relativity theory 
emphasise undivided wholeness (Capra 1975, 1983; Bohm 
1985). Never is this undivided wholeness of the world, 
a way of looking which has been critical in the development 
of this thesis, more clearly demonstrated than in the 
experimental work seeded by the so-called Einstein-Podolsky- 
Rosen thought experiment (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 
1935). The basic proposition of Neils Bohr, one of the 
fathers of quantum theory, is that the quantum is indivisible 
Einstein and his colleagues, who did not accept the 
probabilistic nature of quantum theory and its status 
as a complete theory, argued that if this was so then
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inferences of very strange processes were goingtto be 
necessary. The modern version of the paradox is best 
illustrated by a two particle system (see Capra 1983, 
pp.343-346 and Zukav 1980, pp.299-306). If this system 
is split into two and one of the particles given a certain 
spin in one direction, say clockwise, then if the quantum 
is indivisible the other particle, distant from it, should 
instantaneously spin anticlockwise - as the total spin 
of the system must be zero. Einstein argued that this 
violates the principle of "local causes". The spin induced 
on particle 1 at location A can surely have no effect 
on the spin of the distant, may be very distant, particle 2 
at location B! (The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen or EPR effect). 
Einstein pointed out that nothing in a space-like system 
can travel faster than light and for particle 2 to "receive" 
a counter-clockwise spin instantaneously it would have 
to be subject to a signal that travelled at superluminal 
(faster-than-light) speed. Einstein later said (in 1949) 
that one can only escape the conclusion that quantum theory 
is incomplete by assuming that the measurement of 
particle 1 telepathically changes that of particle 2 or 
by denying that spatially separated systems are independent. 
He did not like either alternative.
The experiment itself, necessary to decide between 
Einstein and Bohr has fairly recently been done (Aspect, 
Dalibard and Roger 1982).* Bohr wins, Einstein loses. 
Spatially separated systems are not independent. This 
experimental result essentially destroys the particularistic
*See also Basil Hiley New Scientist, v.97 No.1339, 6th January 1983, 
pp.17-19 on this experiment and reports in The Times, January 13th 1983 
(page 2 column 8) and The Sunday Times, February 20th 1983 (page 14 
(column 7).
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view of the world. (It also creates an intellectual 
atmosphere whereby telepathy, although far from being 
explained, ceases to be the bete noire of phenomena that 
science has to account for.)
The resolution of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen 
thought experiment in favour of a Bohrian view of undivided 
wholeness creates a completely different theme within 
which science can operate. In this theme separability 
is an illusion and particularistic explanation cannot 
claim to be the crowning most prestigious and respectable 
ones for us to seek.
In this thesis we will adopt the view that reality 
inclusive of people is an interconnected whole. Related 
to this we will seek correspondence between different 
levels of analysis within a contextual frame but argue 
that no level of understanding or language of investigation 
is primary.
As in geology, a rock sample can be taken into 
the laboratory and squeezed, crushed, chemically analysed, 
dated etc., analysis has its place. But the dates and/or 
chemical analyses mean nothing out of a field context 
and may even be questioned on contextual evidence as 
unreliable or invalid. No-one has the last word, everything 
is negotiated via shifting up and down the phenomenal 
scale.
Hence, to return, at last, to psychology, we will 
not rest content with our questionnaire scores, our
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physiological recordings or our experimental results. 
Everything must be embedded in a whole and seen in the 
light of wider issues. We will be holistic - looking 
at how more global higher processes affect lower ones 
(top-down); within-level, thereby looking at the development 
of a person’s processes and products over time and 
reductionistic - seeing how processes at brain or intra­
psychic level may structure their interaction with, and 
in, the world (bottom-up). We will only put down our 
pen when we have a coherent story, a feeling of unity, 
a feeling of at-oneness with the phenomenon.
The Positive View
One of the unfortunate consequences of the analytical 
reductionist view in psychoanalysis, behaviourism and 
cognitive psychology has been a certain negativism, a 
certain coldness.
Freud’s penchant for explaining ’’downwards’’ went 
hand in hand with an assumption that the negative underlay 
the positive. Hate was older than love, repressed 
homosexual lust beneath same-sex friendship, selfishness 
behind altruism. It has created in many people an attitude 
whereby anything negative in someone else is accepted 
for what it is but anything positive has to be reduced 
to neutral or malign language.
Similarly, reductionism and the ’’objective’’ 
mentality has created cynicism throughout the western
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world for religion, mysticism and spirituality. Neuro­
scientists in this tradition have related religiosity 
(Bear and Fedio 1977) and mysticism (Geschwind 1978) to 
right hemisphere temporal lobe pathology. The implication 
has been that such experiences exist "only in the person's 
mind", are totally subjective and have no objective 
reference. We will find in this thesis reports which 
bring such an implication very much into question and 
which raise the possibility that the psychotic state may 
involve "access" to domains, nonetheless real, denied 
to those who are too insensitive to experience them.
One can see the effects of the negative bias very 
clearly in recent research in schizophrenia which is 
dominated by investigations in search of "the schizophrenic 
deficit". There is little search for the "schizophrenic 
credit" . Exceptions here include the papers by La Russo 
(1978) on paranoid schizophrenics’ high sensitivity to 
non-verbal cues and by Keefe and Mogaro (1980) on the 
high creativity of non-paranoid schizophrenics compared 
to normal controls. Kar (1967) also found a non-predicted 
superiority in the schizophrenic group in veridicality 
of perception of the Muller-Lyer illusion.
The mechanistic reductionist view, thanks partly 
to Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709-1751) through his 
book "L’homme Machine" has also fostered an ideal of 
independence, selfishness and hedonism. Economic 
calculations are still done on the assumption that people 
are out to "maximise profit margins". Mechanism and
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objective psychology induces the belief that Man is an 
island. This is an inevitable consequence of an isolationist 
rather than a contextualist Weltanschuung.
A contextual view however which stresses inter­
dependence and holism leads in quite a different direction. 
Rather than locking us up in our own mental processes 
it puts us into the world of relations. We punch through 
the membrane surrounding us through a Freudian idealistic 
intrapsychically dominated psychology into the total flux 
of reality. In this thesis therefore we will dare to 
look at the positive side of the psychotic, at "the 
superconscious" (in ratio with the attitude of the artist Malevich) as well 
as the unconscious and at the spiritual nature of experience 
as well as at CNS pathways.
Murder
It is commonly the case, at least in fiction, 
that the detective in search of a killer has three things 
in mind: Motive, Opportunity and Weapon. Although we 
will look at the positive side of the psychotic, paranoia 
and paranoid schizophrenia are nonetheless killers or 
at least sometimes can be. We are therefore also in the 
hunt for how they strike or suffuse themselves through 
a person's mind.
It is my belief that for a person to suffer from 
such debilitating experiences as cause them to be diagnosed 
as "deluded" or "paranoid", there has to be: Motive,
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Precipitating event (Opportunity) and Capacity (Weapon).
It is useless to study or search for the qualitative aspects 
of a precipitating event using experimental methods.
Our method of attack must suit the target. One does not 
dig for coal with a computer or hit the moon with even 
a powerful peashooter. The experimental method however 
relevant to understanding capacity and, related to this, 
the quantitative side of motive, and we will use it to 
that end. For the nature of the motive and the precipitating 
event we will use case study methods. These will also 
give us some insight into capacity and will form the context 
within which certain experimentally derived results can 
be assessed.
The case studies, to which we now turn, will 
emphasise to the reader both the uniqueness of every 
person who suffers from delusional thinking as well as 
certain family resemblances between them.
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CHAPTER TWO
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES 
AND THE CASE OF DAVID B.
Traditional therapists and counsellors usually 
obtain their information from their so-called "patients" 
or "clients" in an isolated laboratory kind of situation. 
Personal Construct Psychologists even refer to the therapy 
session as taking place in a protected laboratory. In 
psychoanalytic therapy this approach is taken to the extreme. 
The person lies on the same couch for session after session 
for a carefully predetermined length of time and cannot 
even see the therapist while they are recounting their 
thoughts. This all I think stems from classical psychologists' 
great love of somewhow standardising their methods and 
perhaps from a wish not to get in too close lest they 
become lost in the phenomena they are studying. 1930s 
style philosophy of science still reigns supreme even 
in the most modern and "liberated" of these people. Distance 
has to be put between observer/therapist/experimenter 
and the 'subject' of their study.
Some experimental psychopathologists, so the grapevine 
has it, never even meet the people whose scores and data 
make up the roughage of their published papers. This 
is rather like a geologist doing geology by sitting in 
a room and having field workers bring hand specimens to 
them with little comment on where they came from - unless 
perhaps they are markedly unusual. They would certainly
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find patterns in their data, even very regular ones, after 
all most rocks" are made up silicate minerals and can be 
distinguished from other rocks such as carbonates, but 
clearly the approach is nonsense and would tell us only 
the very broadest and most general characteristics of 
the earth's crust of very little theoretical or practical 
relevance. The science of geology would never have 
progressed to its present status if this had been its 
method .
Our case study approach will therefore be very 
different. In trying to understand and help the people 
I have known who have suffered from paranoia and delusional 
thinking my "method" has been to mingle my life with theirs. 
There have been no set times and no set places for interaction 
between us. They are not "patients" or "clients" or 
"subjects", they are friends. In this study we are blurring 
the boundaries between befriending and counselling. The 
number of people involved in the case study approach has 
therefore had to be small - seven in fact (inclusive of 
my own report) although the material on Simon T. is very 
brief. These people also took part in the experimental 
study. This gives us a golden opportunity to see their 
experimental data in the context of their total selves 
and total life situation. It will give us some very 
interesting insights into the validity and meaning of 
this data. Most experimental psychologists bemoan that 
most of the really interesting sources of variance are 
relegated to the error term in the statistical analysis.
In this thesis we hope that this will not be so.
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A qualifying note however needs to be sounded.
I found in my counselling work that I was unable to handle 
or establish rapport with extremely talkative or manic 
clients; those who were very low in self-disclosure and/or 
those (very few) of puritanical bent. The single case 
study volunteers were tacitly accepted on the basis that 
they were not disposed in those ways.
The volunteers nonetheless cover a demographically 
wide spectrum. Although they are all young (<35 years) 
they range from the very non-academic, working class,
David B. to the middle class educated Alison; from scientist 
and economist Shafiq to artists Chris and Alana J.
David B ., Chris and Shafiq had both parents living, Alison 
and Simon T. neither and Alana J. one. Three were working 
(Alana J., Simon T. and Alison) and three were unemployed 
(David B. , Shafiq and Chris). In addition, David B. and 
Shafiq were extraverts, Alana J, Alison and Simon T 
ambiverts and Chris an introvert. All had one thing in 
common: for them their delusions were their "illness".
To obtain accounts of the suffering that these 
people have experienced has been very difficult. At various 
times they have all said that they will write about their 
"episodes", provide me with accounts of them, but none 
has ever got around to doing so. The experience is too 
painful and to write it down requires that one relive 
it. No-one can ask them to do this. The memories and 
style of thinking must not be brought back in full fluency
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lest they reactivate the psychotic state. Hence the accounts 
I have collected are the products of fragments told to me 
at different times, sometimes years apart. Most of the 
people concerned here I have known for up to seven years.
This has been a long project. The number of hours I have 
spent talking with each of them is incalculable, it must 
run into thousands. To help and understand David B. for 
example, who is the first case study, I once went to live 
with him for a week and discussed things often walking 
around South London. Discussions with Shafiq , case two, 
would sometimes start at 9 p.m. and go on, if necessary, 
until 4 a.m., walking around a kitchen table, heads (alas) 
down, consuming tea and cigarettes in great quantity, 
digging, generalising, joking, up and down, left and right 
in "mind space".
Time and time again I have said to these people:
"What did your psychiatrist at the hospital say when you 
told them that?" and back would come the reply "Oh God 
I haven't told them THAT!" or words to that effect. Really 
the traditional helping agencies know nothing about these 
people. Traditional helpers are, through shortage of 
time, resources and people put in the situation of geologists 
who map by helicopter rather than geologists who pour 
over the area on foot for years. Little of much value 
can be gained from such methods.
Traditional case studies of psychotic patients 
and their families are usually very negatively toned. 
Sometimes this can be extreme (e.g. Arthur and Schumann
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1970). They are rather like Krafft-Ebbing's descriptions 
of "sexual psychopathy" (1886), emphasising weakness, 
pathology and degeneration in sexual variants. Havelock 
Ellis (e.g. 1936, 1942) changed this in the realm of sex, 
describing the people he studied in far more positive 
terms e.g. "a manual worker... mentally bright, though 
not highly educated, a keen sportsman, and in general 
a good example of an all-around healthy Englishman^;
"B.O., English, aged thirty-five, missionary abroad... 
has never had any definite homosexual relationships although 
he has always been devoted to boys"; "S.W., aged sixty- 
four, English, musical journalist" etc. etc. As Celia 
Haddon (1982) points out,this, in its day, was very 
courageous. We will, in a somewhat diluted form, use 
Ellis's approach here and try to see beyond the slime 
of conflict and illness. Rather than finding that such 
an exercise is contrived and alien we will see that to 
present a positive view of the psychotic is, in fact, 
easy and refreshing.
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David B.
I first met David B in November 1979, when he 
was 23. He was recovering from his second episode at 
the time (the first one was in 1975) and was rather troubled 
I have often been told that I look like a policeman because 
of my boyish face and love of blue shirts. David B also 
commented on this and said he found it disturbing. 
Persecution by the police was a central feature of his 
delusions.
David looked tall (6’ 3"), tough and hard. Were 
it not for very bad acne he would have been a handsome 
young man. He had a very attractive smile and when he 
did smile, which was often, he bore a marked resemblance 
to David Bowie, hence his pseudonym.
I saw him as intelligent. In a rather Burtian 
fashion I once guessed his I.Q. to be about 120. He was 
lively and amusing and all of us who knew him agreed that 
deep down he had "a very nice nature", and that at his 
best he was "a good laugh".
Like all of the people in these studies he was 
a person of many opposites. His conversation was very 
sexually oriented. At first I took this to be in part 
because of my great interest in the subject, however when 
he was with his closest friend, who we shall call Ash, 
it became even more so. His language was often sexist 
in the extreme. He would occasionally refer to women
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as "meat" for example. In stark contrast to this however 
he would often go through periods when he read the Bible 
every night with an attitude of great devotion. He would 
mix spiritual sensitivity with tough mindedness in such 
phrases as: "He’s a bastard The Devil, I hate him!"
Although he smoked heavily, at least forty a day, he would 
not do so while Bible reading.
When he was in hospital after his third episode 
he visited the chapel regularly and once read The Lesson. 
During this time he said he felt close to God, even at 
one with Him, and that for a moment he actually was Jesus. 
(He interpreted this [well, I thought] as a means of 
explaining all the good feelings he had towards people). 
There was no doubt that David’s religion was a great source 
of strength to him, it helped to prevent relapse and 
promoted recovery.
Speaking more generally now: I found it difficult
to probe deeply in conversations with him. His (usually 
light) statements made on different occasions would often 
contradict one another. Added to this he would often 
deny that he had said certain things, especially deeper 
things, or that he had "really meant" them. For years 
this man’s conversational "slipperiness" and his 
inconsistencies left me and everyone who knew him totally 
bewildered. Psychiatrists just asked him how he was 
feeling and plied him with drugs and EOT. Many people 
said of him that his conversation was "just silly", 
"meaningless" etc. Although he looked like a hard man.
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the process of understanding him was rather like chasing 
a butterfly. Nonetheless I loved him and perhaps because 
of this he once said I had a magical effect on him to 
the good. (Paradoxically he accused me, in the same 
breath, of being The Devil because of this).
David had a younger sister who was also diagnosed 
as schizophrenic but an elder sister who was quite 'normal' 
(a teacher married with children) and a twin sister, also 
'normal', married with three children. Their mother was 
a lovely warm and caring woman who rather spoilt them 
all. David's father had been absent for several years 
during his childhood. He had walked out on his wife.
David found him rather irritating: "He's driving me crazy
Peter!!" he would often say. I could not however see 
any really punitive intent on his father's part. The 
father's attitude to the younger sister was also very 
protective , he was not a generally cold or dominating 
man. David's main complaint seemed to be about his
father's incessant chatter; he would never let him be 
and would continually try to jog him into doing things 
that he didn't feel well enough to do. But these were 
innocuous and quite reasonable things like trying to 
get a job, getting up at a reasonable hour and helping 
with the washing up. None of the father's behaviours 
seemed to be particularly malign. David was never "shown 
up" by him and all his hostility to him was very much 
on the surface. Both parents, despite their perfectly 
human limitations, were consistent and caring. David
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was not dominated or caught in double binds or Catch 22 
situations. Although it could be said that he was punished 
and criticised yet overprotected at the same time, this 
was no more so than millions of other young people living 
at home all over the country.
David also did not lack self-assertiveness. He 
was not under his mother's thumb. Indeed once when we 
were talking at his home he said to her: "Right, leave 
us now Mother". Whereupon she dutifully and rather 
apologetically got up and walked out of the room. In 
fact David's biggest problems at home were those brought 
about by his own laziness (he never once even washed up) 
and those stemming from his difficulties in hiding his 
store of soft pornographic magazines from his father:
"He'd go MAD if he found them!" David's attitude to his 
father seemed to me to be out of all proportion to the 
man's actual portentousness. To be able to write a story 
about a person's personality one has to see them in many 
different contexts. Having seen him with many people,
David was undoubtedly most troubled in the company of 
much older men. He had played truant at school and had 
been put on probation. Teachers and the police unnerved 
him. He also showed much rebelliousness to older male 
psychiatrists and was regarded as an uncooperative patient 
when in hospital. This aggressiveness to men was coupled 
with an expectation of, and fear of, punishment from them. 
He feared violence because of his complete awareness of 
his own hostility. However, although David looked tough
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and did not lack self-assertiveness he was not a physical 
fighter. He had been a follower of Chelsea for many years 
but when his friends had taken to beating people up for 
fun he had broken off with them. While he liked, to a 
moderate, but not extreme, extent, the show of hardness, 
he was afraid of overt violence and genuinely repulsed 
by it.
He was most fluent when talking about sex, popular 
music and his dreams. He often used to say that his problems 
would be completely solved if he went to live on a desert 
island. Once while in hospital he escaped by taxi in 
his pyjamas to an airport to "get away" with this in mind.
He had the dream of one day being a pop idol but had no 
clear idea of how he was going to achieve this. It would 
be easy to look for pathology in all this; there must 
however be thousands of young people in this country with 
similar dreams.
David craved mental pleasure. He described his 
life as boring; he wanted excitement. This he got through 
his music, which he would play for hours on end, through 
pretty girls in magazines, through visits to Soho with 
Ash and through the stimulation of an endless stream of 
colourful fantasies and cigarettes. David essentially 
tried to keep himself simmering. He always needed thrills 
NOW, to get a job to obtain the money to get more thrills 
later was too much.
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His conversation was bright and colourful although 
tangential, at times crude, at other times odd. Always 
there was this self-stimulation. He confessed to me on 
a walk that he was bisexual and would gladly go to bed 
with David Bowie. He felt guilty about masturbating, 
surely the neighbours would hear him. Although there 
was a shallow side to him he could write quaint poetry 
and listen with an attentive ear to other people's problems 
(He was also capable at times of walking and sprinting 
at remarkable speed - something I found out to my cost!).
David's personality cannot be understood fully 
through the use of questionnaires. Basically he saw 
himself as a "good working class lad". His perception 
of himself as working class structured his behaviour and 
thoughts far more than did cortical or limbic arousal 
levels. Because of this he followed certain implicit 
working class "instructions" or "rules" such as "play 
snooker", "know a lot about football"; "don't use long 
words"; "don't be intellectual"; "be practical not 
academic"; "don't do women's work"; "don't be squeamish"; 
"say 'Fuck' a lot"; "value women for their looks/bodies"; 
"read The Sun or The Mirror"; "don't go to the opera, 
ballet or theatre"; "be a 'good lad'"; and so on. When 
I discussed this interpretation of him with him he whole­
heartedly agreed: "That's right Peter! Good! Good !"
He added that there were more rules that both he and his 
friends of old had always followed such as "Look and don't 
look away'.'.
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David was very much a product of this class and 
was good at following its rules. He used to be a very 
talented snooker player before his episode intervened; 
was a devoted football fan; never did "women's work" (hence 
his oft-mentioned washing up problem); and talked rough, 
tough and crude - much to the disgust of Alison who we 
will describe later. His high P score of 10 on the EPQ 
(Eysenck and Eysenck 1975) also reflected his tough-minded 
mentality.
David therefore has to be seen as embedded in 
a fairly average caring family within a working class 
network of rules and guidelines. In the experimental 
and psychometric study his quite high scores of 16 on 
Extraversion (out of 21), 16 on Impulsiveness (out of 
24) and 11 on Venturesomeness (out of 17) also have to 
be seen in this context. The working class favour the 
cheerful, assertive, extravert, the spontaneous and the 
warm and friendly. David was all of these things. This 
being the case, what went wrong?
After trying, unsuccessfully, to fit several extant 
theories to his case a promising insight occurred to me.
If a thought emerged in my mind to the effect that the 
police were monitoring and persecuting me I would 
immediately counter it with three propositions:
1. I don't deserve it.
2. I'm not that important.
3. People wouldn't go to all that trouble on 
account of me.
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To understand psychotic mentation we must invert the 
reasoning. Then it becomes:
1 . I DO deserve it.
2. I AM that important.
3. People WOULD go to all that trouble on account 
of m e .
Statement one implies guilt, statement two: arrogance 
and/or selfishness, statement three: perhaps that one 
has, in lay language, been "spoilt". Let us look at these 
interpretations in turn with reference to David, bearing 
in mind that they obviously are not entirely independent.
Guilt
It would probably occur to the man in the street 
that anyone who thinks they are being persecuted probably 
has a guilty conscience. The guilty man feels that he
deserves to be betrayed. Yet apart from Freud's
concentration as the effects of the guilt surrounding 
homosexual impulses, it does not figure very prominently 
in current theories of paranoia. (See for example, the 
reviews by Arthur (1964) and Winters and Neale (1983)).
There was no doubt that David had a heavy conscience. 
At times it felt that one could almost "see" it in his face as 
a higher order property of his facial expression. When 
I went to live with him for a week this was because I 
felt he needed support as he seemed to be developing 
incipient hallucinations (see Figure 1) involving occasional
voices of people in the house next door. (He was living
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FIGURE 1
Auditory experience
Sensory input
Supplementation of 
input by higher 
processesVery clear \ 
hearing
Hallucination
Hallucinations can be construed as existing on a continuum - 
as also suggested by Strauss ( 1969 ). David’s ’’incipient 
hallucinations” were mid-way between very clear hearing 
(at left) determined largely by sensory input and outright 
hallucinations (at right) determined entirely by 
supplementation or Top-Down addition. The phonemic 
restoration effect (Warren 1970) where people actually 
hear missing phonemes when the gap in input is embedded 
in the context of a sentence lies to the left in the above 
spectrum. A continuum model suggests that the study of 
hallucinations should be part, not only of psychiatry, 
but of the psychology of auditory processing and hence 
should be researched in cognitive psychology units.
A cognitive model of hallucinations also construing them 
in this way has been suggested by Horowitz (1975).
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alone at the time in a council flat). He was concerned 
that they were following and commenting on his actions.
By the end of the week this had passed but during it 1 
saw a frightened man preoccupied with self-monitoring.
His crudity, obsessiveness with sex and guilt 
about masturbation he would regularly purge with his Bible 
reading - although it would be wrong, and cheap,to imply 
that this was his sole motive. Nonetheless it gave him 
some peace, some forgiveness. His working class guidelines 
brought out in him extraversion and warmth but the thin 
end of the wedge was that they made him see the world 
as a tough place where everybody’s business was everybody 
else’s business. David felt that he both deserved and 
expected to be betrayed.
Arrogance
"I’m the champ!", "I’m the Greatest" he would 
often say with a beaming grin. Yet this superiority feeling 
clearly concealed some deep worries about his own adequacy.
1 have said that 1 had estimated his IQ to be 120. How 
wrong 1 was. The Mill Hill Vocabulary Test revealed to 
me what hours of talk had not. When David took this in 
June 1983 as part of the experimental and psychometric 
study he scored a mere 3 out of 33 on the Definitions 
part of the test and 7 out of 33 on the slightly easier 
Synonyms. He did not even know the meaning of such words 
as "Provide", "Formidable" or "Anonymous". 1 started 
to see why his conversation involved so many sudden changes
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of topic and why it was so tangential. Previously 1 had 
naively put this down to being a symptom of mild thought 
disorder. It was nothing of the kind. David would ignore 
what one said to him and would change topic brusquely 
because he simply could not understand some of the words 
he was being presented with. By superb cunning he had 
kept his ignorance concealed from me for three years!
By keeping my sentences very simple and checking with
him that he understood even mildly uncommon words, such
as "adjusted", it was possible to keep him "on track"
quite easily. It became clear that he was fluent on sex
and popular music because his factual knowledge and vocabulary
were adequate to the topics. David's "thought disorder"
had evaporated.
His only two jobs had been one working in a garage 
for a few weeks and a job as a messenger, again short­
lived. 1 subsequently discovered that he could not compose 
and write a decent, legible letter, even when quite strongly 
motivated (it was to an attractive girl). His arithmetic 
was abysmal yet he aspired to be an office worker. David 
completely lacked confidence in anything which seemed 
to require academic skill. My experimental work, as he 
knew, involved thinking tests and it took him a year to 
summon up the courage to participate in it. (Even then 
1 had to pay him £5 to coax him). In this light it is 
clear that his reported stress score of zero at the 
beginning of the experiment (on the MacKay et al.
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inventory (MacKay, Cox, Burrows and Lazzerini 1978)) 
is nonsense.
He must have known that in the world of work he 
was inadequate. In his relationships with girls, other 
than prostitutes, he was also unsuccessful. To compensate 
for all this he was, as he put it, the Champ. He would 
be "Number One in the Top Forty in three years!" Beautiful 
girls would beseech him to go to bed with them. He would 
be a millionaire. He would retire on a desert island.
As Anthony Storr has said ( 1970, p.130) and as Stekel 
also often used to assert (much to Freud’s chagrin) anyone 
who is at the centre of a persecutory plot must at least 
be a person of consequence.*
David’s arrogance also reflected itself in the 
confidence he had in his beliefs and ideas. One could 
easily imagine him holding a delusional system with utter 
conviction. This was manifested in the experimental work 
in his subjective confidence levels in his judgements 
of out-of-focus slides. (The Slide Viewing Task we will 
discuss later). Indeed to compute his B Index (McNichol 
1972, pp. 123-129) on this task, which is a measure of 
a bias to risk or caution, 1 had to extrapolate his data 
far beyond the range of confidence level categories 
available! He was clearly a very risky thinker.
*This centrality of the self, so common in deluded 
psychotics, could be referred to as The Medius Complex, 
after the Latin "medius" which, of course, means "centre".
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Spoilt?
We already have said that David’s mother was probably 
no more spoiling than millions of others. She certainly 
had a tendency to dote and indulge. David would be able 
to lie in bed until 4 pm; he would pay no rent out of 
his sickness benefit; he could pretty nearly always borrow 
money from his parents for cigarettes and records; all 
his meals were provided; he could come and go as he pleased. 
Nothing very much was asked of him and certainly not by 
his mother. Now although this level of freedom was offered, 
most children would probably not utilise it to the full.
They would try and get a job, if only part-time, help 
a little around the house, pay something towards the rent. 
David did none of these things. As we have seen in his 
behaviour with his mother, he selfishly behaved as if 
he was the King of the house who deserved to be waited 
on hand and foot despite the fact that he was, when at 
home, totally dependent on his parents and the state for 
his entire existence. He even borrowed money from his 
younger sister. Just as he expected that people at home 
would go to endless trouble for him (and they did) so 
he expected, in his delusions, that people in the world 
would go to endless trouble because of him. And in psychosis 
they did.
The onset of psychosis
David’s delusions were seeded, 1 think, on veridically 
perceived events. This is something we will meet many
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times. His first trouble apparently began when he over­
heard some people in the room above him plotting a burglary. 
Not all flats are well insulated in the Fulham area and 
it is impossible to obtain insurance cover against burglary 
in this part of London from some companies. (My wife 
and 1 have been the victims of one successful and one 
attempted burglary in six years). Hence although the 
average overworked psychiatrist would probably just lazily 
say that David was "obviously hallucinating" 1 am not 
so sure. His delusional system was elaborated from this 
singular event. The potential burglars were then out 
to "shut him up". The police thought that "he was in 
on it". The delusion did not grow largely intrapsychically 
as Freud would have us believe. It expanded using 
innumerable events in the external world - particularly 
comments from people in buses and shops which pushed it 
in directions that were quite unpredictable on an 
intrapsychic theory. Always David found comments and 
events which "fitted" his persecutory system. If he saw 
one person twice in the same day they were tailing, 
monitoring, or plotting against him. His worse fear was 
that they were going to kill or shoot him. He kept feeling, 
perhaps through enhanced similarity perception, that he 
was seeing the same people in vastly different places.
People in a football crowd or a bus would somehow be 
"connected". He saw people in public places as "all in 
with each other" and, to his distaste, liking to be that 
way. Via being connected they would, at worst, be plotting -
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against him. As well as perceiving the social world as 
a unity he also suffered disturbances in his sense of 
time. Time itself would somehow be "going too fast" and 
then "too slow".
David’s personality structure may have been 
influenced by the absence of his father during most of 
his childhood. It made him like to be and expect to be 
at the focus. His non-verbal behaviour in the company 
of older men seemed to almost scream the message, "Shut 
up!! 1 want to be the centre of attention!!" It made 
him expect people to go to great trouble on his account 
and it structured an expectation, almost a need, for 
punishment. What he feared he also longed for (Freud) 
and what he longed for (certainty) he also feared (rather 
like Lord Arthur Savile in Oscar Wilde’s short story).
As we have previously emphasised, his delusional system 
itself was not something that grew entirely in his mind 
while he sat in a room staring at a blank wall. Soon 
after "the overhearing" he feared that the people concerned 
might know that he was aware of their intentions. 
Coincidentally he then noticed when someone in the street 
gave him a long stare or had a slightly threatening 
expression when they looked at him. Eventually his own 
expression became somewhat apprehensive and attracted 
stares and comments, which further fed his proto-delusion. 
It seems that via small increments like this, in the early 
days of his episode, a state of vigilance and escalating 
self-consciousness was set up which sustained and fed
65
his evolving delusional system in a positive feedback 
manner.
In the middle of his third psychotic episode 1 
had the opportunity to see his facial expression. It 
broadcasted intense fear and hostility. To say he looked 
haunted would be a massive understatement. Indeed his face 
was of such a form that he could not have failed to attract 
attention from anyone within thirty or forty yards of him.
To speculate: it could have been that his 
agitated state may have funneled down his attention only to 
data relevant to this central delusional preoccupation.
As Broadbent (1971, p.433) and M.W. Eysenck (1982) have 
argued, high arousal promotes search of and retrieval from 
dominant sources of information. In this sense David’s 
confirmation bias promoted enhanced agitation which further 
magnified the confirmation bias itself.
These cognitive processes however have to be seen 
in the context of the part they had to play in David’s 
psychic economy. There was, 1 think, a denied need for 
punishment, a kind of disinhibition of masochism. David 
scanned the world and built what he found into a massive 
instrument for his own punishment whilst consciously 
rebelling and trying to evade every psychic blow. His own 
personality structure was, as we have seen, a rich soil 
in which a delusion could grow. He had motive and 
precipitating event. He also had capacity. To entertain
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the idea of a city-wide "pseudocommunity", as Cameron 
(1943, 1951) would call it, intent only on one's
persecution has the flavour of mania. David B. always had 
a tendency even when between psychotic episodes, for larger- 
than-life fantasies. Like all the people we will report 
who suffered from delusions he singularly lacked the ability 
to "modulate". He was either preoccupied with the 
stimulating and fantastic or he was depressed, apathetic 
and lethargic. He would build his father up into an ogre 
or dismiss him as a trivial irritation. He would want to 
"paint the town" but at other times to curl up in seclusion. 
Like many a creative writer there was a definite lack of 
cultivation in the middle ground. However to be able 
to entertain his intense brightly coloured level of fantasy 
suggests a certain special capacity denied to more mundane 
people (but perhaps not to those who pen science fiction 
stories ) .
He was also very creative in the "fluency" sense 
of the term, being a reasonable amateur poet and an 
entertaining, if at times rather bewildering, conversationalist 
1 can well imagine his thoughts racing and leaping at every 
passer-by’s glance or at the hooting of the horn of every 
passing car or bus. In this respect his rather low scores 
on the fluency tests in the experimental part of the 
investigation are, 1 think, highly suspect. David was at 
his best when given the full run of the field. If he could 
go almost anywhere he would go there fast. Any slight
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constraints - as were given in this part of the experiment - 
clearly impeded him greatly. Hence his true retrieval 
speed was vastly underestimated.*
We have briefly looked at a number of aspects of 
David B . , from his spiritual side to social class affects, 
family background and cognitive processes. All fit into 
a story which is the best 1 can construct regarding this 
exceedingly evasive man. David, like Shafiq who we deal with 
next, presents us with few clear glimpses. To understand 
him is rather like interpreting a field area in which there 
is only a hundred clean outcrops rather than a thousand. 
Psychoanalysts, in their wisdom, will easily be able to 
read between the lines above and see areas that provoke 
further, much further, thought. Although it would be 
possible for a geologist to infer, from a hundred outcrops, 
a wealth of complex structures, refolding and metamorphic 
episodes, faults and igneous intrusions in the rocks 
beneath, it would be appalling geology. My approach has been 
to construct the simplest interpretation possible given 
the data. To complexify it would take us into the realm 
of pure unconstrained speculation.
I broke off with David B. in 1985. I felt he was 
eventually going around in circles in his life, making
*His verbal creativity on the word association tests - both 
variants of Mednick's Remote Associates Test (e.g. Mednick 
1962) was much higher than his vocabulary score would ever 
have predicted. This led me to seriously question an 
assumption made early in the investigation that these 
tests tapped creativity under more "constrained" conditions 
than did the fluency and uses tests.
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no move to improve his lot, his arrogance was becoming 
tiresome, his conversation repetitive and his aggressiveness 
was becoming irritating. It seemed to me that he needed 
both a sharp jolt to his life and to realise the consequences 
of his behaviour. Nonetheless 1 retain a deep affection 
for him. Despite his sexist jokes and language, his often 
threatening behaviour and his manic fantasies 1 somehow 
feel he was being most true to his real self when he was 
sat on his bed reading the Good Book.
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CHAPTER THREE 
SHAFIQ
In attempting to interpret Shafiq we face a mammoth 
task. Here we have a young man with a remarkably active 
mind who showed resistance to all forms of help from 
conventional agents and who was determined to take his own 
path in life wherever that might lead.
I knew Shafiq for five years from early in 1980, 
when he was 23, to 1985. He was a person of exceptional 
ability gaining A levels in Mathematics, Physics and 
Chemistry (a B and two Cs), after only six months of private 
study. He had been to university to study engineering but 
dropped out at the end of the first year when he started to 
have paranoid thoughts. His father had finally had him 
admitted to hospital when, after a period of disturbed and 
aggressive behaviour at home, (he had hit his father), 
he had asked one of his sisters to strip.
To his social workers Shafiq presented an evasive, 
jocular and superficial front, parrying and laughing off 
criticisms, deflecting conversation and continually raising 
seeming irrelevancies. In groups he would apparently take 
off in obscure directions and react with great glee when 
challenged by irate or confused participants. He presented 
a classic picture of "lack of insight" and "tangential 
thinking."
70
He once agreed to go for psychotherapy but walked 
out in disgust in the middle of the second session. Shafiq 
was particularly sensitive to having theories imposed upon 
him and said to me of psychiatrists and psychotherapists: 
"They don’t listen!"
For some reason I was able to strike up close 
rapport with Shafiq, possibly because we both shared a strong 
academic orientation and we seemed to give each other ideas 
about life and about science and philosophy etc.
Delusions
He had an interesting central delusion similar to 
one entertained by another person, Simon T, who is not 
discussed in detail here but one I have never seen 
previously reported. Both Shafiq and Simon T believed that 
"scandal sheets" had been put out on them. These were 
pieces of paper retailing personal details about them.
Shafiq’s had been devised by The National Front and carried 
a photograph of him. This was seeded by him overhearing 
while travelling on a bus, a woman say to a friend that 
she’d seen a photograph of him. The sheet described him in 
very negative terms and printed copies of it had, he thought, 
been distributed widely in London.* Because of this he
*Although such a belief sounds "bizarre and obviously 
impossible" it would be wrong to infer a schizophrenic 
delusional condition on hearing it. A friend of mine who 
was a policeman told me that a scandal sheet has in the 
past been put out on someone. Apparently a man who was 
acquitted of rape was the victim of one distributed by the 
raped girl’s family. The sheet carried a photograph of the 
man with personal details about him and describing him as 
a rapist.
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continually thought he was "being recognised" and 
repeatedly overheard people saying "That’s him". Clearly 
this is a highly damaging delusion which in both the people 
who reported it provoked intense suffering.
On crystallising this thought Shafiq became a haunted 
man. If he got on a bus he ran the risk of overhearing 
someone say the dreaded "That’s him", similarly so in shops. 
Nowhere was safe. Almost anything anybody said while 
walking past him in the street such as: "Isn’t that the bloke 
who...?" "I’m sure I ’ve seen him..." "I remember..."
"Have you heard about...?" or "Have you seen...?" was taken 
to be a reference to him and/or the scandal sheet. Not 
surprisingly Shafiq walked around the streets with his head 
down and suffered a degree of agoraphobia which was 
secondary to the delusional preoccupation.
In contrast however, he also overheard some people, 
talking with an American accent, say while walking past 
his house, that he was "the greatest man in the world."
He heard this said by people more than once. Because of this 
he thought that he was secretly being followed and filmed by 
an American television crew while he walked around Fulham. 
Whilst believing that he was being monitored he also 
believed that people thought he was monitoring them. The 
National Front were following him about too, they'kept talking 
about him and suggesting that he also should be National 
Front. He believed that, in addition to all this, he was 
being spied on by people in "the paramilitary" - by which 
he meant an unofficial army.
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It is fairly clear from this brief account that 
the moment Shafiq stepped out into the street - an act which 
at times took tremendous courage - he immediately walked 
into a drama beyond even the realms of a James Bond film.
Even in his bedroom however he was not totally safe. 
For a few weeks he had the idea that women were coming into 
his room while he was asleep and having intercourse with 
him while his penis was erect during REM sleep. He inferred 
this on the basis of the fact that his body felt bruised 
and painful when he awoke. He was often sure that girls 
were fancying him (which some told me they did) but he was 
not sure why. He admitted to me that he had indulged in 
mutual masturbation with a man while in hospital but a few 
weeks later (interestingly) denied that he had said this, 
subsequently claiming, with a laugh, that he "wasn't 
homosexual at all".
Apart from the support I gave him he accepted only 
anti-psychotic medication. However he would repeatedly stop 
taking this, become hypomanie for a week or two and then 
relapse into fantastic delusions.
At one time he thought that Milton Friedman was 
stealing his ideas. This he inferred on the basis of the 
great, almost uncanny, similarity in their ideas. I asked 
him how this could possibly be and he replied that "people" 
had secretly implanted a microphone in his throat which 
transmitted his subvocal speech to receiving devices in 
the United States. When I said that this was absurd and
73
ridiculous he replied, in a quiet voice, "Come off it Peter, 
I'm a major thinker."
Love
Shafiq was troubled by love. A mutual friend, 
Arthur, once told him that I had said that I loved them 
both. Shafiq was somewhat shaken by this and said to me 
that he couldn't "handle" being loved. His family, who 
were deeply concerned about him and who cared for him 
greatly were it seems similarly frozen out. Shafiq was 
very much an independent man and took the slightest 
restraint or sign of mutual dependence as threatening 
to his integrity.
Sex
We have had some glimpses to the effect that Shafiq 
entertained variant sexual impulses. At one time I 
therefore considered his sexual life to be critical to an 
understanding of him. However through many discussions 
over the years it became clear to me that he took the 
subject quite lightly and as genuinely rather trivial.
There were no long pauses , tense expressions or evasive 
comments regarding it with the exception of the one noted 
earlier about his "homosexuality". His occasional escapades 
into unusual sexuality had the same flavour as his repeated 
escapades into unusual thoughts generally and I could not, 
in all honesty, find evidence to the effect that the former
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were in some way a generatrix of the latter existing 
psychically at a deeper level.
Violence
He was, like David B, particularly unnerved, however, 
by physical violence. He was fully aware of his own 
hostility although, apart from brief episodes of shadow 
boxing, it showed itself largely in the ruthless but brave 
quality of his jokes and opinions. Once a very violent 
man, who shared a room with him briefly in a hostel, hit him 
hard on the arm and the punch brought up an extremely 
unsightly bruise. He was in a terribly agitated state 
for weeks following this even though he immediately moved 
out of the hostel and hence away from the source.
By now the reader is probably as amazed and 
bewildered by this man as was everyone else who knew him.
One social worker described him to me as "a very 
deteriorated case" and many of his friends and 
acquaintances regarded him as "just barmy".
The Positive Side
What we have seen so far is the outright "pathology". 
But getting to know Shafiq, although difficult, disclosed 
quite a different side to him. Firstly this man was 
extremely intelligent. In the many long discussions I had 
with him he imposed as much cognitive strain on me as have 
colleagues in university departments. Once he came round
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to our flat in West London while I was marking an Open 
University physics assignment. The student's answer was 
extremely involved and they had arrived at a totally 
nonsensical answer which was orders of magnitude out.
I had battled for several minutes to see where, amidst all 
the trivial mistakes, they had focally gone wrong but without 
success. I explained the problem to Shafiq and handed him 
the script. He detected the crucial error in seconds.
Shafiq was also an astoundingly accurate judge of 
people. (Surprising for someone regarded as thought 
disordered). I once had a friend who seemed to me to want 
to make our relationship closer still and I was uncertain.
I asked Shafiq for a one sentence overview of this man and 
he replied: "home grown". It was perfect. Similarly, a 
number of my friends were talking in a generally positive 
way about a mutual acquaintance when Shafiq piped up:
"He's a creep, all he talks is general knowledge!" It was 
a poignantly valid angle. These are fairly typical examples 
of a capacity that Shafiq deployed many times.
For someone whose thinking sounds so disturbed
he had a remarkable ability to cut through "the trees" to
see "the wood". He could at times do this with a sweep that
at first seemed quite brutal. When an acquaintance of his 
committed suicide after about a dozen previous unsuccessful 
attempts Shafiq said quietly: "Another inadequate personality
bites the dust."
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His thinking ranged widely over science, sociology, 
politics and economics. He read deeply and intensely. In 
one discussion I had with him I said, at 2 a.m., that I 
had better go home and go to bed. He became quite angry 
at this and accused me of shallowness. He pointed out that 
we had reached quite a critical point in the dialogue and 
in the argument where the only thing we could do was to 
plunge deeper. This really shook me. He was right.
I stayed until 4 a.m.
Shafiq was very tough minded and obviously paranoid. 
On the P scale of Eysenck and Eysenck's EPQ (1975), which 
tends to reflect this, he scored 10 on one occasion and 14 
a couple of years later. These are extraordinarily high 
scores. He had little respect for psychiatrists and their 
associated personnel and deliberately talked rubbish to them 
to show "what fools they all were". Then he would delight 
in their confusion. These "fools" however were quite right 
to argue that Shafiq lacked insight of a psychological 
nature. He was adept at discussing external realities such 
as physical science and the social and political plights of 
Indian and Pakistani people in this country - hence his 
obsession with The National Front - but he was still, 
even with me, evasive about the internal side of himself.
It was a great shame that someone who suffered so much 
should not be at all psychologically minded.
Shafiq, being very much a polymath, lacked 
validation. As I am of similar bent I provided that.
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His father said to me: "As long as you're around he'll
be O.K." And indeed when we didn't see each other for 
several weeks he did have a tendency to relapse. He had 
no-one to talk to. By projection he thought that I was a 
genius because I alone could appreciate his genius.
We have a picture so far then of a highly able though 
arrogant man with a considerable capacity for abstract and 
profound thought which strangely issued forth also in 
spectacular and disturbing delusions. The scenario is of 
brilliance wasted on self-aggrandising fantasies. Had he 
deployed his talent with persistence and patience I feel 
sure he could have made an original contribution to human 
knowledge.
Experimental measures in context
In the experimental enquiry, Shafiq and David B . , 
who both had very harrassing delusions were at the very 
extreme end of the whole sample (psychotics and non-psychotics) 
in two measures: subjective confidence levels in incorrect 
hypotheses and verbal confirmation bias, (both scoring very 
high on each). To the extent that Shafiq ever lost any of 
his paranoid thoughts he did not so much conquer them as get 
tired of them. Although contrary to popular belief it ^  
occasionally possible to argue people out of delusional 
thoughts (Rudden, Gilmore and Frances 1982) this was not so 
with either of these men. (As an aside, their behaviour 
leads me to speculate that such disturbances partly involve
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a parallel disturbance in the biochemical and physiological 
processes that underpin the subjective sense of certainty).
The limitation of the experimental method is that 
it only gives us a snapshot of a person’s behaviour at 
a particular spot in time. Hence Shafiq and David B. 
seem more similar from such measures than they really were. 
David’s delusions tended to centre chronically around the 
police and "neighbours" etc. whereas Shafiq’s were more 
fragile and mutable. As also emphasised by Philippa Garety 
(1985), delusions can wax and wane rather than be chronically 
"rigid" beliefs. By 1984 he had ceased to worry about the 
scandal sheet which was so central in 1978-80 and no longer 
believed in it. (He said that he had suffered the phrase 
"that's him" so many times that it ceased to have any 
effect on him). He also no longer believed in the idea 
of reference to the effect that he was "the greatest man 
in the world" or various other fragmentary thoughts such 
as one about computer control, not so far mentioned, or 
the thought that he was considered by people to be monitoring 
them. These and other spectacular ideas seemed to rise, 
float and then sink in his mind.
Shafiq had the arrogance and spoiling at home that 
we have seen with David B. He also had a similarly active, 
creative mind although capable of a far greater degree of 
abstraction. Any notion to the effect that psychotics 
are concrete thinkers (e.g. Goldstein and Scheerer 1941) 
founders in the context of Shafiq. He was probably as
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capable of abstract thought as the investigators who 
thought up the theory. Cameron (1944) also argued that 
abstract thinking can be evoked if rapport is established 
with such people.
In this light his poor performance on my own test 
of abstract thinking is a source of disappointment to me 
regarding its validity. He scored more concrete responses 
than abstract despite operating in conversation almost 
always at an abstract level. As Heisenberg has warned 
physicists we also cannot test or observe a person without 
changing them. Under the beacon light of being 'tested* 
or being 'experimented on' my general impression was that 
he clammed up. His stress and anxiety scores were extremely 
high and he took over twice as long as most other people 
to respond on personality, vocabulary and thinking tests.
It was largely on measures such as those dealt with earlier, 
which were not transparent, that he provided data that were 
more congruent with my expectations regarding him.
On the personality tests he emerged as a neurotic 
slightly extraverted man who was very low on venturesomeness 
Indeed he did, like most of the psychotic sample, tend to 
live in a world of ideas and fantasies rather than in a 
concrete pragmatic world of everyday events. He was daring 
ideationally but not physically. His extraversion score 
of 14 (in 1982) was comparable to that of David B. but was 
obtained by answering quite different keyed items. They
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were very different people. Two years later it had dropped 
to 9 and the change was observable.
Despite his remarkable judgemental efficiency 
with such complex gestalts as people (interestingly 
engineers have been shown to be exceptional judges of 
people (Taft 1955)), his judgement on a more analytic 
task - guessing the identity of ambiguous out-of-focus 
slides, was the poorest in the whole sample of both 
psychotics and non-psychotics. An holistic thinker,
Shafiq was much more at ease with BIG problems, the analytical 
methods of experimental psychology did not capture his 
essence at all. He would complete a difficult complex 
task very quickly but one which was more particularistic - 
such as defining or finding a word - only very slowly indeed.
So chronically intellectually active was Shafiq 
that I was particularly interested in the duration of his 
spiral-after-effect. In that this after-effect must 
involve the activation of movement detection channels in 
neocortical areas 17/18 it seemed likely that it could 
be an indicator of cortical arousal. Shafiq's imagery was 
also, he reported, multimodal - suggesting recruitment of 
wide cortical areas, including the occiput, during his 
private mentations. On the Eysenckian (1967) arousal/ 
activation based model of personality, long after-effects 
would be expected in low impulsives (high cortical arousal). 
This has actually been found by Levy and Lang (1966) 
although anxiety and neuroticism also contributes (Levy
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and Lang 1966; Knowles and Krasner 1965). Shafiq was low 
on impulsivity.
In July 1982 his after-effect was 31.625 secs 
averaged over four determinations. This is extremely long. 
However I tested him again in February 1984 and his duration 
this time turned out to be a mere 8.8 secs, despite him 
being just as intellectually active. This makes one 
seriously question whether this measure is really reliably 
indicative of anything. It has been determined that major 
tranquillisers reduce the movement after effect (Lehmann 
and Csank 1957; Janke and Debus 1972; Harris, Phillipson, 
Watkins and Whelpton 1983). However he had been on modecate 
injections for five years even before the first determination 
and hence it is unlikely that this massive reduction is 
entirely a drug effect. Shafiq’s data clearly shows that 
the spiral-after-effeet is a complex phenomenon involving 
the operation of many variables (Knowles and Krasner 1965).
We therefore can expect difficulties in relating it to 
cortical arousal, cortical inhibition (Eysenck 1957) or 
to the activity level of an arousal modulating system 
(Claridge 1967).
Coincidences
In a sense Shafiq toyed with his own beliefs just 
as he toyed with social workers and therapists. There was 
always this intense mental activity. He would boost his 
concentration by chain-smoking sixty cigarettes a day.
Never was he at rest. It is in this context that almost
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anything that happened around him in the world he could 
process, digest, incorporate into some ongoing idea.
This is where, as we did with David B . , we have to consider 
the role of coincidences. We would talk about this often. 
Shafiq would say: "I just can't believe some of the things
that are happening to me!" At one time, I think it was 
in 1981, he was concerned that "something was going on in 
Fulham". I went with a number of friends including Shafiq 
to a pub and while I was ordering drinks a stranger 
apparently had leant around the enclosure where he was 
sitting, noticed Shafiq and said to his friend in a loud 
voice: "It's him!" Everybody else had heard this. We
have previously mentioned that the persecuted are at least 
persons of consequence and it is interesting in this 
respect that Shafiq's face lit up and his conversation was 
very animated for tens of minutes after this event. This 
validation of Shafiq's belief as to his own fame was 
confirmed to me many times around this period in the 
"knowing looks" I noticed myself that he provoked from shop 
keepers and passers-by in the area where he lived. There 
was no doubt that Shafiq was "known". Alas we cannot say 
whether this was a cause of his behaviour or the result of 
it. He was small and had a slightly unusual walk and sullen 
expression. He may well have been known for unusual behaviours 
he had not told me of. However it was easy to see how a 
proto-delusion seeded on accidental events could have 
mushroomed, with a mind of his level of activity, into his 
gargantuan beliefs in a London-wide persecutory and monitoring
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network. There was plenty happening around him for him 
to process once the flywheel of his delusional system had 
started, slowly at first, to rotate.
We must now round off our discussion of Shafiq, 
partial and fragmentary though it has had to be. He did 
not, of course, have the working class programming that 
so characterised David B. but he was similar in having a 
critical stressor.
Whereas David B ’s central vulnerable spot was his 
total inability to relate to older men, Shafiq’s was his 
felt vulnerability because of his skin colour. Whereas 
David’s chief persecutors were older men in positions of 
power such as police sergeants and inspectors, Shafiq’s 
was The National Front. A point of serious vulnerability 
in a person with a very high opinion of their own importance 
and/or considerable guilt about their own shortcomings 
presents a personality system which may crumble at any 
moment if a precipitating event of the slightest relevance 
occurs. The system is like an inverted triangle that 
may topple at the mildest imbalance of forces. Shafiq is 
adamant that the woman he overheard on the bus was talking 
about him and perhaps her total behaviour including its non­
verbal aspects would have given anyone that impression.
David B. is similarly adamant about the burglary plot.
Feed such data into a self-preoccupied creative mind and 
the result is liable to be bizarre.
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Both Shafiq and David B. wanted to have "the field" 
to themselves. Constraints, demands, compromises 
interrupted their flow - caused them a kind of psychic 
pain - and as with David, these were really the main causes 
of disagreement between Shafiq and the other members of 
his family when he was living at home. Both of them wanted 
to "do their own thing" and chase their thoughts and 
feelings wherever they led them to an extreme degree.
This is very much the cognitive and personality style which 
lends itself to extreme confirmation bias and ^  in a sense 
the behavioural problem associated with a great predilection 
for this particular type of bias. We will have more to say 
on this later.
My termination of my relationship with Shafiq was 
because he was becoming too dependent upon me, coming 
round three, sometimes four, times a day. He had found 
great solace in his religion, he was a Muslim, and visited 
the mosque in Regents Park regularly. It seemed to me 
that I had helped him as much as I could - no new 
developments were taking place - and that in this faith he 
had a support far stronger than anything I could provide.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A MYSTICAL-PARANORMAL-SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE
This account differs from the others reported in 
this thesis is that it does not I think, contain experiences 
which are outrightly in the psychotic domain. However 
there is no doubt that in places we are tip-toeing very 
close to it and the conservatively minded reader may well 
infer that blatant psychosis is manifest in the report 
I am about to give.
In the summer of 1979 I went through an uncanny 
experience from the months of about June to September. It 
overcame me again in August and September I98I whenupon it 
was rapidly and finally resolved. This experience was 
a profound, disturbing and extremely valuable one and one 
which has very considerably altered my personality, view 
of the world and attitude to scientific research. It is 
the subject of this chapter.
To describe it adequately is impossible, really 
the verbal skill of a Poe or a Wilde is required and as 
the reader can probably imagine, from the background to 
this research given in Chapter One, I am predominantly 
a visuo-spatial thinker. Fortunately I keep a journal and 
have done since August 1968. This acts both as an ideas 
notebook and a diary. In 1979 I recorded my thoughts, as 
best 1 could, in this journal and I will utilise some of 
those entries here. All statements in quotes, unless 
otherwise referenced, are from the journal.
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Autobiographical introduction
In 1978 I resigned from a full-time tenured university- 
lecturing post at the University of Strathclyde. Being 
a very epicurean man, a devotee of Oscar Wilde, I found the 
off-campus puritanism and conservatism of Glasgow 
unbearably stifling and oppressive. It was as if the city 
existed, as Martin Wainwright put it, in a Clydeside 
timewarp where Victorian values remained untouched by the 
world of the late twentieth century. So that, for example, 
topics Such as homosexuality and lesbianism, pass^ to me, 
provoked unease.
Previous to this I had been variously described 
by friends and colleagues as "a maverick"; "very human";
"a divergent thinker"; "a screwball"; "a pioneer";
"a man who lives as if he’s got a monkey on his back";
"an intellectual". All suggestive of an unstable but 
reasonably able and colourful personality whose freedom 
had a driven quality to it and who lived at the edge of 
life, of thought and of acceptability.
When I resigned my lecturing post and came down to 
London in October 1978 my thinking was entirely Newtonian 
and Euclidean. I had been able to deploy Newtonian 
mechanics and Euclidean geometry perfectly well in my 
research on the buckling of layers in which I used rock 
mechanics theory and in my studies on the development of 
rock cleavage patterns, in which I used finite strain 
analysis. I knew nothing of quantum or relativistic
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physics nor had I needed to and my psychological research 
was entirely analytic. Similarly I had read neither Capra, 
Pauli nor Progoff and had only a smattering of Heidegger.
My knowledge of Jung was largely restricted to realising 
that he had introduced the terms "Extravert" and "Introvert" 
into the psychological literature, had done some interesting 
reaction time experiments and had noticed that psychasthenic 
neurotics (what we now call "dysthymies") tended to be 
introverted, hysterics more extraverted. All else, so I 
thought, was "Jungian mumbo jumbo". Being still a 
philistine I had also read nothing of mysticism, not even 
William James’s important views on it, (James 1936; Knight 
1954, pp.2ü6-2l4) and if anyone had asked me what the 
I Ching was I probably would have guessed that it was a 
Chinese restaurant off the Earls Court Road.
1 did. however have Christian religious beliefs 
and in a sense my research on the psychology of geological 
observation, in fusing the social and earth sciences, was 
in part a religious mission to humanise science and to 
induce scientists to look for value in the person as well 
as in their techniques and instruments. Other than this 
religiosity however I was quite raw and naive in the face 
of what I was to encounter.
It was difficult to get a counselling practice 
started and I had to take a number of other temporary jobs 
at the same time to make ends meet. The purpose of the 
move however had also been because 1 wanted to extend my
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interests into the fields of personality and abnormal 
psychology. It seemed to me that to do good work in 
these areas it was necessary to go beyond the confines of 
a university environment where one mixes largely with 
other professional psychologists and with undergraduate 
students in psychology and "see a bit of life", meet a 
wide range of people and generally indwell in the world.
So this was generally congruent with my intentions.
I was determined however to use my counselling 
work - and my own always ongoing self analysis - as an 
arena in which to develop and use my ideas about biases 
in human thought itself. My intellectual adventure 
was in part in search of a way to bootstrap myself past 
my own thinking biases. I felt that to "see" mind I had, 
without drugs to somehow get outside myself and "look 
back". In jolting myself out of my habitual ways of 
living into a quite different style of life I might see, 
so I thought, the chains that previously had bound my 
thinking and limited my vision.
Conceptual investigations
By May or June, 1979, insights about biases in 
thought began to coalesce. I started, in a staccato fashion 
at first, to write and think myself into what to me was 
a "new" attitude of mind. Central to this attitude was 
a notion about what a truly liberated person would be.
I called this person-of-the-future a "Borderline Normal"
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for want of any better phrase. The most easily 
communicable feature of a Borderliner was ambiguity.
They were both good and bad, masculine and feminine, 
strong and weak, active and passive etc. etc. In a sense 
they lived between the opposite and transcended them.
They had no one specific personality (or in A.I. terms 
"subroutine"), their identity lay at the level of 
process (in A.I. terms at the level of the "computational 
system"). The Borderliner had dispensed with ego, was 
not oriented towards the world in a focussed competitive, 
or analytical way or in terms of a role or an identity. 
The Borderliner just "was". The Borderline state was a 
floating state of being with all that is. Having 
dispensed with ego, content jettisoned; process all 
important, the Borderliner was "personified process".*
*This use of the term "Borderline" is of course highly 
confusing given that the term already has been embedded, 
with many meanings, in the psychiatric and psychoanalytic 
literature (Liebowitz 1979; Stone 1980). Clarification 
has been achieved through the work of Spitzer, Endicott 
and Gibbon (1979) whose investigations led to the DSM III 
(1980) categories of "schizotypal personality disorder" 
and "borderline personality disorder". Both of these 
categories do, in a sense, describe people of borderline 
psychotic type, the latter referring to the unstable, 
erratic and unpredictable and the former being linked more 
directly on genetic evidence (Reider 1979, Spitzer et al.
1979) to schizophrenia. The "schizotypal" diagnosis is 
indicated-by the presence of magical thinking; illusions 
of "forces" being present; depersonalisation and derealisation; 
odd speech and paranoid ideation; inadequate face-to-face 
rapport and high anxiety in social situations.
It is clear that the crisis to be recounted, 
viewed from a medical model standpoint, is of "schizotypal" 
rather than "borderline" form in the terms of the categories 
used in current psychiatric descriptive practice. Had I 
been seen by a psychiatrist, equipped with DSM III, early 
in 1979 I would almost certainly have been diagnosed as 
suffering from a mild form of schizotypal personality 
disorder and what happened subsequently would have been 
seen as an exacerbation of that disorder under "life change" 
stress (Holmes and Rahe 1967; Brown and Birley 1968).
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Whilst regarding the Borderliner as an ideal I 
tried to identify with it, reach to it, realise it in action 
Always the emphasis was on process and ambiguity and the 
transcendence of it. The latter emphasis was reflected in 
statements such as:
"The Borderliner both happens to be and chooses 
to be... is subject and object ... is a coherent 
pattern of eventuated opposites... is the basic 
generalised person."
The emphasis on process was reflected in my belief that the
Borderliner could only be evaluated in terms of the 'how'
or 'in what manner' they did (and in particular loved),
not in terms of 'what'.
"The Borderliner is process integrated or process 
useful, process practised. The integration is 
that the machinery is working well and ticking 
over. The integration is the tuning of the parts 
to do the job, the Borderliner's personality is 
well tuned, the integration is not ^  the job that 
the parts do, it is not in the whatness of the 
parts... Hence the integration of the Borderline 
person is analogous to the process play of science 
in action over time."
"The Normal sees the world through adjective 
and noun coloured spectacles, summing people up 
with nouns as integers, adjectives as fractions 
and conjunctions as addition signs... The 
Borderliner is probably most accurately perceived 
with infinitives and adverbs, hence the Normal's 
bewilderment - his apparatus just cannot handle 
the job."
In my view the structure of language had 
strangled our thinking. (I wrote that "The Borderliner 
does not belong, not even to language"). Rational man 
thought in terms of Subject (Self or res cogitans) 
operating on the world (Object or res extensa) with all 
reality characterised as atomised into dimensions with
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positive and negative poles such as More - Less,
Good - Bad, Strong - Weak and so on. The basic code of 
the mind was:
+
s o
The Borderliner however lived, as I have said, 
in the middle ground between opposites and yet transcended 
them :
"The Borderline thinker sees the reality which 
the contrasts we usually deal with are merely 
differentiates of. Hence the Borderliner is
the fluid reality between the concrete dogmatic
reality of appearances."
In my own (very) abstruse way I was viewing the 
Borderliner as in touch with the ground, the ground or 
"All" which lay back of the naively accepted reality of 
everyday life. This is, although I did not realise it
at the time, clearly analogous to the Buddhist concept of
the Tao.
The Borderliner was not just a meditator or a 
reflector however, he was very much in action in the world, 
living as I put it at "the point of potential to kinetic 
conversion" , accessing the ground but effective and 
efficient in everyday life.
"The Borderliner's resting state is at the 
potential to kinetic conversion - the sparking 
point, the contact point, between the inertia 
of the ground and the blinkered unreflective 
state of figure."
92
In this context the Eriksonian concept of an 
identity (1950) obviously was a naive capitulation.
Identity was a restriction, a narrowing down from the truly 
rich array of infinite potentialities available to person. 
Ego, content, identity and language were all snares, 
the human person in all their perfection was back of 
all these:
"The Borderliner attempts to be himself. The 
Normal role plays a pattern which weaves together 
all the positive poles of word-opposites that 
language has crystallised out for us and which 
trap us. The Normal then re-presents a 'good' 
image of himself to himself - he shuttles the 
bad away, inside or out into others. The 
Borderliner holds back from falling victim to 
language, he lives tersely in the opposites, 
accepting himself as himself."
My "point of potential to kinetic conversion" is 
clearly identical with Jung's "Psychoid state" where 
psychological events are incompletely differentiated out 
from what he called "the continuum" - there the psychic 
and the physical are no longer differentiated from one 
another. For Jung "psychoid" is "touching the 
undifferentiated state of nature" (Progoff 1973, p. 157). 
This was my "All" or "Ground".
Thinking and feeling in this way I experienced 
the whole of rational thought as an illusion. The division 
of subject "directed" to finding out about Objects 
or other Subjects usually construed in bipolar dimensions 
was a mistake. The Truth that I felt I had "discovered" 
was that these were the structuring rules of rational 
mind, it was how rational mind had to think in order to
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have any purchase on the world in the first instance.
And yet this was a bias, the true "reality" back of all 
this was undifferentiated. In many ways my thinking was 
similar to that articulated by David Bohm (1985) who speaks 
of the "implicate" and "explicate order", the former being 
the ground which contains all forms in a kind of holographic 
potential.
The state of mind I experienced when reaching to 
these insights for the first time was one of vulnerability 
yet of power. A feeling of passivity yet of activity.
The insights had a quality of certainty, of absolute 
validity which was beyond all question. My mind felt 
perfectly clear, as if psychically I could see to infinity. 
Rather than insanity, it was a superlative form of sanity. 
Unknowingly I had, of course, accessed the mystical state.
In this state there was a great sense of the unity 
of all things, time had no meaning, in the ground all 
opposites disappeared, all contrasts faded away, all 
difference and particularity was a consequence of being 
or actuality - in Bohm's terms they were characteristic 
of his explicate order.
As the full force of these insights impressed 
themselves upon me words became increasingly difficult 
to come by to describe the experience. Indeed in the act 
of verbalising the state would be transiently lost.
I wrote of "throwing thoughts sling-like into the domain"
A
but never being able to sit in it. As Laotzu said:
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"He who knows does not speak; he who speaks does not know."- 
The Tao as expressed or represented is not the Tao.
The onset of the uncanny
As my thinking became less verbal, journal entries 
decreased. Having used words as ladders into the 
Borderline domain I essentially and eventually merged 
amoeba-like with it. It is interesting that when 
attempting to write or verbally think myself into the state 
where the essence of Borderlining would be captured I 
experienced a strange alternation between feelings of 
great clarity of my body boundary and an irrational fear 
that if I ever did fully capture the essence in language, 
indeed any language, I would, the moment I moved beyond 
the last word or equation, actually disappear (!).
I therefore gave up language. I moved without explicitly 
knowing how or why I was moving.
In this psychic zone "at the point of potential 
to kinetic conversion" I was in touch, so I felt, with an 
all embracing, awe-inspiring force. The keyboard of my 
mind was immense and stretched out before me. I knew if 
I could play it I could do or be anything. Great "energy" 
surged through me. I oscillated between a state of 
exaltation to the greatest heights and a state of 
condemnation to awesome depths. A great truth had been 
revealed to me. I felt "not of this world". There was 
a sense of unearthly joy. I would walk miles in
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exhilaration, head-on driving rain undeterred me. When 
I tried as best I could to explain how I was feeling to 
a friend he said "You're like a cylinder open at both 
ends". Indeed this was so, feelings of saintliness and 
union with the cosmos alternated with feelings of possession 
by demonic forces and of being a channel, for both good 
and evil to come into the world. With the loss of ego 
and identity my feeling was that of being a vehicle.
There was, to me, no doubt that what was happening to me 
was in some sense real and was important.
I felt most at peace and "together" when lying 
on my back in the park at night gazing up at a star- 
spangled sky with which I was at one. Yet unlike a Zen 
meditator who may have similar experiences in a state of 
tranquillity and low arousal I had accessed this domain 
in great agitation. As Albertus Magnus emphasised, a 
state of mental excess, in my case due to intense abstract 
thinking and extreme sensuality, may help open the door 
to magical and mystical experiences, and it did.
Despite realising how inadequate words were I 
longed to communicate my discovery. Eventually a kind of 
synthesis emerged in the form of an article entitled:
"Half Man, Half Boat, the mind of the Borderline Normal" 
(Chadwick 1979). This effort was useless. Within a day
or so I realised that between the lines was the implicit
communication: "The Borderliner is good".. I had not been 
able to hold the transcendent middle ground state while
writing about my experience. The realisation of this error
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came as a terrible blow. I sat in the park, with my 
head down, bitterly disappointed, even ashamed, of myself.
I had betrayed my lower, earthly, sensual nature. The 
article had been motivated by a wish for self-defence and 
self-justification. Even though I knew that the desire 
for self-justification can inspire much creative thought,
I felt that I had been cowardly and pathetic. After 
this I ceased writing altogether. But my mental state 
had changed.
Around about August 1979 when I was shifting 
in and out of "cosmic consciousness", as Richard Bucke 
(1901) calls it, I became, so I suspected at first, 
precognitive. On one occasion I reflected on how intense, 
iridescent and significant colours had become to me and 
I rushed up to my room in an irrational expectation that 
there would be a discussion on the radio on the hermeneutics 
of colour. There was. On another occasion liwas sitting 
in the park in a reflective state questioning my scientific 
training. I wondered if there might actually be something 
in the seemingly silly mediaeval idea of possession and 
whether, in part, it might apply to me. A little girl 
walked past me with her mother and after a brief glance 
she said to her, "Mummy is that man possessed by The Devil?" 
Her mother also looked at me and replied, "Yes dear".
Yet as far as I was concerned, all I looked was thoughtful. 
Coincidences like these were rampant. I sat in church 
after this event criticising the pragmatic value of my 
"great thoughts". "I feel useless" I mused when the vicar
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piped up in his sermon: "Now you may feel useless, good
for nothing, but in the eyes of God... etc... etc."
At one stage experiences of this kind were happening to 
me twenty to thirty times a day. I was not mindful of 
the Jungian concept of synchronicity (Jung and Pauli 
1955), I called it, crudely, "clockworking". This was 
a bungled attempt to express my feeling of my thoughts 
being somehow entrapped in a harmonious flow of events.
Indeed there was no "synchronisation" of outer reality and 
inner thought, "it" all happened as if in one great 
clock-like machine, wheels within wheels, inner and outer 
reality fused and transcended. I was at one with the world, 
with space-time itself, and it was at one with me.
This period, however, eventually became quite 
terrible, as the reader may well be able to imagine and 
I was totally unable to work during it. I had neither 
the intelligence, nor the conceptual apparatus nor the 
spiritual development to handle the experience which was 
rapidly becoming out of control.
It is ironic that many people seek the development 
of paranormal powers (if what I experienced was evidence 
of the paranormal) and Progoff (1973, p.167) even wonders 
if there might be value in seeking and encouraging synchronistic 
experiences. Once noticed they tend to increase in 
frequency - what thinkers sympathetic to Jung refer to as 
"the synchronicity of synchronicity".(Vaughn 1979).
Having experienced this amplification of the uncanny I
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can report that it is not, in extreme manifestation, 
necessarily a pleasant or rewarding one. The final 
phase of my acquaintance with the bizarre is one which 
the conservative reader, probably already seriously doubting 
my sanity, will probably interpret as unambiguously 
psychotic.
I was suffering greatly through synchronistic 
experiences and frantically and largely unsuccessfully 
trying to weave theories to account for them.* I thought 
of myself experiencing the "dovetailing of contexts" 
and of being "at the intersection of meaning planes".
I was attentive to the events but I never "forced" them.
If I adopted an attitude of deliberate focussed attention 
and calculated planning they would not occur. Always 
they would - like all the features of the Borderliner 
and the Borderline state - have theccharacter of being both 
between opposites and transcending them. They would in 
a sense be suffered and engineered, both caused and 
allowed. When my mental state was between activity and 
passivity, between listening and hearing, watching and 
seeing, they would occur. Hence they jolted, jogged and 
surprised me, yet in a sense I expected them.
*One theory of interest was that some of the events may 
have been due to me subliminally perceiving a stimulus 
in peripheral vision (say a black cat), this may then have 
activated the appropriate knowledge structures and thus 
issued forth in congruent thoughts (e.g. "It would have 
been nice to have had a black cat"). Then the stimulus 
might happen to come into clear foveal vision (the cat 
would cross the road in front of me). Such an event could 
easily be wrongly perceived as an instance of precognition 
or synchronicity. This may explain some of the more 
trivial incidents.
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In this state of mind a particular type of 
synchronistic experience occurred in the middle of 
September. I noticed that taps and clicks were synchronised 
with the termination of every thought that I feared was 
true. These were very intense for a few days and then 
in the period from September 1979 to September 1981 would 
come and go in sustained bursts. Once when I was lying 
in bed with a girlfriend they were rampant as my thoughts 
at the time were kaleidoscopic. She suddenly said, "God! 
what's all those clicks?!" I replied lazily that they 
were "just my clicks" to which she said that I must be 
"sending out vibrations".*
The auditory code was one tap or click for "Yes" 
and two for "No" . I quickly discovered that they were 
not from an "all-knowing" source of infinite wisdom 
because on one occasion they tapped 'Yes' to two logically 
contradictory thoughts that were separated by a period 
of about three to four minutes. Importantly: I did not 
consciously engineer this 'test', I only realised the 
contradiction after hearing the second, single, tap.
I concluded that they were paranormal psychoacoustic 
phenomena which correlated with my own unconscious belief 
as to whether the current thought was true or false - 
and not Ouija board style "evil spirits". As with the 
(other) synchronistic experiences they would only occur when 
not "forced" . If I strongly listened out for them nothing 
would happen. I had to have a kind of floating attentive 
state somehow in between hearing and listening. One was
* Hermann Lenz informs me that several of his patients have experienced 
such taps and clicks and independently discovered the one tap for 'Yes' 
and two taps for 'No' code. (Personal communication, 11:11:87). Lake 
(1986, p.146) also mentions "tappings" from the walls being experienced 
in paranoid psychotic crises (but treats the g±ienomenon dismissively).
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noticeably louder - that which followed the spontaneous 
thought: "I must not tell anybody about this."
Resolution of the crisis
The worst of the 1979 experience had been overcome 
through reading Tennyson; through talks with priests and 
vicars and through the ingestion of pimozide over the 
course of a few weeks. The most potent advice was to 
realise the full loving, forgiving power of God. If I 
forgave myself as He did me, and if I forgave those in 
my past who had harmed and hurt me there was the path to 
peace. And so it was. There was no doubt in my mind at 
the time that I was very much in touch with forces beyond 
science, beyond mind and beyond psychology. My own 
equipment was therefore inadequate. In late August 1981 
when the taps, clicks and other synchronistic events 
began again in full force I tried, vainly and rather 
stupidly, to counter them at first by deliberate thought 
blocking and through indulgence in various distractions. 
These machinations did not work. Eventually I accepted 
that only by opening myself up again to forces beyond 
myself would this "wound in mind space", as I picturesquely 
thought of it, be healed or blocked. I put aside my 
scientific knowledge and with an optimistic attitude of 
faith, hope and reverence I sat down and began reading 
not the British Journal of Psychology, but the New 
Testament. Immediately the taps and clicks, although 
present, began as if to "misfire", it was as if a machine
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had started to malfunction. As I started to read, some 
of them ceased to be synchronised properly with thought 
termination. By the time I had read about three pages 
any occasional taps I heard were quite random, 
essentially they had gone. The "episode" was over.
Other contextual determinants
Now the above account is necessarily brief and 
schematic. To go into a level of detail which would make 
the experience really live in the reader’s mind with all 
the accompanying congruent emotions I obviously would have 
to relive it myself to write about it appropriately - 
I have no wish to do this. It should be clear however 
that this was emotionally an experience both of exhilaration 
and -terror. It was not an experience, however, had 
easily. Academics, who regularly battle with issues as 
equally slippery as cognitive bias do not regularly report 
reaching states of consciousness such as that outlined on 
the preceding pages.
In my case a state of high arousal and high stress,
I believe, facilitated the attainment of this realm of 
experience and knowing. The high stress was brought about 
chiefly by the jolt I received on moving from a university 
environment to the so-called "real world". Using 
Selfridge’s (1955) example of the important of context 
in identification
THE CHT
where the same shape means something quite different in
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different contexts (see also Neisser 1967, p.47), it was 
as if I previously had been an "H" and was now an "A".
In a sense I was "the same" person yet I was changed by 
my totally different environment.
Gradually the underpinning processes and procedures 
that mediated my behaviour were undermined. Expectations 
were repeatedly refuted, for example: when one man said
"I can’t write" I rapidly discovered that it did not mean 
that he could not write like a D.H. Lawrence, it meant 
that he literally could not write at all. When I said to 
someone that I was always writing because I was after 
"the answers" he replied in all sincerity that when he was 
at school: "you could get books with the answers at the 
back, why don’t you get one of those books?"
From being regarded as an exciting and 
stimulating person to talk to I discovered that many 
"ordinary people" actually found me boring to talk to.
My whole programming was changed. Various if-then 
statements no longer were applicable. A certain facial 
expression on another’s part no longer meant "Well that’s 
a tough proposition to swallow". It now meant "I can’t 
understand what you’re talking about."
I could no longer happily and easily anticipate 
what would get a conversation started. The cognitive 
style appropriate to my new environment was not one that 
emphasised principles, ideas and concepts but one that 
emphasised anecdote, narrative and description. Interaction
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changed from being dialogue characterised to being 
dualogue or monologue characterised. I sensed a distinct 
unwillingness on the part of so-called "real people" 
to listen with the same attentiveness as I, they "already 
knew".
Ideas did not get an airing. There was no 
opportunity to internalise the jogs, jolts, blocks and 
refutations that one usually receives in a university 
environment. My cognitive style changed from self- 
correcting, self-monitoring and conversation seeking to 
self-satisfying, confirming and conversation avoiding.
My rule system for interaction no longer worked. 
Instead of negotiating a topic in discovery fashion by 
small steps, the system necessary and expected seemed to 
be based on a rule of mutual self-assertion - as if the 
implicit communication in discussion was "Here are my 
opinionated views, now give me yours."
And yet if all I had had to do was to move along 
existing dimensions (e.g. from cautious to risky or from 
giving two sided arguments to one sided arguments) or if 
I had had merely to explain myself a little more slowly 
and clearly there would have been no problem. The whole 
system I had in my mind was however "all wrong" in this 
context. There was no consistency as I had known it.
This was a 100 IQ environment. A different world. One 
could not merely change the values of the parameters in 
the equations, different equations were needed. As I was
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far too busy with my research I was really unprepared for 
this and hence eventually withdrew from a lot of everyday 
socialising, as I found it too stressful and unrewarding.
That my mystical state, had, so to speak "turned 
bad" may also have been due not only to my isolation and 
to "feeling different" but due to my very poor spiritual 
development at the time. Through years of training in 
traditional geology, physics and psychology I was really 
totally unprepared for and frightened by the domains the 
like of which I stumbled across - even though, as we have 
seen, I was tacitly seeking them. But in truth it was 
like taking a lamb to the slaughter. My full awareness 
of my own flaws and my feelings of inadequacy in the face 
of that which was much greater than I may have induced me 
to find a territory of negative meaning.
One obvious explanation, which rears its head 
given my extraordinary fear of disappearing and my feelings 
of passivity, is that this crisis overcame me because of 
low ego strength. However against this it must be said 
that I was, prior to this phase in my life, quite rational, 
patient, tolerant and judgementally accurate of people.
Such an explanation although irrefutable, as no-one has 
perfect ego strength, is callow psychologism.
What is more relevant, although flavoured with 
physiologism, is that, through shortage of money, I was 
not eating regularly and a lot of these insights and
experiences occurred^ at a time when I was smoking.*
*To check Vvtiether brain dysfunction was involved I had EEGs taken, thanks 
to contacts, at two London hospitals. No abnormalities could be detected
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Mysticism and delusion
As Lenz (1979, 1983) has argued: the early stages 
of delusion may be characterised by "super-rational" 
or mystical thinking such as I experienced) (Table 2) 
and my state did develop in such a way that I entertained 
thoughts of persecution. Maybe, I mused, the torrent 
of kaleidoscopic coincidences was actually engineered 
by some ’organisation’ intent on punishing me for my 
rather Dorian Gray-like private life of silken- women, 
broken hearts and sybaritism. This however was only 
credited by me with the status of a pure guess. The 
reality I had seen was not one of persecutory organisations 
or pseudocommunities, but of "forces" of a spiritual 
nature of tremendous power. Only, in 1981, through giving 
myself over into the hands of positive, life enhancing 
and loving influences which I sincerely perceived as coming 
from beyond myself was the crisis resolved.
The experience obviously was the source of the 
generally positive contextual approach adopted in this 
thesis. It also sensitised me to the possible mystical 
precursors and accompaniments of the delusional state and 
to equally possible paranormal accompaniments. Psychotics 
often report thought transference and, as argued by 
Eisenbud (1972), Lewis (1956), Telling (1928) and Ullman 
(1973), this may not always, or entirely, be delusional 
but in some instances may be a genuinely veridical 
experience. Schizotypals probably are more holistic than 
analytic and holistic personalities have indeed been shown
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TABLE 2. Similarities between the experience of mystics and religious 
leaders and those of patients in the early stages of 
delusion (after Lenz 1979, Table 1, p.189).
Irrational Experience
Abnormal feeling of 
importance
Patients’ expression
I have reached my 
true self.
I am enlightened, 
chosen, renewed.
I am united with God, 
I am a new messiah 
or saint.
I can see perfectly 
clearly.
I am inspired.
I am saved.
Mystics also reporting 
this experience______
(Ignatius Loyola (Ign) 
(John of God (Jo) 
(Theresa of Avila (Ther) 
(Zen Buddhists (Zen)
Delusions
Suddeness and 
passivity
Experience of mission
Polarity of moods
Suspension of feeling 
for time and space
I have had visions, 
received signs.
It happened suddenly. 
It overcame me.
I have been given 
a mission.
I must make a 
sacrifice.
I take the sufferings 
of others upon myself. 
I chastise myself.
I am overjoyed but 
it is not an earthly 
joy.
I have sinned against 
God.
I am in the power of 
the devil.
I am the active 
element of destructive 
powers.
I was not conscious 
of time and space.
Ign., Ther., Zen.
Ign. , Jo. , ITner. , 
Zen.
Ign.
Jo.
Ther., Zen.
Ign.
Jo.
Ther., Zen.
Ther., Zen.
Feeling of shame I am ashamed. Ther.
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to be better at ESP (Busby 1967). My own experience has 
therefore made me very tolerant and open-minded about the 
reports of previously psychotic people and has convinced 
me that to fully understand psychosis we may have to 
radically change our current ways of thinking.
Towards a Psychophysical Interpretation
The early stages of the episode described above 
may remind some readers of the Buddhist concept of Satori. 
This is a state of consciousness beyond duality, 
discrimination and differentiation. It is apparently 
the beginning rather than the end of Zen training. Some 
practitioners of Zen are also said to have developed 
clairvoyant, precognitive, telepathic and psychokinetic 
powers although they must never use them to further their 
self. An interpretation of my altered state in Buddhist 
terms might therefore be fruitful. The relevance of this 
approach seems to be particularly striking in the light 
of these remarks by Gabb (1944), "All Enlightenment is 
gradual, but its eruption into consciousness may be sudden 
in cases where its appearance has been obstructed by an 
over-active intellect or excess of sensuality". This could 
well have been written of myself. Similarly Kovel writes 
(1977, p.152), "The transcendent state potentially permits 
a spectrum of experiential states to occur. At one end 
is the attainment of the blissful state of reunion and 
unity; while the other faces the terror of repressed 
demonic forces. The situation is very much the same as
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having a good or bad drug trip." Zoehner (1957) is 
cutting, he writes that true mystical experiences lead to 
"sobriety", false ones to "drunkenness" and are a form of 
madness, specifically mania. However I doubt that we 
should assume that tranquillity and serenity are always 
the affective characteristics of the mystical experience.
In 1979 I was desperately searching beyond rationality 
My social situation and the state of mind my research had 
led me to produced an experience of torment comparable 
to that of the Zen student trapped by multiple koans 
such as the famous "what is the sound of one hand clapping?" 
Humphreys (1986) states that the Zen hopeful has to 
need Enlightenment and illumination like a man stuck 
underwater needs air. With this I would concur. One has 
to be squeezed into the mystical state by one's thinking 
being unable to turn neither left nor right, neither up 
nor down. Only when there is nowhere else to go, when 
every rational route is blocked, does one discover the 
Borderline/Sartori. It is nonsense to argue that the 
experience is false if it is accompanied by exhilaration.
Buddhist and related literature therefore certainly 
"talk the same language" as I but there are differences.
On page 46 of Humphreys (1986) we find, "Zen is therefore 
a matter of experience... it has a subject but no object.
It is impersonal, undirected, purposeless. There is no 
reference in the vast literature of recorded sartori to 
union with the Beloved, or to union at all. Zen is a
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zip-fastener between the opposites, it passes and they 
are no more". For me there was an experience of access, 
union, of self-loss, of renewal from somewhere, perhaps 
someone. Although there was Enlightenment there was 
enrichment from a source. My experience therefore had 
both Zen and Christian flavour.
Although we see discrepancies, then, from the 
sartori experience there are parallels with the impression 
of "dual unity" described by Grof (1975, pp.178-179) as 
a feature of the LSD experience, i.e. the paradoxical 
coexistence of a sense of unity with that of simultaneous 
awareness of one's own identity. Transpersonal 
experiences are also described as effects of LSD: the 
transcendence of distinctions such as self/other; past/ 
present/ future and time/space. There can be spatial 
expansion of consciousness, temporal expansion and 
experiential extension beyond the framework of objective 
reality.
Given the association of such experiences with 
delusion this provides sustenance to Claridge's belief 
(1978, 1985, p.183) that the LSD experience is a closer 
model of schizophrenia than is amphetamine psychosis.
Given these various parallels, we now need to 
ask what mental science has to say of these experiences.
Within psychology, extant theories of the middle 
ground have for the most part not attempted to encompass 
such experiences and phenomena except to the extent of
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regarding them as totally subjective at best and 
pathognomic at worst. They have been likened to Freud*s 
"oceanic feeling" and to be merely manifestations of 
regression (e.g. The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 
Report (1976) on Mysticism - devastatingly criticised 
and shown, in effect, to be worthless by Deikmann 1977). 
Freud himself, of course, like Deikmann (1966, 1977) and 
Ornstein (1986) did not take such a dismissive view of 
their significance.
Another exception is the theoretical superstructure 
developed by Jung under the heading of Analytical Psychology 
In a number of places above I have raised Jungian concepts 
and ideas. Jung was not naive, of course, to the phenomena 
one encounters in altered states of consciousness. His 
alas rather nebi^ous ideas have, however, been given 
substance and form and have been developed by Progoff 
(1973). Progoff discusses the kind of experience I had 
in terms of "a lowering of the mental level". His 
description of this state clearly maps one-to-one onto 
my own experience and so will be quoted at some length.
This "lowering" he says:
"opens the very deep stratum of the Self, the 
Psychoid, to whatever factors are present in 
the continuum of the Self. In this condition 
the Psychoid level of the psyche is open too 
influence of every possible kind. It is 
accessible to whatever forces and factors 
happen to be present at a given moment in the 
continuum of the Self, whether these are factors 
operating within one’s own psyche, within the 
psyche of others, or whether they are forces 
of any kind active in the universe.
Ill
Considering this, we recognise that in 
opening the individual at the psychoid level, 
the process of mental abaissement makes a 
person psychically vulnerable at the same 
time that it greatly enlarges the range of 
his psychic possibilities. The specific 
effect upon him depends on the nature of the 
other factors and influences that are present 
in the continuum of the Self within the range 
of his personal atmosphere. They may be 
affirmative or negative; beneficial or distinctive; 
they may assist the life of the person, or they 
may distract from it by giving false leadings 
and confusions."
Progoff goes on:
"each experience has to be appraised on its own 
merits, especially since its effects upon an 
individual depend a great deal upon the state 
of inner development within that person. In 
principle, the factors that exert influence during 
the condition of abaissement are of the greatest 
diversity. They may range from petty subjective 
anxieties to large visionary awarenesses of 
prophetic scope. They may reflect some small 
cranny of an individual microcosm or they may 
reflect the large wisdom of the macrocosm. Any 
of them may be reflected at the psychoid level 
when abaissement takes place" (Progoff 1973,
PP.ns'^TTtT.-----
Again on p.115 we find:
"when the 'lowering of the mental level' increases 
the sensitivity of the psyche to the reflections 
of the pattern [of being], the individual becomes 
capable of perception or cognition that goes 
beyond space and time in our usual causalistic 
sense. "
Progoff interprets such events in one's life as 
the experience of an archetypal symbol. This
"results in a sense of relationship to the 
interior workings of life, a sense of 
participation in the movements of the cosmos.
The individual at such moments feels his 
individuality to be exalted, as though he were 
transported for an instant to a higher dimension 
of being. Clearly the situation that is 
established when an archetype becomes active
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in human life is more than personal. It is 
felt to have what Jung speaks of as 'cosmic 
character' and this is derived from the 
fact, as he says, that it appears in the 
individual as a 'complementary equivalent 
of the 'outside world'". It is experienced 
with a great intensity, and it brings an 
awareness of a special light, a numinosity 
carrying a sense of transcendent validity, 
authenticity and essential divinity."
We may not agree with Progoffs interpretation 
(that is, if we can fully understand it) indeed the concept 
of archetype is generally rejected by most academic 
psychologists.through its untestability. However the 
important feature of these quotes is that Jung and Progoff 
are taking such exPej^le^nces ous 1 y and attempting to
understand them in terms of a theoretical structure which 
can also be deployed to understand the less portentous 
experiences of the average person in everyday life. In 
those terms the experiences of the normal, the mystic, 
the borderline psychotic and the psychotic may exist on 
a graded continuum. This is an invitation to us all to 
be accepting, tolerant, patient and, most important of 
all, to listen to those who report the uncanny.
Jung's concepts of synchronicity and of the archetype 
stand outside of contemporary science. My approach however 
is to build on current scientific theories and use current 
scientific techniques, pathetic though we may feel and 
they may be in the face of the task that confronts us, 
to eventually reach an understanding of the experiences 
both that I and the other people reported in these case 
studies, had. In doing so we may eventually up-date Jungian
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ideas and incorporate them into a coherent scientific 
framework.*
In this sense, I am rejecting the Buddhist advice 
not to try to understand the Tao but to just "be" with 
it. I am rejecting also the Christian’s advice to revere 
faith more than understanding. Indeed as Josephson argues 
(1977) a limited conception of God may well come within 
the purview of the theoretical accounts of modern physics 
in the foreseeable future. The next great unification 
may well be that of science and religion (Josephson 
1987). Similarly it may also be possible for 
us through work in physics, physiology and psychology 
to have a partial, albeit ultra-reductionistic, understanding 
of the mechanism of mystic knowing. Josephson has 
speculated (1977), following Lawrence Domash of Maharishi 
International University and Maharishi Mahesh Yogi that 
such knowing may be mediated by the sensitivity of sensory 
receptors to the dance of virtual particles.** Thinking
*Progoff (1973, P-I68) seeks to see if creative persons 
show a particular tendency towards the occurrence of 
synchronistic events. In this thesis I am essentially 
doing the reverse of this: seeking to find if people who 
have suffered a lot of synchronistic events turn out to 
be highly creative.
**A virtual particle is the nearest entity to non-existence 
there is. It is emitted by other fully-fledged particles 
e.g. the electron and then quickly reabsorbed again.
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle permits "something", 
a virtual particle, to be created out of "nothing" provided 
the cycle of creation and destruction is over with very 
quickly. Virtual particles may also be emitted by one 
particle and absorbed by others hence mediating interactions 
between them. They are thus^,very much "Borderline entities" 
hovering on the interface being being and non-being.
. . . continued ...
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along those lines would form the basis of a "new 
psychophysics", quite different in content and aims from 
the classical psychophysics of Weber and Fechner.
Jung himself presaged such a connection when he 
wrote that:
"Physics has demonstrated, as plainly as could 
be wished, that in the realm of atomic 
magnitudes objective reality presupposes 
an observer, and that only on this condition 
is a satisfactory scheme of explanation possible. 
This means that a subjective element attaches 
to the physicist's world picture, and secondly 
that a connection necessarily exists between 
the psyche to be explained and the objective 
space-time continuum."
This quote of Jung’s derives from his view of 
the implication of the discoveries of quantum physicists 
for an understanding of the world-inclusive-of-person.
A merging of psychology and physics in this new way is 
also one of the themes of Zukav’s controversial book (1980) 
which recounts the discoveries of twentieth century physics 
in a language accessible to laymen.
From the above it is clear that there is every 
reason to push ahead scientifically to understand the 
relation between the mystical, the delusional, the
**(footnote continued from previous page)
Another very speculative possibility is that the mystic 
and perhaps the psychotic can somehow "apprehend" probability 
waves, these also, as Heisenberg (1958) emphasised, hover 
in a Borderline domain between possibility and actuality.
Such apprehension would probably give an experience of 
"tendencies to existence", of unity and perhaps mediate 
precognition.
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paranormal and the spiritual. These are exciting times.
Starting points for a psychological understanding
What theoretical possibilities of a psychological 
nature therefore raise themselves in the light of the 
foregoing reports?
Speaking as a psychologist it seems to me that 
arguments about the sensitivity of sensory receptors to 
virtual particles cannot provide a complete theory of 
the mechanisms of mystic knowing. A reductionistic approach 
can give us only a mere glimpse of understanding of such 
a synthetic phenomenon but even in its own terms it is 
inadequate. By analogy: there is more to visual
perception than the detection of photons by the rods and 
cones of the retina. The receptors must, as in the visual 
system, be wired to large neural nets that are capable, 
even if previously dormant, of mediating the subjective 
experience. There must be a readiness, perhaps greater 
in some people than others, for a mystical style of 
knowing, in the brain, which is perhaps activated in part 
by virtual particles (maybe affecting dopaminergic 
transmission) much as visual abstract thinking is activated, 
in the first instance, by photons. We would have no 
appreciation of "redness" without the capacity of photon 
detection. Particle detection may be necessary for mystic 
knowing and visual abstraction, but it is not sufficient 
for it.
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We therefore have to consider the other conditions 
of the brain which mediate and facilitate such experiences 
given the possibility of virtual particle detection or 
mediation as a kind of starting point. It may well be 
the case that those other conditions or processes will 
lower the threshold of detectors even further in Top-Down 
fashion so creating a positive feedback system which 
amplifies and intensifies the experience further. 
Alternatively, perhaps there are higher post-synaptic 
potentials in schizotypal or otherwise vulnerable people 
which allow very weak stimuli to trigger action potentials 
by bringing membrane potential closer to threshold.
There seems little doubt that creative mystical 
insights can occur in states of high global arousal.
Yet we find, for example, in Gellhorn and Kiely (1972), 
that the physiological change which accompanies the mental 
state of meditation is a shift to increased parasympathetic 
discharges and relaxation of skeletal muscles. (They 
do point out however that Yogis may reach ecstasy via 
enhanced cortical excitation wj.^h_ouj increased skeletal 
muscle tone). Thinking however at a fairly molar level: 
some people e.g. A.E. Housman were creative under the 
influence of alcohol, a largely depressant drug, others 
e.g. Freud, under the influence of stimulants such as 
nicotine and cocaine. In this context Karlsson (1978, 
p.189) speaks of the more flighty "scatterbrained" 
hypomanie and the more persistent, profound depressive 
styles of creativity - which presumably implies behaviour
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at extremes of, at least, felt arousal. If we push this 
further we find that in this country, religious experience 
usually is assumed to be most accessible in a state of 
quiet relaxed contemplation as in prayer, yet in less 
conservative countries, religious ecstasy and experience 
is repeatedly attained after hours of dancing and chanting. 
There is a pattern here. The mystical and creative states 
and the state of spiritual awareness are all it seems 
particularly achievable at arousal extremes, either very 
low or very high. Not surprisingly, high creative 
production has been linked by different authors with low 
(Osgood I960; Blum 1961) and high (Bachtold 1980) arousal. 
In this thesis we will investigate this possible non­
inverted U pattern in the context of performance on various 
tests of creativity and we will see if creativity scores 
show any consistent relation with indices of autonomic 
and cortical arousal, felt arousal, arousal variation 
and arousal control/modulation.
The mystical and the paranormal are also enhanced 
by an attitude of risk, of gullibility, vigilance and 
belief. A verificationist attitude coupled with a 
willingness to open oneself up to remote associations, 
unusual combinations and brave speculations. This was 
very much my tone in 1979. Whilst researching the 
verificationist tendency I came to "live it" and its 
effects. One counsellee also said to me that when he 
was "getting ill" he managed, with tremendous effort, 
to reflect on this, saying to himself: "I keep fitting
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everything in, and I can’t stop!" Therefore it seems 
that access to the realms of the uncanny is enhanced by 
an amplification of confirmation bias. Highly creative 
scientists also tend to demonstrate this bias strongly 
(Mitroff 1974; Tweney, Doherty and Mynatt I98I). We will 
therefore study confirmation bias experimentally in the 
context of arousal levels and creativity and attempt to 
measure its intensity in both psychotics and non-psychotics.
The general picture which emerges from this chapter 
then is of a definite multiple overlap between the domains 
of mystical and delusional thinking (Lenz 1979, 1983) 
between psychosis and the paranormal (Ehrenwald 1972;
Eisenbud 1972; Lewis 1956; Telling 1928; Ullman 1973), 
between physics, psychology and religion (Josephson 1977, 
1987), between creativity and mysticism and between the 
mystical, the paranormal and the spiritual - as we have 
seen in my own case report. These dimensions of human 
experience seem to be related. We will examine their 
relations further in the next two case studies, those 
of Alana J. and Chris, both creative people who have suffered 
the ravages of psychosis. Then, after considering a person 
whose experience does not fit our patterns (so as to avoid 
confirmation bias in our investigation itself!) we will 
look at the outcome of the experimental and psychometric 
studies.
119
CHAPTER FIVE
ALANA J
Introduction and first "episode"
In Chapter One I referred caustically to the negative 
bias in research on schizophrenia which propels researchers 
forward in the hunt for the schizophrenic deficit. Claridge 
(1985, pp.152-153) also bemoans this sad state of affairs. 
There is however a parallel negative bias in research 
on the, perhaps related, area of sexual variations.
I will deliberately attempt to counteract this bias in 
this study of a schizoaffective infantilist and fetishist: 
Alana J,
Psychoanalytic investigations suggest a borderline 
or outrightly psychotic level of personality functioning 
in sexual variants of gender disturbed and/or fetishistic 
orientation (e.g. Batz 1953; Lewis 1963; Ovesey and Person 
1978; Payne 1939), findings consonant with the results 
of some psychometric research (Taylor and McLachlan 1963; 
Bentler and Prince 1970a, b) but not all - see for example 
the generally low psychoticism scores reported in Gosselin 
and Wilson (I98O) and Gosselin and S.B.C. Eysenck (1980).
The direction of causality problem however is 
a very serious one in this context, for example when 
neuroticism scores have to be interpreted or when scores 
on paranoid sensitivity are assessed. (Note the total 
neglect of this vital issue in Beatrice 1985).
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Although there is much search for high scoring 
patterns on scales reflecting pathology there is a singular 
absence of investigations into the intelligence, creativity 
and imaginativeness, abstract thinking capacities, daring 
and capacities for pleasure of the variant groups, all 
of which, I think, would repay enquiry. In this case 
study we will therefore "turn the coin over" and examine 
the other side of the link between sexual variation and 
psychotic functioning.
It frequently is said in the human sciences literature 
that fetishism is virtually unknown in women. Gosselin 
and Wilson (1980), for example, base their entire study 
of this variation on men. This, despite the obvious 
pleasure women obtain from wearing clothes in silk, satin, 
taffeta and chiffon. The intensity of the experience 
may be less than the male equivalent but a sensuous delight 
in the caress of such fabrics obviously is so endemic 
in the female sex that nobody would ever consider there 
to be anything "abnormal" about it.
Alana’s fetishism was more ostentatiously sexual.
She was, from her earliest years stimulated by transparent 
plastic baby pants and nappies. The reader may initially 
find this rather amusing and indeed she expected laughter 
and ridicule from people were it ever to become known.
It was her great secret, kept from everyone, including 
the psychiatrists and social workers who tried to help 
her. Unknown to all, Alana would masturbate whilst sat
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on a chair with a plastic sheet wrapped around her hips 
and buttocks. Later she did this whilst wearing plastic 
incontinence pants, a nappy, and sometimes surrounded 
by transparent PVC clothes. At other times she would 
at night fantasise about a warm loving older woman who 
she liked to think would "mummy" her.
Alana had very strong lesbian tendencies. She 
had been raped three times as a teenager and every boy 
she went out with seemed only interested in her for the 
sexual side of the relationship. This had not helped 
her to realise her, undoubtedly present, heterosexual 
capacity. Nonetheless she had felt a conscious sexual 
attraction to older women ever since the age of four.
Her greatest pleasure was to be bathed and powdered by 
an older woman, have her put a nappy and plastic pants 
on her, and then for the woman to allow her to suckle 
at her (preferably large) breasts. She had longed for 
this since childhood but only eventually realised it at 
the age of 36, many years after her episodes.
Alana described her first "breakdown" as a kind 
of anxiety attack at the age of 23- She cried uncontrollably 
for a week. One problem was her hair, which had been 
very long and she had had it cut short. She was very 
upset by the result: it made her look like a man. (Looking 
and feeling rather like a man was a long standing problem 
for her right up to the time when I first met her).
Another problem was that she was in love with another
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woman but could not make a sexual relationship with her.
She believes that the frustration of both these problems 
and of her sexual situation in general was what made her 
break down. She was working as a nurse at the time and 
was referred by the nurses’ doctor to a psychiatrist - 
but she did not go back after the first meeting because 
she thought the really important issues were her fetishism 
and lesbianism and she was not prepared to discuss those 
desires with him.
Her first psychotic experience was in 1974 when 
she was 26. Before it she describes her life as having 
been terrible. She used to lose her temper frequently, 
get drunk (usually on whisky) and cry a great deal.
Anything she did not enjoy used to make her feel that 
she was wasting time. She could not make friends nor 
communicate with people and she wished desperately that 
she could have confidence and be an interesting person.
The only thing that really gave her pleasure was training 
to be a dancer.
Eventually she found she could not sleep and became 
very depressed. She jumped out of the first floor window 
of her flat ("as a cry for help") but that act really, 
she felt, brought on the psychosis. After it she started 
noticing colours and felt that they had some meaning.
Her mind was racing: "there were too many thoughts in 
my head" she said. Everything that happened had a meaning; 
she could not eat; her thoughts kept "going round and 
round". She went to her G.P. who put her on soluble
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aspirin plus something "to relax her stomach" with the 
aim of enabling her to eat.
She started to think that she was being followed 
and watched. When a car went past, especially if it was 
red, it had been sent "to keep an eye on her". All this 
time she was "madly in love" with her dance teacher.
A piece of lemon skin in a glass had been left by this 
teacher as a message that she'd be back to see her - because 
the skin "reminded her of the sun" (?). Everything David 
Hamilton said on the radio was directed at her and all 
the songs had meaning relevant to her situation. Then 
the TV programmes and the contents of Woman’s Own also 
became directed at her. She was convinced she was going 
to go on Broadway.
Despite all this she did not go into hospital 
and had no treatment, (her mother put everything down 
to malnutrition) but the strange experiences nonetheless 
subsided after 6-8 weeks. Then she made a critical decision 
to give herself one_year to somehow "make it" as a dancer. 
Eleven months later another episode overwhelmed her.
Background
The story so far is a fairly standard one. Every 
psychiatrist knows of the high incidence of sexual 
problems and variations in people diagnosed as schizophrenic 
or schizoaffective etc. All of Alana’s experiences thus 
reported also fit easily into established categories of
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"delusions of persecution", "ideas of reference" and 
"interpenetration of thoughts".
The superficial impression of Alana herself may 
seem to the reader to be one of low self-confidence, 
inability to communicate and poor social skills, temper 
tantrums, unrealistic dreams, drunkenness, "perversion" 
and madness. It would be all too easy to view her in 
that way, elementary and effortless to weave interpretations 
from her life history data which would present her as 
an inadequate fantasiser. Yet having known her for seven 
years (I met her at about the same time as David B. with 
whom she was friendly) that is not, for me, the story 
that emerges at all.
When I first met this young .lady I found that 
when she was relaxed and at ease she was an extremely 
entertaining conversationalist with a considerable 
knowledge of dancing and the world of dance and a 
remarkable aesthetic sense. We went to see a documentary 
film about the working life of models together and her 
comments on it revealed tremendous sensitivity to the 
models' non-verbal behaviour and a finely tuned sense 
of what is good and what is bad art. I rapidly realised 
that this girl's failures to communicate were due to 
mixing with people who were completely unsuited to her. 
Really she would have been far better off in a school 
of art.
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Convinced that, as with Shafiq, I was dealing 
with a very talented person I gave her the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale. She scored no less than 146 on verbal 
ability and 114 on the performance scale, with an overall 
IQ of 133. And this was an ex-hotel chamber maid. After 
Thurstone's finding that verbal fluency correlates 0.69 
with full scale IQ score (Thursto ne and Thurstone 1941) 
it was not surprising to find that Alana obtained the 
second highest fluency score in the experimental 
investigation out of a sample of 59 people. (She was 
only beaten by a modern languages graduate). This test 
involved generating as many words as one could think of 
that began with a particular letter. Later, to check 
that the result was not a fluke, I tested her again 
against myself on letters other than the one used in the 
experiment. She out-performed me every time.
Psychopathologists may expect me to state that 
Alana’s thinking was "disordered" or confused. On the 
contrary she demonstrated exceptional clarity of mind 
and excellent planning and organisational ability. One 
social worker who was friendly with her even repeatedly 
took advice from her and would praise her "remarkable 
powers of common sense". This high ability had not been 
entirely dormant in her earlier years. Throughout her 
days at school she had always come either top or very 
near the top in history, art, geography and biology (but 
was totally non-plussed by physics and mathematics).
Generally however she had found her school rigid, puritanical
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and authoritarian, obviously totally unsuited to her liberal 
minded intuitive and divergent thinking personality.
She left with only two ’0 ’ levels.
It is clear that Alana was not only intelligent 
in the conventional sense but that she also had high 
"bodily kinaesthetic" intelligence in the sense of Gardner 
(1985). Although she had talent as a dancer her real 
wish was to be a choreographer. A very secondary wish - 
not uncommon among bisexual girls - was to be a stripper.
Once she gave me a display in her flat of one of her erotic 
routines. I sat through the entire performance with a 
solid erection.
She had been keen on modern dancing and ballet 
many years before it became fashionable and she had excellent 
dress sense. She attempted to write a lesbian novel and 
created some passages of literary merit but could not, 
alas, achieve integration, in book form, of her ideas.
As a child she had been told that she ought to 
become a comedienne. Indeed she could create hilariously 
funny dance routines with the same skill that she could 
generate erotic ones and she also had an enormously amusing 
repertoire of voices and faces. Everybody who knew her 
liked her; of her one man said "Alana can talk to anyone, 
she’s a gem". Her lover, an older woman, described her 
as "a sweet and loving girl".
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Given this very positive picture of her, how did 
she stumble across the psychotic state?
Although we must assume that Alana had a long 
dormant capacity for psychosis the great source of stress 
in her life was her mother. She was a small, rather tight- 
lipped woman with a "strong" personality who dominated 
her husband, a warm Irishman, and who had very fixed ideas 
about right and wrong, good and bad. She once said to 
me, with almost a threatening expression: "I’m a Big
Royalist and a Big Tory." She was very much "against 
blacks", thought Mary Whitehouse was "a wonderful woman" 
and if any sexually tinged scene appeared on television 
would complain vociferously. She always preferred Alana’s 
sister and indeed showed this when she left two-thirds 
of her estate to her on her death and only one-third to 
Alana.
Alana’s unpredictability and disobedience was 
an anathema to her. Alana had very much a mind of her 
5 own, was perhaps best described as "a raver" in her earlier 
years and was not mindful of the Victorian values which 
her mother prized so highly. Her sister (Barbara) was 
a very hard working girl, a teacher, who, although not 
totally averse to crossing swords with their mother, was 
not really the kind of person who would follow Alana into 
the (then) underground world of lesbianism (1971- ) and
drugs (1963-65). Her persistence and grit was much to 
her mother’s liking. Generally when the family went out 
on walks, Alana would walk with their father and Barbara 
with their mother.
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Alana’s mother explained: "I used to give Alana
and Barbara a job to do and I ’d come back five minutes 
later to find that Alana had gone off somewhere and left 
Barbara to do the job on her own.’’
Interestingly, one summer, when Alana was eight 
and her sister six, Alana had come out of the garden and 
told her mother: ’’Barbara’s dead ! " Her mother had rushed
out, found it was untrue, and gone "absolutely hysterical" 
at Alana’s deception.
There was not a single point or aspect of life 
on which Alana and her mother saw eye to eye. The only 
thing they had in common was that they were both talented 
artists. So "strong" and immovable was her mother that 
Alana reacted frequently by erupting into temper tantrums 
and screaming rages which of course only made matters 
worse in the long term. Of her, her mother said to me: 
"She’s given me Hell!!" Alana had even once stuck a fork 
in her arm.
The tapestry we are weaving so far seems to depict 
a colourful creative Alana, very much of Dionysian spirit, 
pitched against a stoical Apollonian mother whose mind 
was dominated by the protestant ethic. From afar off 
that was how it was. But Alana was not all peaches and 
cream. Like David B ., and possibly Shafiq, there was 
a definite problem in what I referred to earlier as 
"behavioural modulation". She would move from being "very 
sweet" into a state of barely controllable fury after
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taking only a few light and rapid steps through a narrow 
middle ground. I saw Alana’s temper a number of times: 
it was indeed quite terrifying - and could reach frightening 
proportions in a few tens of seconds. Similarly she would 
show high motivation and enthusiasm about a task or topic 
and then, almost in an instant, lose interest completely 
and become apathetic and lethargic. Her life seemed to 
be an oscillation between passion and depression, between 
believing what she wanted to believe (especially about 
the chances of a loved woman reciprocating her affections) 
and plunging into a state where she felt totally unlovable, 
pathetic and useless. This modulation problem was the 
source of her unpredictability and must have evoked great 
discontent in her mother who, by her style, was totally 
ill-equipped to handle her.
Alana said that she had never felt loved by her 
mother who she perceived mainly as a restrictor of her 
spontaneity and imagination. From her sexual variation 
it is possible to infer that she had felt loved as an 
infant but that this love had been withdrawn as she gained 
more independence. The birth of her sister, eighteen 
months her junior, had probably not helped in this respect.
Her mother was not a warm woman, Alana never 
remembers her ever once cuddling her, and when Alana’s 
father died of heart trouble in 1976 Alana felt totally 
alone.
She had moved to London, from the North, in 1971 
so as to join "the gay scene", (her mother had reacted
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with total silence when she admitted her lesbianism to 
the family, although her father was more sympathetic).
Alas she was looking for a warm feminine lover but she 
describes the scene she found as full of feminists, 
intellectuals and dykes. Trousers, jumpers and short 
haircuts abounded on cold faced, bitter, word-spinning 
women whereas she sought a human caring woman in dresses, 
high heels and perfume. Such a person could not be found.
In despair she took more and more to her fetishism 
which she indulged with great guilt and which induced 
considerable sub-clinical paranoia. She was not able 
to practise it very often and her frustration and 
loneliness eventually built up to an intolerable level.
One ray of light in her life was her (for once) 
sustained love of dancing and of her dance teacher - a 
very creative, feminine woman who, apart from her rather 
small breasts, was everything Alana had ever dreamed of 
and ever dreamed of being. It was in this context of 
a history of puritanical authoritarian restriction, current 
loneliness, sexual passion and frustration, guilt, paranoia 
and love that Alana accessed the psychotic domain.
The second episode
She had given herself a year to work her way into 
a professional dance group. After eleven months she half­
realised that this was not going to happen; still her 
enthusiasm for dancing remained undiminished. In fact
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she said that at that time she lived for it, it was 
"something special" in her life.
Penniless, unloved, vastly underemployed as a 
chamber maid, mixing in her time off with butch lesbian 
women who she hated she would regularly dance herself 
high. The music of Stevie Wonder, famous for its spiritual 
character, plus various other artists such as Earth, Wind 
and Eire, The Average White Band, Bob Marley and The Pointer 
Sisters would, with her dancing movements, transport her 
as if into another dimension of being. Time and space 
would be suspended, she would be filled with a sense of 
idyllic beauty. Her little room, boring job, butch lesbian 
acquaintances, distant mother, all would be left behind 
as she danced herself into an ecstatic state of union 
with Pure Love.
The episode happened very quickly. She sat meditating 
in her room (a state known to produce low autonomic but 
high cortical arousal (Banquet 1973; Hirai 1974; Orme- 
Johnson 1973)). She heard a chorus of Hallelujahs in 
her head. She heard a baby cry as if it had just been 
born. She was convinced she had been born again and that 
this was a turning point in her life. At about the same 
time she thought she had ESP.
She kept hearing her dance teacher whispering
her own name. She was deeply in love with this woman
and in a deluded way believed that she was in love with
her too. This seems to have been a pure wish-fulfilment
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delusion - what we might call an "optatic" delusion after 
the Latin op_ta_ta which means "according to one’s wishes".
Her reasoning seems to have been: "I am a lesbian,
therefore she (I wish and hope) is a lesbian. I love 
her, therefore she (I wish and hope) loves me." When 
I presented this, obviously very straightforward, 
interpretation to her she said, "Yes! Yes, that’s it 
exactly!" Other delusions, however, do not fit this pattern 
so easily. She thought, when she lay on the floor of 
her room that "people" were taking photographs of her 
through the ceiling. Her head kept going from side to 
side and she felt that she was in some sort of trance. 
Psychotic experiences were exacerbated at night whenever 
she lay on her back in bed. She felt quite "normal" and 
rational during the day.
Eventually, back in her hotel room she, like myself, 
experienced uncanny taps and clicks and, again like myself, 
discovered their code of one click or tap for Yes, two 
for No. This lasted for about a day. The housekeeper 
brought a doctor to see her because she could not sleep 
nor wash nor even go to the canteen. She was admitted 
immediately. Once she left her room she forgot all about 
the clicks and they never returned. She was put on 
medication and never "relapsed" again.
Alana now rarely talks of her episodes. This 
I think is a good sign. Perhaps I was able to help her:
I was narcissistically gratified one day when she said 
"I’ve been happy since I met you." She now has a good
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job and a relationship with a feminine older woman who 
she loves deeply. She still takes medication which she 
feels helps her to handle anxiety and depression. It 
is the latter, more than anything else, which she still 
needs verbal support for. Her relationship and identification 
with her love - a successful businesswoman - has at last 
given her the motivation to work and the tenacity to hold 
down a job.
Reflections on Alana J .
Comparing Alana's experiences with mine, reported 
in Chapter Four, we can see some parallels. She seems 
to have accessed a mystical state, though transiently, 
through dance and possibly suffered acoustic paranormal 
phenomena. (Whether her belief in her ESP was veridical 
or not we shall, of course, never know). This Borderlining 
state, as in Lenz’s cases (1979, 1983) sadly collapsed 
into delusion. Perhaps if there is a motivation to leave 
an intolerable reality, one cannot immediately use what 
one has discovered at the periphery of sanity to enrich 
one’s own life and that of others and one ceases to be 
effective in the world.
Her access to the mystical state was achieved 
in a state of high arousal and under great stress. Possibly 
repeated excitation, in a person who cannot anyway modulate 
it easily, weakens^an inhibitory mechanism (as suggested 
by Malmo (1957)) permitting excitation to rise eventually 
to disruptive levels.
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Callow reductionists will merely state that 
Alana suffered a biochemically mediated altered state 
of consciousness with no objective reference. In contrast 
I suggest that her experience, like my own, reveals that 
the brain in certain states can mediate the intuitive 
awareness of a deeper reality usually only revealed to 
physicists and mystics. The understanding of psychosis, 
on this view, is partly a problem for physics. Consequently 
psychology and psychiatry are not only at the intersection 
of biology and sociology but of physics and religion.
Alana’s crises, like those of all the people so 
far discussed, have stimulated her religious sensitivity.
She was confirmed in 1983 and has no hesitation in going 
for a half hour of silent prayer at times of inner turmoil. 
This in itself reveals how, for some people. Borderline 
experiences touch the very heights and depths of their 
being, revealing superconscious as well as unconscious 
capacities and an extra-dimensional aspect to reality.
Now, in a generally calmer state of mind and having 
found what she was looking for^sexually, Alana is 
consolidating all she learned from her episodes and is 
moving forward into what looks like a highly productive 
and happy future.
It would be wrong to end the study of her with 
the implication that she can be validly pictured now as 
walking off into the sunset with her lover. Affairs between 
lesbians or bisexual women are just not like that, if
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any affairs ever were. However, although Alana still 
suffers paranoid and depressive thoughts from time to 
time she does get on with her life and has improved her 
situation, through her own efforts, out of all recognition 
compared to its dishevelled state in 1979/80.
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CHAPTER SIX
CHRIS
Introduction and background
A classic example of the popular notion of an 
"undiscovered genius", Chris describes himself, with 
humility, as "a drawer" rather than an artist. Yet every 
drawing he reveals evokes immediate gasps of admiration 
from every person I have ever known who has seen his work.
He has had some illustrations published but I cannot display
his work to the reader without prejudicing his future - 
his style is so distinctive that it is easily recognisable - 
and there are still many people who steadfastly believe 
that anyone diagnosed as schizophrenic cannot produce 
great art. Chris secretes fantastic highly original images
onto paper like - to put it pithily - a cow secretes milk.
He has had very little formal instruction in drawing 
techniques, his is a raw largely untutored talent.
His images have always been "other worldly".
Asked to represent a particular shoe or nude he has not 
usually done a better-than-average job. He has had a 
long standing interest in science fiction, this caters 
for his wide ranging iridescent imagination and his penchant 
for "free style" production. This preference for a largely 
unconstrained atmosphere for creative endeavour he shares 
with David B . , Shafiq and Alana J. Chris is an extreme 
manifestation of it; given the whole field so that he
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can exude that which is within he produces strikingework 
Narrow the array and make demands and his efforts 
deteriorate. Yet there is no doubt that there is a more, 
than-average talent there.
Twenty-one when I first met him, in 1980, he was 
a very pleasant, friendly and attractive young man with 
a tremendous sense of humour. He would regularly generate 
hilariously funny analogies and far-fetched witticisms 
demonstrating verbally the same level of creativity that 
he did visuo-spatially. If, however, as Mednick (1962) 
argues, creativity is demonstrated in the production of 
useful contextually appropriate remote associations then 
Chris was even more genuinely creative in the verbal sphere.
I always regarded this young man as rather like 
a breath of fresh air. His wit, automatically unpredictable, 
and his colourful interests would always blow any gathering 
cobwebs out of my mind, sharpen my perception and produce 
plenty of belly laughs. He was (judging from their 
remarks) also attractive to women because of his great 
sense of humour, his unassuming, perhaps rather hesitant 
manner with them, his pleasant fresh-faced appearance 
and his light, entertaining but warm conversation.
Chris would often say that his problem areas lay 
in the territory of self-assertiveness and self-confidence. 
Although attractive to women he did not really believe
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himself to be and the task of asking girls to dance would 
fill him with great apprehension. Although enjoyable 
to talk with he was shy and spent a lot of time on his 
own. A talented drawer he downplayed every production, 
compared himself unfavourably with recognised artists 
and displayed his creations only with reticence. The 
picture is rather similar to the "avoidant personality" 
of DSM III (1980); similarly, whereas the hypomanie person 
overestimates their ability, Chris would habitually under­
estimate his resources and performance in virtually every 
area of life in an almost "hypodepressive" manner. Such 
tendencies are, in part, indicative of such a personality.
He had two elder brothers, one of whom, Michael, 
was also diagnosed as schizophrenic. His father was a 
retired jobbing builder and greengrocer. He was a regular 
gambler and was also very partial to a drink. He seemed 
not to have made a close relationship with Chris. In 
contrast, his mother, who worked as a cleaner, was an 
exceptionally caring and loving woman who was very 
concerned for his welfare. Rather like David B ’s mother, 
warmth and affection fairly exuded from her. In many 
ways, especially through the psychotic episodes of her 
two sons, she fairly carried the household on her shoulders, 
worked hard and was difficult to anger. Although it might 
be said that she wanted her sons to leave home and be 
independent, yet spoiled them in such a way as to keep 
them there, I really cannot see that she was double-binding 
them in this way any more so than do millions of other
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loving mothers nationwide. If Chris’s mother was the 
pathogenic core then half the nation’s children would 
currently be in psychiatric units.
First episode
His first experience of psychosis occurred in 
1980 when he was living with his parents. He had left 
his job as a clerical assistant and was unemployed. He 
spent a lot of time on his own, reading, watching 
television and listening to music. He would argue a lot 
with his father because the latter came home drunk most 
nights. Chris would go on long walks especially to parks 
and spend the whole day there. He felt depressed and 
anxious and suffered from tachycardia and pains in the 
chest. He would go to the pictures on his own (seeing 
both "The Exorcist" and "Alien" twice), severed all contacts 
with friends and spent a lot of time at Speakers’ Corner - 
where he was "affected" by one particular speaker who 
used to quote a cocktail of Nietzische, Hitler, The Bible 
and Idris Shah ("Caravan of Dreams") with remarkable 
accuracy.
His pre-delusional state involved strange feelings 
devoid of concrete thoughts, a kind of "meaning feeling"
(see p. 178 ). Some content then crystallised:
"people looked strange"; he was "not at one with society"; 
"things were coming to a head". He was a Kafkaesque figure, 
different, tormented. Then through a kind of gestalt
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synthesis he crystallised a delusion from the solitude 
of his room that there was a war on. A 1984 regime of 
a neo-Nazi character was in power. He even thought he 
was Jewish and that the regime would, as he put it, bungle 
him away into a concentration camp. Under this delusion, 
which he described as "the funnel through which everything 
flowed" even an otherwise trifling event such as a visit 
to the post office took extraordinary courage. Outside 
the streets looked different, old and decayed as in the 
Second World War. He was taken to hospital by his father 
after he impulsively threw himself out of the first floor 
window of his parents' flat. He said that he di,d this 
"because of frustration and anxiety" and because he 
wanted to escape from his situation. This event seemed 
to mentally awaken his father to the fact that all was 
not well with his son.
There is a pattern in the approach to Chris's 
episode demonstrative of my early expectation in this 
research noted on p. 30 . Not getting on with his parents 
and not feeling that he really articulated well with his 
friends and with society, Chris withdrew. This withdrawal 
meant he placed himself in a situation which gave him 
licence to entertain himself with his own imaginings free 
from the jogs and corrections one usually receives to 
one's ongoing thoughts when one indwells in the world.
Free from constraints and from the modificatory feedback 
one receives through airing one's ideas to others, Chris 
indulged his undoubtedly original mind such that he came
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to see patterns in the clouds of his own fantasies.
Before he crystallised his "1984 delusion" he 
became interested in many things but was committed to 
none. His attention would flit from one topic to another 
as if driven by a craving for mental excitement. His 
idea that "things were coming to a head" probably reflected 
his feeling that he could not entirely control the 
incrementally rising arousal of his own brain. Again 
a form of modulation problem raises its head.
The delusion itself was a creative leap. Through 
it he understood why the world was strange and different 
but he had done it without anyone telling him. With his 
own imagination he had worked out "what was going on".
Via his delusion he was transacting with a world with 
which he could not normally communicate. This I think 
is generally true: the delusion is an arcuate leap towards 
productive integrated functioning. By constructing a 
world on his own terms the deluded person can, at last, 
transact with it. They may be persecuted or the centre 
of attention or both but at least in a sense they are 
"in" the world and no longer an outsider. The delusion 
is a vehicle for a social process; now the person "under­
stands" the world; they know how it is structured; the 
rules are laid bare. No longer are they puzzled and 
confused, uncertain and hesitant, they are plunged right 
into the middle of a network of relations which makes 
them very much at one with ongoing life.
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On this view Maher's belief (1974, p.104) - which 
is very relevant in Chris's case - that the delusion enables 
the person to say implicitly: "Now at least I know the 
worst" is nonetheless a corollary to the central concern.
Chris, like all the people discussed so far, was 
an inveterate enquirer, seeking the truth behind 
appearances; the projector loaded with film behind the 
screen and its fleeting images. .Carl Sagan has argued 
(1977, p.183) that science is a paranoid pattern seeking 
process applied to nature; conversely paranoia is the 
result of a scientific attitude operating to find patterns 
in inadequate data.
Just as visual illusion is more likely when 
impoverished degraded stimuli are looked at with one eye 
by an expectant observer so, I think, delusion is more 
likely when an impoverished social situation is viewed 
by an active questing mind. Since information is never 
complete,visual illusion, to some degree, accompanies 
all of our perceptions and so a limited measure of 
delusion is also a fact, almost an inevitable fact, of 
life (see for example, Charles MacKay's book on popular 
delusions (1841) and the research on the very common 
delusion^to the effect that "people get what they deserve" - 
the so-called Just World delusion (Lerner 1970, 1974;
Rubin and Peplau 1975; Wagstaff 1982, 1983; Wagstaff and 
Quirk 1983)). That ambiguity and ignorance may facilitate 
delusion has also been suggested by J.G. Miller (1951, 
p.277).
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We see clearly in Chris’s case how a delusion 
is a creative thought and I would concur in a general 
sense with Freud's belief (1911) that it is a creative 
action in the service of self-cure. Just as our under­
standing of the "how" of the creative process itself is 
limited, so is our understanding of the initiation of 
delusional belief. The consequences of delusion, however, 
are more transparent. Whilst Chris's thought gave him 
a world context in which he at last found a place, the 
actual effect of that thought was the reverse of the 
unconscious motive that preceded it. (Hence the result 
of a delusion need not be the cause of it). A delusion 
could be said to take a person one step forward towards 
the world and then two steps backward away from it. Chris 
was mortally terrified of the world that he then perceived 
He knew the world but did not like the consequences of 
his own belief. He sought a locale in society and found 
hell in his own mind. Not surprisingly he leapt through 
a window into oblivion.
Second episode
-This occurred two years later when he was living 
in a hostel. He had felt that he was being "pushed and 
pulled" by the other people who lived there. He started 
to withdraw; refused to eat or talk with other people 
except to snap at, or argue with them. At the time he 
felt a lot of anger towards his father who was often drunk 
He wanted to be left alone and didn't want to say anything 
to anyone .
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He heard a record by Clock DVA entitled "Thirst" 
and took it to mean that "the way out" was to de-vi-ate.
A phone-in programme on the radio "sounded strange", he 
was sure it was all a hoax and even tried taping it to 
prove it. Eventually he found that his brain was "going 
at ten million miles an hour". If he said anything it 
would set off a shock wave of double, triple and quadruple 
meanings; thoughts were racing and ricocheting around 
his mind.
He became unable to sleep and lay on his bed 
for two days with his bedside lamp on. He felt he was 
in a cellar, the walls of his room were grainy and seemed 
to be very dirty. There were insects, so he thought, 
crawling about on the walls but when he looked hard they 
disappeared. He thought that the hostel was on fire, 
he could smell burning. The rest of the people who lived 
in the hostel were having sex with the Jewish girl who 
lived in the next room. There were security cameras 
everywhere, he was being constantly monitored. Being 
a smoker he needed tobacco but the effort needed to go 
to the shop to get it was gargantuan. Still he went.
When people said to him that he had "got to get out of 
this state" he took that to mean that he had got to get 
out of town.
Eventually a doctor was brought and he was admitted 
immediately to a psychiatric unit.
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Brief update and overview
Chris has kept out of hospital since 1982. Although 
he has not yet settled down into stable full-time employment 
he has done quite a number of further education classes 
in English, Art and Study Skills and worked full time 
as a security guard for several months.
He married in December 1983, a woman seventeen 
years his senior, but alas the marriage only lasted six 
months and was marred partly by his extreme jealousy.
They are still good friends, like each other, and both 
accept that their decision to get married was made impulsively
Chris once went for psychotherapy but, like Shafiq, 
gave this up, in disgust, after two sessions. He now 
is a keen computer user and wishes to embark on courses 
in computer graphics. The use of a computer as an instrument 
for his inventive visual imagination would seem to promise 
results of great interest and vitality.
In the first three to five years of this study 
I sought hard for evidence of unconscious hostility (after 
Knight 1940), unconscious homosexuality (after Freud 1911), 
defenses against shame and humiliation (after Colby 1976, 
1977), evidence of the suffering of early sadism (after 
Cameron 1959) and various assorted communication distortions 
within the families of these people, Chris included.
Despite looking for the subtlest hints in non-verbal 
behaviour; slips of the tongue; fleeting facial expressions;
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indeed for anything that might be revealed in an unguarded 
moment I was genuinely unable to sustain these basically 
negatively toned theories.
In Chris's case, as in them all, any troubling 
hostility was overt and fully conscious, homosexuality 
trivial and impotent as a force, his family caring and 
his school and early days devoid of trauma. When I began 
to look on the positive side it became evident that Chris 
was a man able to look at the world in novel ways and 
I sensed that this angle looked more promising.
In this case, as in all the studies reported so 
far, we see the results, in psychosis, of a creative mind 
alienated in some way from society and under stress.
We see difficulties in modulating arousal, conscious 
hostility to a parent, particularly a parent of the same 
sex, a rapid search for data that confirms a speculation - 
which thus acts (to use Chris’s words) as "a funnel through 
which everything flows".
We see a conflict between conscious and unconscious 
mentation, an unconsciously motivated move into the world 
via delusion but then a consciously mediated move put 
and away when the force of the consequences of that delusion 
are fully apprehended. In this sense a delusion even 
if spectacular may give transiently calming order and 
feelings of unity with society (plus in some cases 
aggrandisement of the self) but when considered over time 
it is a system with rapidly diminishing returns.
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Whereas an appropriate, carefully articulated 
belief, based on a great deal of evidence, enriches a 
person’s life, puts them into the world in an effective 
productive way, and makes sense without great effort, 
an idiosyncratic spectacular belief based on very 
fragmentary data, although transiently exciting (in a 
"what heats me cools me" fashion) alienates a person^^'^. — 
from others, decreases their effectiveness in the world 
and requires progressively more and more remote associations 
to be generated and selected to sustain it.
Chris shows a definite pattern of an independently 
minded man with a very sensitive perceptive nature, perhaps
cy
attentive to subtleties that others easily miss, generative 
of fantastic ideas, who felt something of a misfit and 
who thereby was hesitant in social situations. He put 
his innovative capacity to the task of creating a self- 
styled world but when he had conceived it he found he 
could live in his dream with even less effectiveness than 
he could in the world from which he had withdrawn. Chris 
was in my view very much a victim of his own talent.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
ALISON
"You ... are a PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIC". So said 
Alison’s psychiatrist to her in 198O after her first episode 
Indeed these are the only words she remembered from her 
talks with him. They have, however, stayed with her, 
reverberating around her mind, ever since, words she 
perceived of condemnation rather than comfort.
Alison was a lovely looking young woman, about 
5 ’ 3” tall with a pert face, greenish eyes, a melodic 
feminine voice and an extremely polite manner. To meet 
her, one would never believe that she had been through 
the crises in her mental life that she had; she seemed 
perfectly normal, perhaps a little quiet and reserved, 
but that was all.
Behind her consciously mediated pleasant polite 
"exterior" Alison carried the, also conscious, heart and 
mind of a warm, indeed passionate woman. Like Alana J. 
she oscillated between being madly in love and merely 
"lukewarm". Her first episode, late in 1978, grew out 
of a very brief affair with a tall, fair, handsome doctor. 
(Alison had a weakness for highly intelligent professional 
men). She, in fact, only went out with him once but quickly 
developed a deep all-pervading infatuation for him and 
believed, on the basis of very little evidence, that he 
was in love with her. Rather in the manner of a woman
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with de Clerambault’s Syndrome she pestered him with phone 
calls, letters and cards. He became very irritated with 
her behaviour and was rude and aggressive with her on 
the ’phone.
As their "relationship" turned very sour she started 
to believe that he was watching and monitoring her. Indeed 
she did actually see him once "hovering" around her flat 
in his car. This event triggered off vastly increased 
self-consciousness and self-awareness. She came to believe 
that this man was following her around, a feeling which 
lasted for several weeks. Any car remotely like his WAS 
his, any man who looked like him WAS him. Eventually her 
brother took her to a psychiatric unit and she was admitted.
Her second episode in 1980 was quite different.
She started to have difficulty sleeping. She would often 
stay awake all night thinking and listening to the radio, 
her thoughts, accompanied by intense subvocal articulation, 
racing and rambling. She lost her appetite yet experienced 
great feelings of energy and could easily walk for miles. 
Then one morning, after a dream of a similar nature, she 
awoke with the conviction that people were trying to kill 
her. Outside she ran along a sidestreet off Oxford Street 
"dodging bullets" . Eventually she found herself in 
Piccadilly Circus where she thought she heard a passer­
by say to her "You’d better make your way to X Hospital 
now". She went there, by taxi, lying down on the back 
seat to avoid being "hit", and was admitted.
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After I had lost touch with her a third episode 
occurred, in 1982. This was precipitated by loneliness 
and by her ringing up her previous boyfriend, the one
she had pestered. He said to her: "Anything from you
goes right in the bin". The sound of his voice and his 
rudeness, she said, "seemed to bring it all back." This
was a brief crisis and with great grit she was soon back
at work.
She very quickly developed however a passionate 
attachment to another doctor, one of extremely high status 
and repute, fully believing that he was going to divorce
his wife and marry her. She never had a date with him
and based this belief on next to no evidence at all, merely 
a single warm remark he made to her. This love she had, 
however, fortified her for three years which she quietly 
and patiently spent waiting for him to get divorced.
For eighteen months of this period she was on no medication
at all . This is of extreme theoretical interest. This 
delusion clearly defensively solved all of her psychological 
problems. She would become quite tersely ill-disposed 
towards one when it was questioned to an extent that made 
people anxious about pursuing the issue further, so clearly 
important was it to her and so certain was she of the 
correctness of her belief. Given the eminence of her 
potential spouse this delusion clearly validated her sense 
of being special and must have tremendously boosted her 
self-esteem and feelings of being lovable by men of "high
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quality" - to the extent that it is reasonable to infer 
that this feeling and this need were of central relevance 
to her psychological equilibrium.
Eventually she realised, because of his off-hand 
attitude to her, that her belief was ill-founded, that 
the dream was not going to come true. Shortly after the 
demise of this belief her flat was burgled and within 
two weeks she was manically deluded.
On the telephone to me she said she was having 
hypnotherapy "at a distance" from X Hospital. An unknown 
therapist was implanting "suggestions in her mind" which 
were clearing it and "freeing all her emotions". She 
said "they've found out that I ’ve been repressing all 
my emotions since I told my mother about a sex game I 
was playing with my brother". She said she was now "full 
of life. I ’m not a schizophrenic". She was going swimming 
and dancing regularly. All through the conversation she 
was laughing hysterically and uncontrollably at every 
marginally funny remark I made. I told her that I did 
not believe a word of what she thought was happening to 
her and she just giggled. Once again however she bounced 
back from this episode quickly and was soon working, 
although part-time.
Background
Alison seems to have had a perfectly average childhood 
Her home was loving and she harbours no great negative
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feelings towards either of her parents or to her brothers. 
She was not victimised or dominated or overprotected or 
excessively criticised, indeed her early life seems to 
have been very happy. Although she reports that her 
brothers jokingly regarded her as the "helpless little 
sister" there was nothing malign or vindictive about this. 
The only sadness in her life was the loss of both parents, 
her mother in 1974, her father in 1973. Indeed she nursed 
her mother for a year while she was dying of cancer.
At school she started going out with boys rather 
later than most of the other girls, at 21 in fact, and 
felt some mildly homosexual jealousy when she lost girl­
friends to boys. However there seemed to be nothing 
particularly pathological about that time in her life.
Alison was a highly intelligent woman with the 
equivalent of a degree in French and for a time held highly 
paid jobs as a bilingual secretary. She was also extremely 
imaginative and a typist of exceedingly high quality.
She had no religious feelings and in none of the 
four episodes she had suffered inclusive of the one in 
1978 had she had anything remotely like a mystical or 
spiritual experience. She had no religious delusions 
nor had she developed a religious attitude since her crises 
Although imaginative one would not really have described 
her as creative in any outstanding way and her delusions 
did not have the colourful kaleidoscopic quality I sensed 
in the reports of Chris.
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Like him however she tended to have her four episodes 
or crises when she had been isolated. Reduction in cues 
had given her licence to entertain herself with increasingly 
remote thoughts or to put it another way: contrary to 
a behaviouristic model nothing stimulates paranoia better 
than no stimuli.
All the people we have studied so far were under 
some kind of stress at the time they developed delusional 
thoughts. In Alison’s case the loss of love for or from 
a man appears to be critical. Indeed relationships or 
infatuations with men appear to have very considerable 
psychological significance for her. In all her affairs 
she had difficulty being natural and rapidly began to 
"play games". Her men had to be good looking and in positions 
of some status. As long as she was in love she was stable. 
When she lost the feeling or the affair began to go wrong, 
her psychic economy started to be noticeably upset.
She was a woman with a very strong need to love 
and be loved and the absence or loss of a man in her life 
was a considerable blow to psychic harmony. It is possible 
to speculate that this had something to do with the loss 
of her father, perhaps it was a reactivated mourning reaction. 
However I found little evidence that she had a "complex" 
about her father, she spoke of him in a spontaneous free 
and easy manner showing no hint of intense emotional 
discharge, or pent up fury or passion.
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If Alison was interested in a man she would approach 
him (usually by letter) and this strategy, backed up 
by her good looks, was often successful. Having got the 
man, however, her difficulty always had been in maintaining 
the relationship satisfactorily. Like some men who are 
validated by having a ladyfriend, Alison was validated 
in all that she was by loving and being loved. She was 
told that she would make "a lovely mum" and I always sensed 
that Alison, single, was somehow half a person.
Over the last eight years however (she is now 
37) Alison’s relationships with men were largely "in her 
head" as she herself admitted and realised and she seems 
to have had all the trouble in her mental life since she 
started to so internalise her relationships.
Her manic episode (in 1985) may have been, as 
in the case of Chris, a step toward productive functioning.
It was valuable for Alison to realise that she was repressing 
her emotions, indeed she was usually only actually lively 
when she had had a few drinks. Yet, like Chris, while 
taking one step forward she simultaneously took two steps 
back into delusion.
There is little more I can say about her. Every 
other psychological avenue we have discussed together 
has failed to lead anywhere. She does not fit my overall 
theme of the psychotic as a creative person and/or a person 
who can gain access to mystical states. She does however 
show evidence of the behavioural modulation problem.
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mentioned repeatedly in this thesis, being either greatly 
overinvolved with a man or not interested at all and either 
manically emotional or quite reserved and cool. During 
her episodes of delusion there was also evidence of enhanced 
confirmation bias thus sustaining her aberrant beliefs.
Her social worker and present counsellor are keen 
to work on her "buried hostility", something she finds rather 
puzzling, boring and time-wasting. She is not for them 
a very keen counsellee. Personally I do not think that 
Knightian (1940) theory - of repressed hostility as the 
key to paranoia - is particularly pertinent in this case. 
Alison, on the contrary, seems to me to be a woman with 
a great need for love and a great capacity to love. She 
is also not a woman of exactly outstanding social skills 
- although she does not in the least lack self-assertiveness 
but instead of expressing and satisfying these needs in 
real life relationships she had been thrown back, through 
disappointments, onto her own vivid imagination to find 
that for which she so desperately hungers. In contrast 
her aggressive emotions seem to be spontaneous, natural, 
appropriate and well-, though not over-, managed. If 
necessary and justifiable she can express herself in a 
very piercing and biting way but can also be more gently 
assertive, again, if appropriate. Her grittiness in getting 
back to work after relapses, sometimes while she was still 
a day hospital patient also shows socially useful and 
effective aggression.
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ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER SEVEN 
A Note on Simon T .
The reader may remember from our discussion of 
Shafiq (especially p. 70 ) that Simon shared his unusual 
belief that a "scandal sheet" had been put out on him by 
people intent on discrediting and humiliating him. Shafiq 
and Simon would often compare notes in this matter, Shafiq 
believing in Simon's scandal sheet but Simon not believing 
in Shafiq's. The evidence for Shafiq's was rather flimsy 
thought Simon, that for his own was not so. Because of this 
Simon did not wish his (very interesting) case to be discussed. 
However he did "release" certain information concerning the 
largely successful methods he and I used to help him firstly 
with outright hallucinations; secondly with a special form 
of thought-broadcasting delusion and thirdly with what is here 
referred to as his "semi-hallucinations". These methods 
clearly should be communicated.
He had become very isolated and withdrawn in the 
summer of 1978 and spent long periods in his room in a 
shared flat in a provincial town. He was convinced that 
the neighbours were talking about him but could only hear 
muffled noises from the flats next door and beneath him.
Over a period of about a month these noises gradually 
took shape until one day they became clear voices. The 
voices were of a young couple echoing and commenting on 
his thoughts - the man supporting and the woman criticising 
him. Within an hour or so he realised that they were
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hallucinations and tried getting drunk as a means of 
removing them - without success.
Rather than going to see a psychiatrist or G.P. 
he decided after about three days to take a brief holiday 
and went to stay with his girlfriend - who lived in a 
caravan in the country. When he arrived there he rapidly 
discovered that the sound of Radio One drowned his voices. 
After the radio was turned off it would take a few seconds 
for them to return. He decided to capitalise on this 
observation and so played Radio One continually from 8a.m. 
until 11 p.m. at sufficient loudness to continuously mask 
the voices. After four days of the use of this technique 
the hallucinations had disappeared completely and, he 
claimed, never returned. During this time he took no 
tranquillising or anti-psychotic medication of any kind. 
Simon happily referred to this as his "Radio One Therapy".
A similar technique was reported by Feder (1982), 
who used radio headphones with his patient, but it would 
be fair to say that Simon T. was the first discoverer 
of auditory masking by patterned sound as a means of 
alleviating hallucinations without the use of anti-psychotic 
drugs. He said that he also found the general "happy 
sound" of Radio One and its relaxed easy-going manner 
very therapeutic. Obviously the concern, care and sympathy 
of his girlfriend also helped considerably to reduce his 
feelings of anxiety and panic.
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It would seem therefore that a move to a place 
of asylum coupled with the use of masking patterned sound 
was sufficient to eliminate completely this terribly 
distressing phenomenon and it would be advisable, given 
the almost equally distressing side effects and long term 
costs of anti-psychotic medication, for psychiatrists 
to recommend the wider use of this technique.
In 1981 Simon also reported to the effect that 
his own inner speech or subvocal articulations were 
occasionally audible when they were (to him) very intense 
and loud. Psychiatrists he spoke with clearly regarded 
this belief as a Schneiderian (1959) first rank schizophrenic 
symptom. I suggested to the hospital that he be videoed 
in conversation for about one and a half hours and the 
video recording played back to him so that he could tell 
whether they were indeed audible or not. They agreed.
The articulations turned out not to be audible at all 
and after realising this, Simon's particular form of "Thought 
Broadcasting Delusion" disappeared - and has apparently 
not returned at the time of writing (1987). This testifies 
to the fact that reliable feedback sometimes valuable
for previously deluded patients; when they are reasonably 
settled they do not always "find ways around" contradictory 
evidence to sustain their beliefs. I will take up this 
theme again in the section on "Implications for therapy" 
on page 390.
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Semi-hallucinations
Simon was able to deal with outright hallucinations 
successfully, as we have seen, with his Radio One Therapy. 
Hallucinations however which were actually based on some 
sensory input but which resulted from addition to or 
rearrangement of that input were more difficult to conquer. 
Simon would refer to these as his "semi-hallucinations" - 
they were comparable to David B's "incipient hallucinations" 
discussed in Chapter 2. They were basically remarks heard 
in the street or through walls which involved supplementation 
or contortion of the actual input.
As we saw in the case of Alison (p. ), a black
or unopened box, stimulus-response behaviouristic approach 
is effectively bankrupt as a tool for understanding or 
helping the paranoid or deluded person. (Indeed behaviourist 
treatment of deluded psychotics involving instructions 
to decrease deluded behaviour actually increased its rate 
(Wincze, Leitenberg and Agras 1970)).* Paradoxically, 
from the behaviourist viewpoint, a situation involving 
an absence of stimuli is an extraordinarily potent energiser 
of the paranoid process. Examples are abundant from Simon T's 
episode. He would suffer agonies and weave outrageous 
theories to explain unanswered letters. If he called 
somebody and the phone just rang and rang then the person 
was deliberately not answering because they somehow "knew" 
that it was him who was ringing. The dead of night was 
a time fraught with great anxiety. A delayed cheque had 
been "interfered with" by the pseudocommunity ; a broken 
appointment was due to a friend or acquaintance having
*Instructions to stop delusional behaviour may have increased its rate 
through drive increase making the habit more dominant. Hence an approach 
invoking hypothetical constructs could accommodate this finding.
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"discovered" something bad about him, thus ending the 
relationship in a passive way. Missing items had been 
stolen; people who had moved had moved to get away from 
him and so on.
Unclear stimuli also had tremendous potency for him, 
again, in contrast to behaviourist predictions, having far 
more behavioural consequences than direct, clear, unambiguous 
stimuli.
One therapeutic exercise which we used in this 
context was to try to create examples of likely "mishearings" 
of unclear stimuli. Table Three gives some of the results. This helped 
Simon T to realise that many, if not all, of the "over­
hearings" he had suffered could well be based on remarks 
which were quite different from what he had thought had 
actually been said. Simon’s own experience of "delusional 
mood" (Conrad 1968) seems to have arisen from misoverhearings 
of this nature - through which he developed the uneasy 
feeling that he may have been being referred to in the 
misperceptions that he Had - hence the resultant feeling 
was: "something is going on".
It is clear from the asterisked example 6 in 
Table Three which was a misperception that he actually did 
make, that his mind was doing preconscious mental acrobatics 
of Olympian quality to make out of the actual stimulus what 
he experienced. In his semi-hallucination he leapt like 
a gazelle to the conclusions he wanted to reach - as if to
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TABLE THREE. Auditory misperceptions which could sustain or elaborate 
malign delusional thou^t
Actual remark
1. Physics
2. That's it
3. We're going to the market 
tomorrow
4. He might have gone
5. He's going to Essex
6.* Look Mam, there's a McDonald's!
7. We'd better put the kettle on
8. It's marvellous down there
9. It's the twenty-fifth of
this month
10. There's 30 days ahead
11. He's a flirty type
12. He must have taken it
13. I only go to church at Christmas
14. His wife just rambles
15. It does look likely
16. He's meant to be in
17. He's a participant
Could be misheard as:
He's sick 
That's him
He's a marked man from now on
His mind's gone
He's going to have sex
Look Mam, there's that man they're 
going to knock down!
We'd better kill that one
There's Martians down there
There's plenty of filth in this punk
There's 30 days 'til he's dead
He has a dirty mind
His mother was to blame for it
A turd like him should be killed off
His life is just a shambles
It does look like him
He's masturbatin'
He's a Paki bastard
*See text
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be right and consistent in his terrifying beliefs was 
more important than to be at peace or to be happy.
Simon's delusional thinking was, I think, fed far 
more, by such semi-hallucinations than by outright 
hallucinations devoid of external input. He did, as did 
David B, have a tendency to avoid circumstances where they 
were likely to occur such as shops, crowds, minimarkets and 
buses where people could be speaking not quite out of earshot. 
Alison, who lived on a busy, noisy road, also feared them 
and always slept wearing earplugs so as to avoid or reduce 
them. Semi-hallucinations were an ever-present threat to 
the well-being of all these people.
Many clinicians interpreted. Simon's reports as evidence 
of outright hallucinations but this was not really so, and 
he himself had insight into this - although not sufficient 
to eliminate all of his seemingly aberrant beliefs. We also 
discussed the fact that his conviction in the validity of 
his overhearings tended to rise with time since experiencing 
them. This ."post-event cementation" of his confidence levels 
suggests that the subsequent higher level cognitive 
processing of the perception which embedded it, with 
consistency, in his belief system was largely or partly 
responsible for his high conviction even though the real­
time evidential basis, of a more peripheral, perceptual 
nature, was realised to be very slender. Discussions along 
these lines were also very helpful for him.
1 6 3
Simon used a wide range of avoidant behaviours to 
evade his tendency, which he felt was automatic and 
involuntary, to "make something out" of degraded or poor 
auditory input. He insisted on net curtains so as to 
eliminate the possibility of a couple looking in during the 
day, seeing him, then saying something which he might 
partially overhear and "elaborate" on. He never had the 
light on, in the evenings, in his front room unless opaque 
curtains were drawn, for the same reason. (It is quite 
likely that many "normal" people share these fears to some 
degree). He tended to live in the back of his flat thus 
avoiding the front room which was a "danger zone locality" 
for partially overhearing comments of people passing by 
in the street outside.
It is evident both from the experiences of Simon T 
and those of the other case study volunteers, that semi­
hallucinations are an ever-present threat to psychotics, 
perhaps even more so than are outright hallucinations and 
clinicians should realise this and be sympathetic about this, 
often chronic, problem. Other possible techniques, 
feedback-based, which may help to alleviate the anxiety 
associated with and caused by this enhanced cognitive 
processing of impoverished input, are discussed on pages 
390-395.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
OVERVIEW AND REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE STUDIES
Thinking on delusional thinking is changing.
The stock textbook image of a person invariantly and rigidly 
holding on to a certain belief has been challenged by 
Garety (1985). Similarly the assumption that a deluded 
person can never be argued out of their belief has been 
invalidated by Rudden, Gilmore and Frances (1982). Early 
emphasis on the content and deviance of the belief (e.g. 
Jaspers 1962, Freedman, Kaplan and Sadock 1975) has been 
replaced by emphasis on the evidence for it, how it relates 
to the person’s intelligence, education and background 
and on the manner in which the belief is held (Moor and 
Tucker 1979). The dichotomous view, i.e. that a person 
either has a delusion or does not (rather as a woman is 
either pregnant or not) has been quashed by Strauss (1969). 
Delusions, like hallucinations, exist on continua from 
arguably justifiable and mildly paranoid or eccentric 
thoughts which could be entertained by anyone (and 
probably are) through to examples of fully blown bizarrity 
and impossibility based on little or no evidence. The 
traditional search for deficit and disadvantage in paranoid 
patients is now being counteracted by some research that 
shows them to have areas of superiority over normal 
non-psychiatric controls (La Russo 1978) and which argues 
that they possibly carry a survival advantage (Jarvik 
and Deckard 1977) .
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Delusional thinking is not then, it seems, conceptually 
distinct from normal thinking. One of the themes of Meissner’s 
book (1978) is that paranoid processes are on a continuum 
with daily human functioning; paranoid mechanisms are 
utilised by everyone. We are, however, far from an under­
standing of normal thinking and our explanations for delusional 
thought are still very incomplete.
Like normal thoughts, delusional thoughts can 
take on many many different forms. It is however wrong 
to think that a paranoid person has but one delusion: 
their thinking is usually suffused through with dozens 
of inappropriate and invalid inferences covering almost 
every area of their life. It is nonsense however to seek 
different explanations for every different delusion just 
as we cannot have a different theory for every different 
dream or joke.
Just as I mentioned in caption to Figure One 
(p. 58) that we should move towards a rapprochement between
research on auditory hallucinations and that on normal 
auditory perception so I think we should thus coalesce 
our efforts on normal and on delusional thinking and not 
have the phenomena investigated in different camps.
Magic
Having said this, however, the task facing us 
is enormous. There is a rational aspect to delusion:
I see it as a risky thinking style in the long term
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interests of caution/self protection/survival (a massive 
preference for Type 1 errors) but its content is undoubtedly 
magical and irrational. Because of this it may always 
elude an understanding in logical or rational terms.
Wilson (1983) came up against the same barrier in attempting 
to understand magical thinking in fiction. In this respect 
the psychotic and the sexual variant, groups I have compared 
before in this thesis, are in the same pool. I find it 
to be no surprise that sexual variations are present in , 
the psychotic sample. The magical power, for example, 
that material has for the fetishist is beyond reason, beyond 
sense. I have known satin fetishists who claim to "worship" 
the material and, as Wagner was, are creatively inspired 
by it. Both the psychotic and the fetishist, masochist 
and transvestite seem to have an access to a magical form 
of experience long repressed and condemned by our materialistic 
society but which nonetheless lives on, waiting, available 
and which cannot be extinguished.
Similarly in the mystic, the psychotic and the 
masochist we see a capacity for Dionysian abandon. Abandon 
to forces beyond themselves, a capacity to "let go", "give 
in" and to let what will be, be, and what will happen, 
happen. This probably is the reason why mystical experiences 
can indeed turn into delusional experiences. It is 
however very much an aspect of life and of being which 
we have eschewed in our Baconian Apollonian efforts to 
master and control nature and human nature. All of these 
people are indulging in the magical, the "mad", forbidden
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territories of the human psyche. All, even raasochists, 
comment on the spiritual nature of their experiences.
To understand them in terms of the commonplace and down- 
to-earth may therefore prove impossible, our scientific 
interpretations may forever be partial and we must face 
this.
With these cautions in mind I have adopted the 
attitude that we must loosen our thinking to get our minds 
around the phenomenon of delusional thought, we must be 
audacious, we must dare. Very early in this investigation 
I decided to start my attack on the nonsensical in this 
spirit with a nonsensical question and this was it:
What colour is madness?
When one does ask such questions of people, for 
example: "What colour is Tuesday?" replies are received 
which demonstrate a certain degree of consensus. (Tuesday 
tends to be yellow I find!). I asked the "madness" question 
to each of the people discussed in the case studies 
independently and of myself with reference to my own 
"episode". I was surprised to find that all but one of 
us regarded our experiences as purple . (Alana J. initially 
also said this but a few years later changed it to red). 
LUscher (1971) has this to say of violet, which is the 
nearest to this colour in his scheme: (p.71) a preference 
for it implies
"a high degree of sensitive intimacy leading to 
complete fusion between subject and object, so 
that everything which is thought and desired 
must become Reality. In a way, this is 
enchantment, a dream made fact, a magical 
state in which wishes are fulfilled... The
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mentally and emotionally immature... may 
prefer violet. Violet occurring in first 
position suggests a pre-adolescent immaturity 
carried forward into adult life. In this 
event the person will tend to be unrealistic 
and have difficulty distinguishing the 
practical from the visionary."
This is clearly a very intriguing and apposite 
quote in this context. (I now find that purple is a colour 
that has long been associated with the mystical experience, 
further, albeit slender, evidence that the mystical and 
at least the acute psychotic states are related).
In LUscher’s terms the violet preferring person 
may in some sense be immature but their vision is hardly 
"unrealistic" when one considers what Schrttdinger had 
to say of reality in 1955: "Subject and object are only
one. The barrier between them cannot be said to have 
broken down as a result of recent experiments in the 
physical sciences, for this barrier does not exist."
Bohr also stated that an independent status could be 
ascribed neither to the physical nor the mental realms.
The immaturity of the enchanted person is also 
given a different slant by the work of Barron (1972).
He commented (p.85) on the way that the creative person 
is not so much characterised by a capacity to "regress" 
as to carry their childhood sense of wonder with them 
into adult life. The creative person may show a hint 
of immaturity in their behaviour but it is underpinned 
by a process which they put to great societal use. All 
of the people in my sample who suffered psychotic episodes
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were of great imaginativeness and in the cases of Chris 
and Alana J. this issued forth in work which could be 
truly regarded as creative. Where then did they go wrong?
The "typical" psychotic episode
In Table 4 I list a number of features commonly 
thought characteristic of the psychotic; features also 
of importance in precipitating, sustaining or predisposing 
to psychosis and some which have emerged from the present 
investigation. If we consider those characteristics applying 
to five or to all six of the people listed and discussed 
in earlier chapters we arrive at the following description.
They were all young (<35 years) unmarried, rather 
neurotic people, with perhaps a poor identity through 
an inadequate relationship with the same sex parent.
They were unemployed or underemployed, (and therefore 
bored), imaginative and with a great love of fantasy, 
and a great capacity for excitement, who found that they 
could not relate to other people particularly well, 
especially members of the opposite sex.
In these circumstances, lacking a close validating 
relationship, a certain degree of paranoid sensitivity 
developed. Without such a relationship, which would have 
made them feel "basically O.K." they sought validation 
in the world with the ever present threat of rejection 
from people whose ties to others were stronger than they 
were to them. They were unsuccessful. Hence as a result
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TABLE 4. .
Feature
1. Unusually emotional home environment
2. Parents unusually critical and overprotective
3. Training in bizarre and/or magical thinking
4. Living at home at time of first episode
5. Difficulties in leaving home
6. History of psychosis in the family
7. Spoilt by parents
8. Arrogant/feeling of being "special"
9. Guilty conscience
10. Highly creative individual
11. Withdrawn and isolated at time of episodes
12. Behavioural modulation problems
13. Amplification of confirmation bias 
m. Low socio-economic living conditions
15. Unemployment or underemployment
16. Low self esteem
17. Physical unattractiveness
18. Low intelligence
19. Anti-social behaviour prior to crisis
20. Poor social skills
21. Low on self-assertiveness
22. Difficulties in relating to opposite sex
23. Repressed homosexuality and/or hostility
24. Poor relationship with same sex parent
25. Indulgence in sexual variations
26. Unmarried at time of first episode
27. Age <35 at time of first episode
28. Overt homosexuality or bisexuality
29. Under stress at time of episode
30. Racing thoughts before episodes
31. Loss of appetite before episodes
32. Difficulty in sleeping before episodes
33. Great capacity for excitement
34. Mystical experiences before or during episode
35. Possible ESP before or during episode
36. Anhedonia
37. Manic tendencies
38. Depressive tendencies
39. Gender identity problem
40. Deterioration over five year period
41. Evidence of hallucinations
42. Evidence of delusions
43. Said that the colour of madness was purple
44. Prone to obsessions and/or compulsions
45. Prone to phobias
46. High on neuroticism
47. Introverted personality
48. Impulsive personality
49. Hi^ly aroused at time of episode
50. "Very imaginative"/great love of fantasy
51. Low on venturesomeness 
• 52. Difficulty modulating hostility
53. Phobia of breaking down again at the same 
time of year
54. Believed in delusions with absolute and 
complete certainty
55. Suffered "the meaning feeling" before 
delusional thoughts crystallised
56. Considerable number of "life changes" prior 
to first episode
57. Persecutor was once loved
58. Paranoid pre-morbid personality
59. Schizoid pre-morbid personality
60. Avoidant pre-morbid personality
61. Schizotypal pre-morbid personality
62. Borderline pre-morbid personality
63. Looked young for their years
64. Delusion encroached extensively on 
person’s life
65. Delusion was bizarre
66. Delusional thinking was very disorganised
67. Delusion was very preoccupying
(54 and 64-67 dimensions taken from Kervdler, Glazer and Morgenstern
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of their poor social life they withdrew more and more 
and replaced a life in-the-world with a life of reverie.
In personality they tended to have a view of themselves 
as somehow very "special" yet at the same time their esteem 
was not high and they also were rather prone to guilt 
feelings. Usually some stressful event occurred, one 
"fitted" in a malign way to some particular vulnerability. 
This would agitate and arouse their already rather fanciful, 
meaning-seeking minds and, rather than discussing and 
airing their thoughts with close ones, they instead, alone, 
embarked on a private mission of self-protection, 
justification and enhancement. Rather than joining the 
world they attempted to model the events of the world 
in their iridescent imagination free from the jogs of 
verifying or corrective feedback that could have been 
provided by others.
In that state they felt distanced and alienated 
from life. They started to have difficulty sleeping, 
their appetites became poor, their thoughts were racing.
They felt isolated and full of doubt. Life and the world 
became "different", strange, they felt that "something 
somehow was going on". They suffered a kind of "meaning 
feeling". As a step towards health, a step towards life- 
in-the-world, they crystallised a spectacular, exciting 
hypothesis which indeed placed them in that world, a delusion 
This was not best thought of as a "projection", it was 
a thought that happened to solve simultaneously many current 
problems such as boredom, feelings of alienation and of
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unpredictability' etc. and which^in a rather Gregorian 
fashion^"made sense" out of their current situation.
It was conceived in great doubt, a thought of a mind unable 
to find the middle ground, viz: "When in doubt, fear the 
worst!" This conception or rather its realization in 
a particular form rocketed them from the state of being 
a complete outsider to that of being "the centre" (the 
Medius Complex). Yet quickly they found that the costs 
of this thought were greater than its immediate benefits. 
Though now free of doubt and very much part of "the action" 
in-the-world the implications of their particular conception 
eventually made their new situation even more unliveable 
than the old one. Conceive a delusion and something is 
bound to happen to confirm it. Confirmatory instances 
occurred in positively uncanny profusion. Rapidly they 
found that their view of the world implied a portentous 
form of victimisation, events were happening all the time 
that not only sustained but elaborated their conception. 
Events did not only have significance and meanings with 
reference to what they thought was going on but like Epsom’s 
poetry, double, triple and quadruple meanings. Fast though 
they tried, self-protectively, to anticipate or "second 
guess" their adversaries, machinations seemingly beyond 
their control were happening faster. Hard, indeed 
frantically, though they worked - with the vigilance of 
a threatened beast - they found that they could not even 
keep up, let alone be ahead.
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Eventually their world "imploded"; on the brink 
of "the worst" actually happening, they were admitted 
to psychiatric units and their (eventually) self-defeating 
conceptions medicated out of awareness.
The above is a brief bird's-eye-view of the psychotic 
and the psychotic episode. It may seem to paint the 
psychotic in negatively hued colours, but between the 
strokes is a positive view. It depicts a sensitive 
perceptive meaning-seeking mind that may indeed find everyday 
(often coarse) social life too much. It is the kind of 
mind that can either write a penetrating perceptive novel 
laying bare the many facets of its characters or, if stressed 
too far, implode into oblivion.
Far from finding that the people I dealt with 
were bravely sustaining false selves or personas in the 
face of an adverse world I encountered them as the very 
personification of genuineness and perceptiveness. They 
were all refreshingly direct and open and could read my 
mood in a flash. Far from finding them to be concrete 
and literal they were easily able to abstract and go far, 
indeed in some cases too far, beyond the information given. 
This is the very essence of humanness and they were indeed 
quintessentially human.
Paranoia without Classical Projection
The Knightian (1940) and, in part, Freudian (1911) 
notions that the deluded paranoid projects their unconscious
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hostility onto the world, (classical projection), I found 
no evidence for. This thesis is very much a discussion 
therefore of paranoia without such projection. The 
empirical evidence for projection being the characteristic 
defence of the paranoid is also rather weak (Cooper and 
Kline 1986, p.30). There was no doubt however that these 
people felt very different from the common stock of humanity. 
They could hardly have been expected to have used the 
rule: "When in doubt assume a stranger is the same as 
you". Instead, as we have seen, they slot-rattled to 
"when in doubt, fear the worst". Hence the hostility 
they inferred that they were suffering was seeded in 
caution, doubt and a feeling of difference from the bulk 
of their associates, not consequential on a projective 
defence. In all these people aggression was easily 
expressed when the situation reasonably could be said 
to have called for it although in Chris, Alana J., Alison 
and Simon T it tended to be overdone or "poorly modulated". 
These people could be regarded as both repressing and 
expressing their hostility but psychoanalytic theory, 
strictly speaking, calls only for its repression in these 
cases. This was not so. Also in the cases where 
aggression and hostility could not in any view be regarded 
as repressed - David B. and Shafiq - the hostility inferred 
in others was still considerable. (Even some psycho­
analysts, e.g. Bonime (1979a, b) question that projection 
is involved at all in paranoia). At best we can defend 
a view of conscious or "naive" projection (Horney 1939, 
p.26) otherwise known as "attributive" projection (e.g.
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Sherwood 1981), but not of classical or, to use Cameron’s 
(1959) words, "disowning” projection of unconscious 
hostility or homosexuality. This naive projection however 
in no way reduces stress (see Holmes 1981, p.465) and 
hence its defensive role is highly questionable.
To check, empirically, the possibility of naive 
projection I rank ordered the volunteers in the case studies 
in terms of the malignity of their delusional systems.
This rank order correlated perfectly with my rank ordering 
of the intensity of their overt hostility. As a check 
I asked my wife Jill, who knows all the subjects well, 
to also rank order them in terms of their overt hostility, 
although when she did this she did not know why I was 
requesting that she do so. Below is the outcome:
Malignity of Overt Hostility
delusional system
(Most) (Most)
1. Simon^T 1. Simon T
2. Alison 2. Alison
3. David B 3. David B
4. Shafiq 4. Chris
5. Chris 5. Shafiq
6. Alana J 6. Alana J
(Least) (Least)
This gives a Spearman rank order correlation of 0.943 
which is clearly highly significant (p = 0.01, one tailed).
It would be unwise however to argue that no defensive 
behaviour of any kind is involved in delusional thinking.
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The more malign delusional states, assuming (importantly) 
mood congruence of the delusion (see Winters and Neale 
1983), are characterised by the emotions of anger, fear 
and guilt. Now research in the context of attribution 
theory has shown that negative affect mediates perception 
of control as external just as positive affect mediates 
a perception of control as internal (Weiner 1986). The 
person's argument tends to be "if life is lousy it's not 
my fault" and "thanks to my own efforts I have a good life" 
The shift to an external locus of control (which 
schizophrenics in treatment do tend to have (Cromwell, 
Rosenthal, Shakow and Zahn 1961)) may have the defensive 
function of attributing negative life circumstances to 
an external source. This perception of negative outcomes 
as due to external factors under the control of others 
is also and exactly the perception which would then lead, 
in an attribution theory conceptualisation, to high anger 
(Weiner 1986, pp.135-149). The psychotic therefore does 
not project unconscious anger outwards but shifts control 
of outcomes to an external source.
In these circumstances conscious anger would be 
expected to escalate in a positive feedback mode both due 
to it inducing and resulting from the ascription of 
negative life event out-comes to this external source.
(This escalation of anger in positive feedback fashion 
also is discussed by Melges and Freeman 1975, p.1039).
Were Colby correct in his view that the paranoid 
is defending against shame (1971, 1975, 1976, 1977) this
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defence (if successful) would eliminate the theoretical 
need for, and the psychological presence of, an external 
locus of control - which is blatantly present.
Given the anger (and coincidence) induced and 
the anger resulting presence of this external locus, 
the psychotic is then forced self-protectively to adopt 
a highly risky criterion, in signal detection terms, 
to evade or anticipate their persecutors. Hence the 
importance of feedforward, look-ahead and planning in 
paranoia so emphasised by Melges and Freeman (1975) and 
Federn (1977, p.232). They are prepared to suffer false 
alarms or Type One errors (delusional interpretations) 
so as to maximise hits (correct interpretations) and 
so as to feel safe in the knowledge that they "know what 
is going on". On this Top-Down processing view their 
much researched hypervigilance, extensive scanning and, 
sometimes, overinclusive thinking detected after admission 
are largely caused ^  the delusion and the processing 
style necessary to sustain and elaborate it and are not, 
in large measure, a cause o^ it.
Emphasising an attribution theory approach to 
the deluded person's mentation implies axiomatically 
that the understanding of causal conscious thinking is 
more profitable a way of accounting for paranoid disorders 
than is the postulation of purely unconscious defensive 
thinking. But positive symptom schizophrenia certainly
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involves causal thinking. Events happening close 
together in time are causally connected to an extent 
bordering on frenzy. The schizophrenic also searches 
for the causes of all the coincidences that happen to 
them - constructing a pseudocommunity to "explain" them. 
The globality (across situations) assumption causes 
preoccupation. The stability (across time) assumption 
causes despair. The externality assumption in part 
causes the delusion and the delusional pseudocommunity 
and the negative outcomes, inferences of intent and 
external controllability cause the anger and fear.
Were Colby's very simple défense-against-shame 
view correct people would also be being admitted to 
psychiatric units for clinical paranoia in their 
millions. The disorder is, surely, far more complex 
than this.
The "Meaning Feeling"
We therefore can accommodate the processes involving 
negative affects within an attribution theory framework. 
Delusional thinking, however, cannot be explained by one 
or two processes, it is a result of a whole orchestra
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of processes playing in sinister harmony. There are 
affects in psychosis which are less tangible than those 
discussed above and these need a different conceptual 
grid to cover them. Of critical importance here is what 
I have so far called rather vaguely the "meaning feeling". 
All of my volunteers could empathise very easily when 
I described this to them. It is a phrase of my own designed 
to capture the flavour of some of my own experiences in 
1979 .
The meaning,^feeling is contentless. To describe 
it I have to use words which imply content but the 
experience is, like Garnier’s spatial poetry, beyond 
language. There is a feeling of significance, of 
portentousness, of foreboding, of multiplicity and wispy 
insubstantial ambiguity. The affect* is primary, delusional 
thoughts can give solidity to this feeling, but such 
cognitions (e.g. the contents of the so-called "delusional 
mood" or trema (Conrad 1968) to the effect that "something 
strange is going on"), are secondary.
The meaning feeling is the affect character of 
the Borderline/mystical state. The collapse from it into 
delusion is again through an attribution of its source 
to an external worldly factor. This "misattribution 
process" is therefore worth closer inspection.
Its status as an affect is, I admit, rather vulnerable.
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Parallels with the mystical state
In earlier chapters and previously here I have 
made a great deal out of the similarities between psychotic 
and mystical states and indeed the outright occurrence 
of mystical experiences before and during the psychotic 
crisis. Yet in Table 3 we see a singular absence of 
anything remotely resembling such phenomena in the cases 
of Shafiq and Alison. The mystical experience is closely 
related to Maslow’s "peak experiences" and instances of 
B (Being) cognition (Maslow 1968, 1971). He notes that 
these are more endemic in those of more poetic and artistic 
temperament (Maslow 1970) and not so common in the more 
down-to-earth self actualisers. This may be the reason 
for the absence of anything mystical and/or paranormal 
for Shafiq.and Alison, both of whom were rather pragmatic 
hard-headed characters. (I once called both of them "tough 
little nuts".) David B, in contrast, was both tough minded 
and poetic.
Nonetheless I feel that this theme needs to be 
explored just a little further - largely because of the 
positive feedback I have had when discussing it with the 
others. There are great similarities in theme between 
the mystical state such as I experienced it and certain 
aspects of the psychotic state which I will outline below 
in the form of parallels between the two:
The mystic thinks: "I am in touch with everyone."
this is paralleled by
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The psychotic who thinks: "Everyone can hear my thoughts". 
The mystic: The world is not as it is commonly seen
is paralleled by 
The psychotic: The world has changed, there's a war on.
The mystic: There is a great harmony and oneness between
all things
paralleled by
The psychotic: People and the world are all together in 
communication against me.
The mystic: Nothing is trivial
paralleled by
The psychotic: Everything means something, even street 
signs and car number plates.
The mystic: No-one is a stranger
paralleled by
The psychotic: Everyone knows me and is plotting against me 
The mystic: I am both supreme and insignificant.
paralleled by 
The psychotic: I am the Christ and the Devil 
The mystic: I am passive, floating, at one with the
universe, open to all 
paralleled by
The psychotic: I am dissolving, decaying, penetrated by 
rays, penises.
The mystic: Meaning is everywhere/all is meaning
paralleled by
The psychotic: Everything I do or that happens has double, 
triple or quadruple meanings.
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Parallels seem to obtain but there also are 
differences. The certainty of the psychotic often carries 
with it great aggressiveness; the certainty of the mystic 
does not. The mystic opens himself to that which is beyond 
himself and remains unharmed, the psychotic is very nearly 
destroyed. The mystic uses irrationality productively, 
the psychotic destructively. Taking Kierkegaard’s 
existential leap the mystic finds Nirvana, the psychotic: 
Hell.
We see, nevertheless, from this brief comparison 
that some of the higher order characteristics of the mystical 
state are reflected at a lower order, more tangible "real" 
level in the delusional. The deluded person differs not 
only in the ways discussed above but also in putting 
everyday worldly meanings to the cosmic intuitions of 
the mystic and then searching for isolated events that 
confirm the more mundane interpretation. In a sense 
perhaps the deluded does not hold the mystical state but 
falls down and back from it. I believe that the mystical 
intuitions may indeed be the frame at a kind of "deep 
structure level" for the delusions which thereby exist 
at "surface structure level". The collapse into delusion 
from the state of uncertainty, from the "meaning feeling", 
is not a collapse from abstract to concrete thinking but 
from holistic global intuitions to local analytic 
ratiocinations and perceptions.
The psychotic may also be interpreting in everyday 
Newtonian terms a level of quantum interconnectedness
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which they have intuitively accessed but cannot put into 
words or re-present to themselves in a meaningful way 
- simply because they have no medium of expression for 
what has touched them. Outrageous though it may sound, 
psychosis is thus partly an educational problem. Were 
we to prepare people for such states of consciousness 
they would be less likely to misinterpret them in delusional 
terms. The therapeutic relevance of this is that the 
person’s initial strange perceptions and/or feelings could 
well be accepted, or at least not questioned, without 
danger, whilst their attributions could thus be the focus 
of change efforts. Successful therapeutic intervention 
along these lines, within an attribution theory framework, 
has been reported by Johnson, Ross and Mastria (1977).
The Uncanny
This radical but positive view of the psychotic 
allows us to see their experience in a very different 
light and to search in our thinking, theorising and 
experimenting for very different phenomena and patterns 
than usually are sought.
All of the psychotics I have discussed spontaneously 
remark on the extraordinary frequency of confirmations; 
that they were far beyond what would be expected simply 
as the basis of their own enhanced awareness or 
confirmation seeking attitude. That they were, in a word, 
uncanny^ as if the world was orchestrated to "drive them 
mad". Although I have not conceived of any way of testing
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this, perhaps they are right; maybe a state of psychic 
excess does, as if acting like a field, produce coincidences. 
Maybe the subterranean levels of the mind structure the 
meaning domain shared by other minds so as to bring about 
comments, remarks and events which have meaning in the 
particular terms of the thoughts of the psychotic person.
This may sound, at first, to be a rather "cranky" hypothesis 
but we know so little of the capacities of the psychotic 
mind that maybe we should not dismiss it out of hand.
It is a disturbing yet, paradoxically, sobering 
thought that the type of person we have always regarded 
in the Western world as "reality-oriented", "well adjusted", 
"straight" and "sensible", the type of person we have 
seen as a good tool for the uncovering of what really 
is, may not in fact be of temperament appropriate to the 
accurate perception of reality at all. While we have 
encouraged people to be or become of this ilk our inducements 
could well have been profoundly misguided. In contrast 
to the grey rationaliser, the purple magicians already 
know that "the ultimate answers to existence are not to 
be found in intellectual concepts and philosophies, however 
sophisticated, but rather in a level of direct non- 
conceptual experience which can never be limited to the 
dualistic nature of language" (Blythe 1976).
Coming down to earth
Strenuously I have tried to observe the long 
neglected positive side of the psychotic. Always I have
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given them the benefit of the doubt. I have, over these 
seven years, resisted every tendency to infer pathology 
unless it was heavily forced upon me. Even in outright 
pathology I have sought generatrices which are not outwith 
a positive conceptualisation. In adopting this attitude 
I have been led to making audacious claims in the defence 
of the psychotic and to reconstruing them in ways markedly 
discrepant with that demanded by the medical model of 
orthodox psychiatry - a model which has considerable 
influence also in the research field of abnormal psychology
It is now time to organise our thinking, to thrust 
into the experimental phase of the enquiry. If, as seems 
to be the case, psychotics are not only rather selfish 
and spoilt but are people of talent, originality, courage 
and grit, genuineness, perceptiveness, sensitivity and 
vision then is it possible to demonstrate or confirm this 
in standardised tests? Does human worth somehow slip 
through the nets constructed in the service of objectivity 
or is our positive view fundamentally mistaken? We shall 
see. The first part of this thesis was written without 
knowledge of the outcome of the experimental enquiry.
My predictions are genuinely propter hoc. I will therefore 
be bold and state them pithily; on the basis of these 
predictions the broadly positive view adopted from the 
outset in this research will be confirmed or disconfirmed.
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Broad outline of hypotheses
A detailed discussion of the hypotheses to be 
tested will be given in Part 2; here my purpose is to 
build a bridge between the two sections of the thesis 
and show how the second part grows out of the first.
I will state the broad hypotheses which have evolved from 
the single case studies and from my own disturbing 
experience. We will go into these in greater detail and 
see how they can be operationalized later.
Firstly I believe that the psychotic is 
imaginative and creatively fluent. I would expect them, 
in fairly open-ended tests of creativity where there are 
little or no constraints, to perform well, maybe better, 
than non-psychotics. However when their mentation is 
constrained in some way so that their thinking has to 
meet certain criteria and is not allowed to be "fancy- 
free" I expect that their performance will deteriorate 
more than that of non-psychotics. For reasons discussed 
in Chapter 4 I expect creativity across subjects, to be 
maximal at very low and very high arousal levels.
Secondly I believe that the bizarre mentation 
of psychotics is, in large part, maintained and sustained 
by confirmations which they actively seek. They do not 
only suffer their delusional systems, they actively 
construct them. (Freud himself commented on this in his 
concept of "delusion work"). I therefore expect that 
the bias to seek confirmatory instances will be amplified
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in psychotics; they will show enhanced "confirmation bias". 
It is possible that this is in part due to their very 
highly aroused, agitated and/or stressed state which makes 
the psychic pain of disconfirmation highly aversive and 
which reduces the capacity to make the major rearrangements 
in thought necessary to assimilate disconfirmatory evidence 
The psychotic's thinking therefore travels, so to speak, 
along a path of least resistance. We therefore expect 
a positive correlation between magnitude of confirmation 
bias and scores on arousal and/or felt stress.
In the actual course of the psychotic crisis I 
see hyperarousal as cause, consequence and concomitant 
of the abnormal state. If, for the sake of argument I 
speak dualistically, the high arousal could be construed 
as generating spectacular cognitions but these feed-down 
to enhance arousal which further sustains and escalates 
them. This circular positive feedback system is however 
initiated by an arousal and stress magnifying event or 
series of events. In the experiment we will model this 
crudely by measuring the arousal and stress levels first 
and then seeing how these predict levels of confirmation 
bias and creativity measured later.
Thirdly: since the deluded psychotic seems to 
have a great love of private fantasy and reverie we would 
expect them to be rather low on venturesomeness in social 
situations when compared with non-psychotics, to be on 
the introverted but empathie side, and to be poor at 
perceiving and judging ambiguous stimuli. In the latter
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case we would expect them to see what they want to see 
rather than what is actually there and to hold onto 
hypotheses (confirmation bias) rather than modify them 
in the light of clearer less ambiguous evidence.
Fourthly: although their iridescent imaginations 
may make them perform poorly on a judgement task the story 
should be very different when they are asked to "make 
something out of" a very impoverished stimulus. Then 
their performance should be better than non-psychotics.
Fifthly: the thinking of the psychotic I see not 
as a projection of hostility but as characterised by very 
reasonable cautious strategies designed to deal with what 
they perceive as an uncertain, rather unpredictable world.
I would therefore expect, in general, that their reported 
confidence levels in judgements they make in their post 
crisis state to be low i.e. to be more cautious than 
those of non-psychotics. There is a certain degree of 
paradox here in that the delusional thought is a risky 
one but it is in the interests of caution - almost as 
if the person has, to put it in Kellyan terms, "slot- 
rattled" from a state of ego-weakening unbearable doubt 
to intoxicating certainty in a defensive but ego-protecting 
manner. Depending on how psychotic the volunteers’ 
mentation still is they may show extreme caution or extreme 
risk and confidence. As I say, I expect the bias in these 
recovering psychotic volunteers to be generally towards 
caution but the standard deviation in confidence levels 
across the whole psychotic sample should be higher, maybe
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much higher, than that in the non-psychotic sample.
(In this and in other measures such as cortical arousal 
and reported emotion the psychotics’ inferred modulation 
problem should also manifest itself in a wider spread 
of scores) .
Finally, if the psychotic really is a victim of 
their own talent we should expect to see, dotted around 
the results of the performance tests, that rare but truly 
outstanding and remarkable performances should come largely 
from that group of people.
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PART TWO: Experimental and Psychometric investigation
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CHAPTER NINE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
Experimentalists generally assume that the processes 
and mechanisms whose operation they study operate 
acontextually. They seek isolated core processes whose 
function they believe can be demonstrated in a "pure" form 
by the kinds of tests and experimental procedures habitually 
adopted by experimental psychologists and psychometricians - 
for example by shott answer IQ tests and by tachistoscopically 
presented or VDU presented isolated stimuli.
If we conceptually defocus from this scientistic 
view we can see that such purification of process is in 
no way ensured by these methods. An example by Ceci and 
Liker (1986) nicely demonstrates this:
"... children... were asked to predict the distance 
that was likely to be traversed by a microdot on 
a computer monitor. The solution requires that 
one simultaneously take into consideration the 
size of the dot, its colour, and its speed, because 
each variable can potentially influence the value 
of the others. Not surprisingly, perhaps, young 
children found this prediction task very difficult. 
They consistently failed to estimate the correct 
distance the dot would travel. Yet, when they 
were given what was essentially the same task 
except that the prediction was embedded in a 
video-gamelike format, they performed substantially 
better. In the latter task children were told 
to "fire a missile" at the likely location on the 
computer screen that a spaceship of a specified 
colour, shape, and size would appear. The two 
t tasks ostensibly tapped a similar ability to think
in terms of a three-way interaction, but the 
context of the task determined whether a child 
would exhibit this ability. Thus, complexity on 
one task did not guarantee complexity on the 
other, even though both tasks presumably tapped 
similar higher-order reasoning skills". (Ceci 
and Liker, 1986, p.140, note 4).
In this experimental part of my study of delusional 
thinking I am seeking to find if there a "core" process 
or mechanism or set of such core processes which are 
necessary, albeit not sufficient, for delusional phenomena 
to be experienced and permitted. I therefore have a double 
problem facing me. Medical model psychiatrists might claim 
that this core process has already been found in the effects 
of the greater number of dopamine receptors in the brains 
of chronic, drug-free schizophrenics (Wong et al. (1986)). 
However Wong's data refers to elevated dopamine receptors 
which are located on the membrane of dopaminergic neurons 
and might be thus expected to inhibit the production of 
neurotransmitter rather than enhance it (Carlson 1986, 
p.688). Elevated receptor density was also found in 
schizophrenics by Cross, Crow and Owen (1981) so there 
do seem to be differences in dopaminergic systems in the 
brains of schizophrenic patients although it is not clear 
yet just what these differences actually mean.
These and other neurochemical and physiological 
abnormalities, for example, the evidence for greater 
thickness of the corpus callosum in schizophrenics 
(Bigelow, Nasrallah and Rauscher 1983) are obscure 
on the significance of such findings to an under­
standing of the processes involved, but are also 
meaningless without a control sample of the brains 
either of previously highly aroused.or of highly
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creative normals given the critical importance of hyper­
arousal in acute schizophrenia* (Gjerde 1983) and the 
similarities in cognitive processing and experience of 
schizophrenics and creative people (Barron 1972; Forest 
1976; Keefe and Magaro 1980; Claridge 1985, pp.150-151). 
Depue (1974) for example found that with a highly aroused, 
rather than normal, control group a schizophrenic effect 
in an information processing task was completely eliminated.
The search therefore for a core process or mechanism 
mediating the experience of acute schizophrenia is not 
at an end and it is still actively pursued in an aspiringly 
acontextual manner using laboratory investigations.
In the following experimental enquiry a whole series 
of personality, arousal, emotional state, thinking and
*This proposition is not, of course, one with which all 
researchers would agree. Lader (1975) and Neale and Oltmanns 
(1980) argue against increased arousal in acute psychosis;
Depue and Fowles (1974) found manies and schizoaffectives to 
be underaroused while Venables and Wing (1962) reported that 
the highest levels of autonomic arousal were in withdrawn 
schizophrenics.
Eichler and Antelman (1979) however relate cortical dopamine 
to the hyperarousal response of schizophrenics to stress and 
Broen (1968) and Zahn (1975) discuss evidence favourable to a 
hyperarousal/schizophrenia link. Some researchers in this vein 
suggest central hyperarousal (Venables 1966; Kornetsky and 
Orzack 1978), others autonomic hyperarousal (Zahn 1964; Zahn, 
Carpenter and McGlashan 1981).
Some researchers (e.g. Spohn, Lacoursiere, Thompson and 
Coyne (1978), Gjerde (1983)) favour a unitary view of 
arousal in this context, others (e.g. Claridge 1967, 1981) 
a framework involving tonic arousal and arousal modulation 
and others (e.g. Gur (1978); Gruzelier (1978, 1984)) a state 
of bimodal arousal in which differential activation of the 
dominant and non-dominant hemispheres is involved.
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visual judgement tests have been individually administered 
to a sample of previously deluded psychotics and to two 
samples of non-psychotics: one which comprised people who 
scored highly on the Neuroticism (N) scale of the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck and Eysenck 1975) , who 
acted as the over-aroused controls, and one group who scored 
low on this scale. In all, 59 people were tested, over 
a period of three years and five months, in an experiment 
which usually took about three hours for each volunteer 
to complete.
It is impossible to run an out-of-context experiment 
All of the results therefore will be examined in the light 
of the volunteers' state, reactions to myself who was the 
experimenter, to the situation and to the stimulus materials 
This information is obviously vital to the assessment of 
the results of this experiment. In this context the state 
measures of MacKay and of Nowlis (MacKay, Cox, Burrows 
and Lazzerini 1978; Nowlis 1965) are particularly valuable 
as they inform^us, for example, about whether or not the 
volunteer reported themselves to be "concentrating", 
"anxious" or "aggressive" etc., at the start of the 
experiment. A summary scale derived from the adjectives 
given in these tests also enables us to see whether or 
not the volunteer reported themselves to be pleasantly 
or unpleasantly disposed to the total situation at the 
time,
The dependent variables in this experiment are 
really performance variables. The scores on these tests
195
and the manner in which they have been achieved cannot 
be viewed in a "cold cognitive" way as, in humans, 
thinking always takes place in an emotional context 
(Zajonc 1980). This is all the more important when people 
are acutely aware that they are being evaluated. To perform 
well on any task usually requires interest/passion/motivation 
and experience and knowledge of the domain under scrutiny.
The type of tests which I have given however, like 
traditional IQ tests (Neisser 1976) sadly have little or 
no intrinsic interest and are disembedded from the individual's 
ordinary experience. These characteristics, supposedly 
necessary to capture pure process operation, actually impose, 
as do nonsense syllables and paired-associates very special 
and unusual demands on the volunteer which, unless they 
are able and willing to engross themselves in artificial 
situations, may well underestimate the complexity and 
efficiency of analysis of which they are capable.
In this introduction I therefore am basically 
confessing to the inadequacy of my methods to the task 
of giving a very representative picture of my three samples 
of volunteers. It may well be that those of academic bent 
will show a disproportionate superiority over those of 
a very practical real-world orientation whose "processing" 
complexity" might have been much better revealed by tasks 
of more personal relevance and interest. Since most of 
the psychotic samples' main interest in life at the time 
of testing seemed to be "staying sane" it is unfortunate.
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I now think, that I did not have detailed discussions with 
them about how they managed this and how they deflected 
their attention away from a re-emergence of a delusional 
style of thinking. This might have revealed a great deal, 
for example, about their intra and interpersonal 
intelligences (in the sense of Gardner (1985) and Walters 
and Gardner (1986)) and about their cognitive capacities 
in operation in a stressful context. Instead I asked them 
to play word-games. The only way I can now comfort myself 
is by hoping that these, at least, were related in a manner 
of some relevance and interest, to their probable scrabble- 
playing days on the wards and in day hospital.
In this experiment I tested rather a large number 
of my friends, 17 in fact. Fortunately these were fairly 
evenly distributed across the samples (see Chapter 11) 
but the advantage of this is that I know these people very 
well, or at least have seen them behave in a fairly wide 
range of contexts and I can thus comment on the extent 
to which these 'pure' measures really do correlate with 
real world behaviours and performances and, if they do 
not, how "dissolvable" they are in different contextual 
situations .
Part Two of this thesis therefore is more 
analytic and "bottom-up" than Part One because there comes 
a time when the total flux of relations which constitute 
life has to be studied in a somewhat compartmentalised 
way. As John Wilding said to me, "at some point the nettle
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has to be grasped". Like most researchers in experimental 
psychopathology I am assuming that, because these tasks 
are not directly related to the volunteers' real world 
concerns - such as their previous delusional systems - 
the results obtained thus tap "underlying" mechanisms and 
procedures which acted as the generatrices or more 
accurately, permittors, of their delusional or non-delusional 
states, as the case may be. This, of course, is a highly 
risky assumption as the perceiving and thinking styles 
thus reported, at least in the psychotic sample, may well 
be the result of their previous delusional style of 
cognising generalising to performances even on the 
emotionally aseptic tasks presented here. I am therefore, 
like all experimentalists in this field, left in a cleft 
stick. To capture faithfully the volunteers skills one 
should really use test materials and situations which are 
relevant to their daily concerns and interests but if one 
does so one risks merely picking up manifestations of the 
functioning of idiosyncratic psychotic belief systems of 
little theoretical relevance to generalisations about the 
'how' of delusional thinking. On the other hand if one 
moves away from real-life tasks to pick up cognitive styles 
in operation outside the delusional context - and thus 
perhaps involved in its formation - one risks presenting 
the subject with such a false situation that they are not 
motivated to reveal the way they habitually deal with problem 
situations. If they do generalise their orchestra of 
delusional cognitive operations to the analytic task one
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is left with the problem of deciding whether the processes 
and procedures revealed were, in part, the cause (bottom- 
up) or the result (top-down) of the psychotic mentation.
One answer to this dilemma is to give both richly 
evocative interesting tasks and specific laboratory probe 
tasks and see if the results from these disparate enguiries 
can be gelled. Another is to examine the cognitive styles 
of genetically at-risk volunteers and those not at risk 
and see if peculiarities of processing predict later 
decompensation into psychosis or not. A further option 
is to test people high in "psychosis proneness" as revealed 
by psychometric scales (e.g. Woody and Claridge (1977) 
who used the P scale of Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) or the 
work of Claridge and Broks (1984), Broks (1984) and Rawlings 
and Claridge (1984) who used a specially developed 
schizotaxia scale derived from the description of 
schizotypals given in DSM III (1980)). Testing floridly 
deluded psychotics or even, as I have done, medicated 
volunteers on laboratory tasks alone can never, I think, 
give a clear-cut answer about underlying processes or a 
faithful depiction of the capacities of the psychotic 
person .
I therefore have to confess to the reader at the 
start that the results of my experimental investigation 
cannot be conclusive or even demonstrative but only 
suggestive. My own personal hunch is that performance 
peculiarities of psychotics on laboratory tasks is heavily
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affected by their own particular developed style of perceiving 
the world and dealing with people, including experimenters* - 
but that this is not entirely so. I am hoping, but it 
is no more than a hope and a guess, that the "normalisation" 
of these psychotic volunteers by medication will have 
removed the worst "top-down" manifestations of their 
delusional systems in the tasks I have given them (which 
always involve written responses) and that what remains, 
if anything, are genuine peculiarities in processing, some 
useful, some counter-productive, which could permit a 
delusional system were the person to find themselves in 
a situation which exacerbated or amplified these, probably 
slight, tendencies.
I therefore will conclude this introduction with 
the warning that the differences between the (medicated) 
psychotic sample and the High N and Low N non-psychotic 
samples will probably be slight, particularly since all 
responses are written; that the cause of the difference 
could be explained in top-down or bottom-up fashion but 
that I am suggesting that the tests reveal the (small)
*See for example Lewine (1978) who showed that over a 
range of laboratory tasks a paranoid effect was only 
reported when the volunteer had to make an oral response, 
which it is reasonable to presume involves greater 
interpersonal interaction than a written response.
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bottom-up component perhaps involving localised mechanisms 
in the generation and permission of the psychotic state 
and that these tests, being academic and short-answer, 
may well under-represent the talents or intelligences of 
many volunteers, psychotic and non-psychotic, alike.
mnn
CHAPTER 10
MAIN HYPOTHESES AND HOW THEY WERE TESTED
This experiment was very long and involved, each 
of the fifty nine volunteers providing scores on 167 
variables over a (usually) three hour evening session.
It therefore is impossible to present each component 
of the experiment as a separate piece of information 
as it is necessary for the reader to see the experiment
I
as a whole. I shall thus deviate from the format of 
the traditional write-up, as for example recommended 
in texts such as Robson (1973), so that the reader can 
maintain a broad and integrated view and so that they 
do not become confused. In this chapter I shall derive 
all the separate chief hypotheses and describe how they 
were tested; in the next I will describe the volunteers; 
then the actual running of the experiment and finally 
present the results, with reminders of what results were 
expected, and discussions.
Section A
Confirmation bias and arousal
Scientists are well known to "have" confirmation 
bias (Mitroff 1974; Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney 197 7) 
but in the case of the deluded psychotic it could well 
be said that confirmation bias "has them". Although 
this bias, in the early stages of a psychotic episode,
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may lead to valuable experiences and insights (see Part
One, especially Chapter 4) its general effect in psychosis
is eventually destructive of the person's peace of mind 
and integrity of self. In this section, then, I will 
temporarily adopt a deficit seeking approach and, to 
use a phrase of Stanley Schachter's, "push it to see
how far it will go".
The theory to be articulated here is that the 
vastly increased arousal of the psychotic increases 
confirmation bias and exacerbates the delusional state 
because at high arousal attention is funnelled producing 
a preoccupying central dominant idea and then resources 
or capacity are decreased over the range from high to 
very very high arousal. Because of this there is 
insufficient capacity to^cope with the rejection^demands 
posed by myriad external and internal stimuli and 
patterns, which thus take on cognitive conseguences for 
the psychotic through being simply assimilated to an 
ongoing idea. In other words the idea is established 
at high arousal and then entrenched at very high arousal 
such that, to put it rather crudely, it merely attracts, 
like a vacuum cleaner, evidence to it. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that under distracting conditions effort is 
required to maintain flexible adaptive thinking. This 
would imply that the screening out of irrelevancies is 
an active, albeit unconscious, process. Spare capacity 
may, of course, also decrease under high anxiety because 
of the distracting effects of worrying thoughts 
(M.W. Eysenck 1982).
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Refutation bias, which Popper has argued (1959,
1963) is the strategy that people should use in problem 
solving, may however, even in normal people, overload 
cognitive capacity. It may be extremely difficult to 
test a chosen hypothesis and seek alternative hypotheses 
at the same time. Indeed volunteers in scientific 
inference experiments who show refutation bias do not 
generally progress rapidly (Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney
1977). I therefore expect all the volunteers in this 
experiment to demonstrate some measure of confirmation 
bias and indeed a certain degree of it may be necessary 
for good performance.
For the psychotic the problems presented by 
greatly amplified confirmation bias may however be 
exacerbated. Disconfirmatory input presumably requires 
and provokes more thorough and extensive internal search 
to accept or reject. If it imposes these greater demands 
and if capacity is decreased by extreme hyperarousal, 
disconfirmatory information may well be relatively 
neglected, if the person is simultaneously faced with 
the tasks of storing their ongoing idea, testing it, 
elaborating it and vigilantly scanning the external array 
all at the same time.
Hyperarousal may also provoke retrieval from 
dominant sources (Broadbent 1971) or provoke attention to 
sources which will most readily repay the allocation of 
effort (M.W. Eysenck 1982). This would be 
expected to help produce the preoccupying
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central delusion of the psychotic as delusions, at least 
judging from my own case study work, tend to reflect 
important cognitive themes of great emotive significance, 
in the psychotic's life. If hyperarousal promotes 
openness to and retrieval of evidence and ideas which 
confirm a delusion which high arousal itself has helped 
bring about through previously strengthening dominant 
habits then a vicious circle-positive feedback system 
is produced which would be expected to push arousal even 
higher over time.
If arousal is moderately high the external and 
internal "beam of attention" (Wachtel 1967) may be 
narrow (Easterbrook 1959). Hence the scanning of the 
situation, in the early stages of delusion, prior to 
formulating an initial position may be hasty and incomplete 
and undeflectable by "secondary" concerns which might 
otherwise enrich ideation. The psychotic is liable to 
foreclose on a position and not "tolerate ambiguity".
Hence the initial sampling of the internal and external 
array will be restricted and very partial. This will 
lead to very selective narrowly focussed thinking.
High drive previously has been shown to increase rigidity 
in problem solving tasks (Maher 1957, Glucksberg 1962,
1964) .
Hyperarousal also tends, even in normal volunteers 
to influence software strategies so that confidence levels 
polarise or shift towards risk (Broadbent 1971) . In
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the psychotic the latter seems to be demonstrated to 
an extreme degree. In ambiguous and stimulus-impoverished 
situations the psychotic adopts an extremely risky 
criterion which also maximises (valuable) hits and 
minimises (costly) misses. Hence any stimulus pattern 
that can even remotely be assimilated to the delusion 
is generally detected and accepted as "positive" whilst 
patterns that disconfirm it are ignored. This therefore 
produces high false alarm perceiving.
The above "bottom-up" in the sense of mechanistic, 
rather quantitative arguments, taken with the generally 
"top-down" in the sense of motivational, qualitative 
arguments articulated in Part One, lead to the view that 
there is an orchestra of processes in delusional thinking 
acting on different levels which all operate together 
in harmony in the direction of producing speedy, risky 
confirmation seeking thought operating under extraordinarily 
high incentive but which can only perseverate a central 
dominant idea and elaborate rather than undermine it.
The felt arousal of the psychotic, which obtains 
under tremendous incentive, is, I believe, an additive 
mixture of a hyperfunctioning passive (M.W. Eysenck 1982) 
or tonic (Claridge 1967) arousal system and an effort 
system (Kahneman 1973). Unlike Kahneman however I do 
not think it appropriate to equate capacity with effort.
If acute psychosis is, in part, a hyperarousal phenomenon 
then at some point capacity, "processing space", or 
capacity to perform simultaneous or parallel operations
206
actually decreases while effort or capacity devoted to 
the central task continues to increase. The psychotic 
ends up putting increasing effort into progressively 
simpler styles or modes of thinking. As one counsellee 
said: "I felt that I was going like a rocket yet at the
same time that I didn't have much space to move in".
In as much as the pseudocommunity or persecutors 
seem always to be one step ahead, the psychotic feels 
that they themselves are performing suboptimally. Hence 
they are continually faced with the necessity of boosting 
performance - hence using Broadbent's (1971) upper 
(compensatory) mechanism. Their task is: "find out what 
is going on and take evasive or counteractive action".
But never are they quite up with ongoing events. Thus 
they continually need to expend more effort. Alas, the 
psychological consequences of doing this only exacerbate 
their situation. The more alert, fast and vigilant they 
become in performing their delusional task the more 
"evidence" do they find - which increases incentive further 
and justifies still more speed and vigilance.
The effort system, which I see as, in part, a 
form of conscious arousal modulation device, does however 
function. The unconscious (I assume) involuntary arousal 
modulation system (of Claridge 1967) may well break down. 
This must have consequences at the voluntary level - 
the person may be able to boost arousal more easily than 
dampen it.
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The account so far leaves unclear what behavioural 
or cognitive procedures are affected by decreased 
available "volume" or "processing space". Below '1' 
and '5' seem to be attached more closely to a narrowed 
processing space notion, the rest might be more molar 
consequences of this. Decreased capacity might therefore 
result in:
1) A decreased short term storage capacity - 
which is commonly argued to be a result of high arousal 
(M.W. Eysenck 1976, Humphreys, Revelle, Simon and 
Gilliland 1980) ;
2) A decreased capacity to really carefully
test evidence against consciously held ideas;
3) A decreased capacity to generate alternative
hypotheses ;
4) A decreased capacity to halt the stream of 
conscious thoughts and/or backtrack;
5) A decreased capacity to store and operate 
on what is stored simultaneously; or
6) A decreased capacity to access ideas remote
from current awareness (which might radically change 
current thinking).
Virtually all of these component processes, not 
all of which are totally independent, (see for example 
1 and 5; 4 and 6 or 2 and 4), are possible candidates 
for the effects of capacity decrease. In this thesis 
I will concentrate on one fairly specific function 
described by 5 - the capacity to store and operate on
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what is stored simultaneously and a more general, complex 
behaviourally described operation covered by 4 - the 
halting/backtracking problem.
Although this position seems broadly similar 
to that of Hasher and Zacks (1979) who discuss normal 
cognition, there are differences, some of which refer 
to phenomena which I infer make their appearance at very 
very high arousal. Contrary to Hasher and Zacks (1979), 
who also argue for reduced capacity at hyperarousal, 
fairly simple forms of effortful processes may, I believe, 
be enhanced in the very aroused state. One such process 
is subvocal speech. Innumerable contacts of mine who 
have suffered psychotic states report intense subvocal 
speech having accompanied their "racing thoughts" as 
their crisis was intensifying. Interestingly some major 
tranquillisers such as haloperidol do seem to decrease 
subvocal speech, for example in Gilles de la Tourette's 
syndrome. Wilding and Mohindra (1980) also reported 
with normal subjects that high arousal (85 dbC white 
noise) led to increased use of subvocal articulatory 
rehearsal^ although the speech was slower, not faster.
Hasher and Zacks also argue that high arousal 
has no effect on word meaning Retrieval as this is an 
automatic process. If, however, acute psychosis is a 
hyperarousal phenomenon then it would seem that the 
processing of the semantic implications of words, either 
in visual or auditory form, is actually enhanced.
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High arousal seems to make it easier to inhibit 
the operation of automatic processes when this is useful 
for efficient task performance (evidence from the Stroop 
test (M.W. Eysenck 1982)). However at very very high 
arousal, at least when this has been sustained for long 
periods as in acute psychosis, this success in inhibition 
may break down. Furthermore while effort increase usually 
leads to capacity increase (Dornic 1977), in acute 
psychosis these constructs seem to diverge.
The general approach here however does attach 
some of the phenomena of the acute psychotic episode 
to those that obtain in normal people. Although there 
are differences, the scheme is consistent with a view 
of schizophrenia and active psychosis as existing on 
a continuum with normal mentation and not as a group 
of qualitatively different entities.
A general arousal and capacity approach does 
not permit me to make differential predictions of the 
magnitude of confirmation bias on visual and verbal 
tasks. However the work of Magaro (1981, 1984),
Gruzel 1er (1981) and, in social psychology, Drake (1983) 
all suggests that at least the paranoid delusional 
syndrome, which is certainly characterised by Drake's 
(1983) "belief perseverance", is a left hemisphere 
dysfunction. One might imagine that this could well 
be the case given the generally linear sequential 
processing style of the dominant hemisphere (Ornstein
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1986). Magaro argues, from the basis of the highly 
controversial distinction between 'controlled' and 
•automatic processing (Shiffrin and Schneider 1977), 
that the paranoid is "conceptually driven" with a dominance 
of controlled left hemisphere processing while the non­
paranoid is "data driven" with a dominance of automatic 
right hemisphere processing. Drake (1983) argues that 
high arousal generally activates the left hemisphere (see 
also Powell 1982) and that hyperarousal of the left 
hemisphere produces perseveration of belief. Drake's 
hypothesis therefore makes different and more differentiated 
predictions than a global capacity model in that performance 
will differ depending on whether tasks are left or right 
hemisphere mediated. Drake and Bingham (1985) provide 
experimental confirmation of his arguments: students showed 
more attitude change after persuasive messages aimed against 
a currently held belief or opinion were input to the left 
ear (right hemisphere processing) than when input to the 
right ear (left hemisphere processing). In the latter 
case their previous beliefs persevered. Rausch (1977) 
also found that patients with right temporal lesions 
(overaroused left hemispheres (?)) showed lose-stay 
responses (confirmation bias and belif perseverance) while 
left temporals (overaroused right hemispheres (?)) showed 
win-shift responses (refutation bias) (Drake 1983) .
If these arguments are valid it is possible that 
if paranoids have overaroused left hemipsheres, they will 
show particularly high confirmation bias in verbal tasks
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(left hemisphere). If the non-paranoids have overaroused 
right hemispheres and thus show win-shift responses they 
will show particularly low confirmation bias on visual 
tasks given that visuo-spatial information is predominantly 
processed by the fight hemisphere (Kinsbourne 1982). 
Confirmation bias on verbal and visual tasks should therefore 
be higher in paranoids but arousal should correlate 
positively with verbal confirmation bias and negatively 
with visual confirmation.bias.
Finally if hyperarousal increases at least verbal 
confirmation bias it would seem possible that it has the 
effect of inducing its victim to (putting it rather vaguely) 
"think forwards". Ideas are elaborated, built up and 
permuted constructively. There is little or no tendency 
to back-track; dare counter-productive moves; re-route 
or undermine the amplifying developing network of 
propositions which thereby become embellished rather than 
jettisoned. This, of course, is to an extent just another 
way of describing the verificationist tendency but it 
is one which has slightly different operational consequences. 
These consequences will be discussed in the section on 
experimental tests.
Experimental Tests
In all the experimental tests discussed from hereon 
in this chapter, which involve arousal theory, the following 
rationale is being followed:
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If an effect, whatever it happens to be, is no 
different in the psychotic and (presumably) highly aroused 
high N group, but these groups do differ from the low 
N group, then the effect is argued to be due to hyperarousal 
rather than to some peculiarity associated with psychosis.
If the psychotics differ from the high and low 
N groups, but the latter do not differ significantly from 
one another, then the effect is due to the psychosis and 
not to hyperarousal.
If the psychotics , high Ns and low Ns are all 
different, with the effect being greatest in the psychotics 
and least in the low Ns (or vice versa) then the effect 
is due both to the psychosis and to hyperarousal.
Other rank orderings and patterns will have to 
be explained post hoc when, for example, the outcome of 
neuroticism and of state stress and anxiety scores for 
the three groups is known.
Confirmation bias
Confirmation bias was examined in this experiment 
in both a visual and verbal mode. In the visual mode 
a Slide Viewing Task (SVT) was employed.* The procedure, 
similar to that deployed in Draguns (1963) and Bruner
*Details of all tasks are given in the description of 
the running of the experiment in Chapter 12.
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and Potter (1966), was to show slides first very much 
out of focus and then gradually bring them into focus. 
Volunteers were requested to guess what the slide depicted 
at each stage of the re-focussing sequence and give a 
rating of confidence in their hypothesis. The frequency 
with which volunteers "hung onto" incorrect hypotheses 
across focussing position changes (as a function of the 
total number of incorrect hypotheses) was the measure 
of "visual" confirmation bias.
Confirmation bias was hypothesised to be influenced 
by very high arousal via the letter's effects on capacity 
and hence arousal was also measured in a number of 
different ways.
Firstly autonomic arousal was measured via pulse 
and via systolic and diastolic blood pressure determinations 
Assuming that high cortical arousal will lead to 
amplification of stimulation and drop in thresholds, the 
spiral-after-effect duration should increase with increase 
in cortical arousal and thus to a tentative measure of 
this parameter. Similarly stronger inhibitory or modulatory 
processes should result in shorter after-effects.
General felt arousal was assessed by the MacKay 
et al. (1978) and Nowlis (1965) self report measures 
previously mentioned.
It was expected that the confirmation bias score - 
which for each volunteer was the mean number of focussing 
position changes through which incorrect hypotheses were
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maintained - would be higher in the psychotics than the 
Low non-psychotics ; higher in the paranoids than the non­
paranoids and, due to increasing rigidity at high arousal 
and decrease of capacity at very high arousal, confirmation 
bias would show a positive correlation with arousal.
A critical disambiguating test is possible here; 
if the Drake (1983) hypothesis is correct, visual 
confirmation bias should correlate negatively with 
arousal.
In assessing confirmation bias in the verbal mode, 
two tests of associative thinking similar to Mednick's 
Remote Association Test (Mednick 1962) were employed.
In one, volunteers were presented with two word items 
and requested to find a third word which was an associate 
of both the previous two (2-3 Test). In the other they 
were presented with three word items and were requested 
to find a fourth word which was an associate, in a more 
general sense, of all the previous three (3-4 Test).
Pilot experiments with these tests with 35 volunteers 
revealed that people first did a search and retrieve 
operation (through an associative network?) and then 
serially tested possible solutions against the given words 
until a solution which "fitted" all the test items could 
be obtained.* Confirmation bias was therefore demonstrated
*I therefore find Perkins's argument (1988) to the effect 
that the RAT is only a hypothesis testing task, with no 
involvement of activation spread, untenable.
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when, say, a volunteer found a possible solution word 
which fitted with two of the three test words but not 
with the third. I infer that the third word is either 
being ignored or is being associated with the solution 
word only in a very tenuous convoluted fashion. Either 
way confirmation bias is manifested.
Psychotics were expected to show higher confirmation 
bias than low N non-psychotics in both the verbal tests, 
paranoids higher than non-paranoids and the scores were 
expected tosshow a positive correlation with arousal on 
both the capacity model and the Drake hypothesis. It 
was expected that confirmation bias on the 2-3 test would 
correlate positively with that on the 3-4 test.
Capacity measurement
It seems to me inappropriate to separate capacity 
itself from that which has capacity; inappropriate totally 
to separate upper compensatory processes from lower passive 
or tonic processes and inappropriate to separate arousal 
from arousal modulatory processes. All the members of 
these pairs, I think^ overlap and are interdependent.
Capacity is notoriously difficult to define and 
measure (Kahneman 1973, but especially Allport 1983) and 
although I am arguing that it decreases at very very high 
arousal it may be possible that some operations such as 
similarity perceptions are actually enhanced at these 
levels. I will take perhaps the least controversial
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processing entity and assess the capacity of working 
memory (Douglas 1967, Baddeley and Hitch 1974; Baddeley, 
Grant, Wight and Thomson 19 74), I will assess the capacity 
simultaneously to store and perform operations on that 
which is stored using the backward digit span task from 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler 1958).
The more capacity a person has the longer will their backward 
digit span be.
It was predicted that psychotics would show shorter 
backward digit spans than low N non-psychotics. It was 
also expected that the magnitude of backwards digit span 
would correlate negatively with the confirmation bias 
scores and would show a negative correlation when plotted 
against arousal. The latter two patterns should be most 
apparent at the upper levels of arousal as capacity goes 
down and confirmation bias accelerates.
Verbal reports of volunteers in pilot runs of 
this test suggested that backward digit span makes 
considerable demands on capacity as the person has to 
both rehearse the digits "forwards", visualise them and 
scan the image backwards before it fades. They then renew 
the image by rehearsal, visualise and scan again. The 
digits are never reported in one flow, the person has 
to continually make an image reappear so as to scan it 
and report. It is thus virtually impossible to perform 
any other task (such as balancing a dowel rod) while 
performing backward digit span.
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Risky thinking
During the Slide Viewing Task volunteers were 
requested to give a confidence rating in the hypothesis 
that they generated at each focussing position. Since 
the psychotic is, I believe, risky in the long term 
interests of caution (top down) (i.e. they make risky 
decisions in the interests of avoiding later threat) but 
shifted also to risk by hyperarousal (bottom-up) it was 
difficult to predict whether a shift to risk or to caution 
would be manifested in this particular experimental 
situation. I decided to let the experiment disambiguate 
for me. Another possibility was that, since deluded 
psychotics usually hold to their delusion with high 
confidence, they should be more likely to assign confidence 
levels of "4" or "5" (i.e. "almost certain" and "certain")
to incorrect hypotheses.
Since confidence ratings were obtained at all 
focussing positions in the SVT it was possible not only 
to record mean confidence levels (which is what is usually 
done on tasks of this kind) but to perform a signal 
detection analysis and obtain a non-parametric measure 
of bias to risk or caution, the B index (McNicol 1972, 
pp.123^129) on this task. An incorrect hypothesis held 
at a high confidence level is a false alarm and a correct 
hypothesis held at a very low confidence level is a miss.
It was expected that the psychotics would show 
significant differences in mean confidence levels and
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B index values from low N non-psychotics but no prediction 
was made as to the direction of these differences. Since 
paranoids are more sensitive to non-verbal cues (La Russo,
1978) it was considered a possibility that they might 
be more sensitive generally and hence show higher d ' values 
at least than the non-paranoid group.
Dominant responses
If hyperarousal increases the tendency to process 
information from and retrieve information from, dominant 
sources then in the Slide Viewing Task psychotic subjects 
should be more misled by a particular slide in which a 
dominant (common) response was in fact an incorrect one.
This particular state of affairs was engineered by devising 
a slide which depicted a round red quite shiny object, 
with a hint of yellow - easily misidentifled as an apple - 
which was in fact a red balloon and a bunch of bananas 
(Figure 2). It was expected that psychotics would 
accurately guess this slide later i.e. at a clearer 
(numerically lower) focussing position than low N non- 
psychotics. (Because of their expected greater confirmation 
bias and intolerance of ambiguity it was expected that 
psychotics would accurately generally guess all the slides 
later than non-psychotics, as, in fact, found previously 
by Draguns ( 1963) , but that this would particularly be 
so on the balloon slide).
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FIGURE TWO 
One of the seven slides used in the 
Slide Viewing Task shown here as it 
appeared when presented at focussing 
positions seven through to zero.
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It was also expected that the arousal scores would 
correlate negatively with the numerical value of the focussing 
position at which the balloon slide would be guessed.
To make this clearer: relaxed subjects should guess the 
balloon slide at a numerically high, quite out-of-focus, 
focussing position.
Forward thinking
The tendency towards forward thinking I examined 
via testing volunteers' responses to different forms of 
item in the 2-3 and 3-4 verbal thinking tests. Some items, 
for example from the 3-4 test, were such that the answer 
followed the test item, i.e. was a form of suffix to it: 
e.g. Pen Kitchen Bread: Answer "Knife"
Water Fire Shock: Answer "Proof"
Two Old Egg: Answer "Timer"
Others were of a design Such that the answer was a prefix 
to the test items:
e.g. Asleep Track Barrier: Answer "Sound"
Land Hopper Roots: Answer "Grass"
Ship Pole Store: Answer "Flag"
The latter, I infer, required "backward thinking" and 
my prediction was that psychotics, if more prone to forward 
thinking, would be worse on prefix items than suffix items 
and would show a greater difference between suffix and 
prefix scores than would low N non-psychotics.
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Hasty thinking
In this section I am assuming that haste and risk 
are not synonymous. If this is so then if psychotics 
are hasty in their scan of the array and more prone to 
retrieving dominant responses because of being hyperaroused, 
they should spend less time on the 2-3 and 3-4 verbal 
thinking tests and make more errors. However they should 
be as good as, perhaps even better than, the low N non- 
psychotics on the easier items of the 3-4 test (established 
via the pilot research) where an appropriate response 
is more easily accessible in internal search.
Section B
Creativity, personality and arousal
The reader may by now be rather surprised and 
disappointed in the rather deficit oriented approach in 
Section A, in its concentration on enhanced confirmation 
bias as a mediator of negative life experiences. This 
is, however, not an inevitable or required view of the 
implications of an amplified verificationist tendency.
It is perfectly possible that such a tendency may enable 
a person to build a highly productive view of the world 
as is often the case in scientific and artistic endeavours. 
The previous section then only had a negative tone because 
of its association with the usually negative consequences 
of psychosis, it is not to say that the mediation of
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psychosis need necessarily be construed always in a 
wholeheartedly negative fashion.
The same quality asymmetry between cause and effect 
raises its head in the present section which investigates 
the oft-reported links between creativity and psychosis. 
Clearly the creative act in bringing novelty, beauty, 
elegance and order to experience is unquestionably positive. 
Yet in psychosis we see this capacity and activity often 
put to self destructive, perhaps even masochistic ends.
The purpose of this section then is to theorise on the 
basically positive creative underpinnings to the psychotic 
experience, creative underpinnings which cannot only be 
dynamically fashioned into a tool for the psychotic's 
own needed punishment but which can produce insights, 
experiences and behaviours of great novelty, value and 
occasionally even splendour.
Perhaps it would be useful briefly to recapitulate 
on the basic theme which emerged from Part One, so that 
we do not lose sight of it in the detail that follows.
My central hypothesis here, from which all other 
hypotheses are merely derivative, is that the creativity 
of psychotics enables them to access a domain beyond that 
reachable by the average brain. If there is a one-ness 
at subquantal level between mind and matter, as suggested 
by Jung and by Bohm, a theme also emergent from Chapter 4, 
then perhaps the understanding of the creative process 
and associated relational judgemental processes will give
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an insight into the deepest (or highest) levels of 
reality.
If we cannot, as yet, understand the rules of 
the subquantal domain, (if indeed such a realm has any 
meaning) , maybe we can understand the workings of the 
device (the brain) that could possibly apprehend that 
domain. But of course in the same way that one can 
understand the structure and function of a tool, e.g. 
a spade, a hand, a pair of scissors, one cannot then say 
that one understands that which the spade digs, or the 
hand grasps or the scissors cut.
Yet in the Mystical-creative or Borderline state 
one has a direct apprehension of reality - one feels "at 
one" with the'Truth. This is quite different from the 
realm of discourse appropriate to talking about a spade 
digging. The person in the mystical or the (I believe) 
related delusional psychotic state is not doing but being, 
they are not operating but resonating, not diving but 
floating, not changing or manipulating but experiencing 
an essence; mapping onto; establishing an absorbed state 
of parity. Given the quality of the experience it is 
possible that some insight into how this is permitted 
and into what happens when it occurs will give us a 
glimpse of what we are resonating to or what we are 
establishing an absorbed parity with. In this endeavour, 
the study of psychology may take us to what Niels Bohr 
(e.g. 1958) often referred to as deep truth. (Bohr
himself actually preferred to avoid this).
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That highly creative people may possess a high 
loading on an underlying personality dimension related 
to psychosis has been noted many times since the idea 
first appeared in the writings of Aristotle, Seneca, Diderot 
and Schopenhauer (e.g. Kretschmer 1929; Barron 1953, 1972; 
Cattell and Drevdahl 1955; MacKinnon 1961; Cattell and 
Butcher 1968; Andreasen and Canter 1974; Eysenck and Eysenck 
1976; Woody and Claridge 1977; Keefe and Magaro 1980). That 
creative production may in part be a control process which 
is required to keep psychopathology at bay has been suggested 
by Storr (1972) and that creative people differ from 
uncreatives in their dispositionally high resting cortical 
arousal levels has been shown by Martindale (1975).
Martindale also comments on the hypersensitivity to 
distraction that this induces in high creatives and points 
out that this has also been noted in schizophrenics. 
Receptivity to information on the unattended channel has 
been found in both schizophrenics and high creatives (Dykes 
and McGhie 1976) and highly creative writers have been 
found to be overinclusive on a test designed to assess 
this phenomenon in schizophrenics (Andreasen and Powers 
1975; Keefe and Magaro 1980). (It should be noted however 
that ovef^inclusion is not invariably demonstrated in 
schizophrenics' performance on such tests (Payne 1973)).
The work of Martindale on the relations between 
arousal and creativity (Martindale and Greenough 1973, 
Martindale and Armstrong 1974, Martindale 1975) indicates 
that high creatives can boost arousal easier and better 
than they can reduce it. Martindale and Armstrong (1974) 
found that high creatives as assessed by the RAT were 
better at quick control of a but were not better at a
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increase. Instead they were better at a suppression. Hence 
the creative)real forte is the focussing of attention (arousal 
boost) necessary to move from primary to secondary process 
modes of thought. Pine (1959) and Pine and Holt (1960) 
also had previously suggested this.
The difficulty that high creatives have in dropping 
arousal and their sensitivity to distraction means that they 
also have to modulate their arousal using external tricks 
and strategies such as finding secluded places to work or 
as Bosuet apparently used to do, wrapping their heads in 
furs, lying in bed or disconnecting the doorbell to cut down 
sudden arousing distraction (Martindale 1975). This high 
dispositional arousal and difficulties in arousal drop in 
high creatives seems also to obtain, I think, in psychotics 
prone to delusion. The latter also seem to withdraw into 
isolation partly to titrate their arousal level but the 
very isolation then gives them licence for unconstrained 
fantasising which eventually exacerbates their state.
In Part One I speculated that high creative production 
is mediated by either very very low or very very high 
arousal. This also was suggested by Martindale (1975) 
who regarded the extremities of arousal as the zones of 
primary process thinking (mystical states, reverie and 
free association) with middle levels of arousal best for 
rational serial secondary process thought. That the shift 
from primary to secondary process thought may be an arousal 
shift was also suggested by Blum (1961) and Martindale 
and Armstrong (1974). Martindale's work concentrated 
on the benefits of arousal drop (as measured by increased 
alpha) as a facilitator of creativity (Martindale 1975) 
and Martindale and Greenough (1973) found that high arousal 
decreased creativity on the Remote Associates and Uses
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of Objects tests. However in deluded psychotics we seem 
to have cases where remote associations are facilitated 
by arousal of extreme magnitude, hence in this thesis 
we are searching the opposite end of the spectrum 
investigated by Martindale.*
An inverted U relation between creativity and 
arousal is reminiscent of drive theory research in this 
domain (Mednick 1962) where it was argued that as drive 
increased, response hierarchies at first steepened - making 
dominant (usually common) responses more likely - and 
then flattened again so that more remote associations 
became available (as they had at very very low drive).
An excitation-inhibition theory would make the same 
prediction: if creativity depends on the balance between 
excitatory and inhibitory processes and inhibition increases 
(very slowly at first) with excitation until the latter 
floods the system and inhibition breaks down, then a 
non-inverted U relation between arousal (which may tend 
to rise with excitation) and creativity would result 
(Figure 3). Inhibition could be transiently released, 
say by alcohol, but repeated strong excitation may weaken 
inhibitory mechanisms (Malmo 1957) producing a relatively 
more chronic state in the psychotic. Oppenheim in an 
early work (1890) suggested a failure in neural transmission 
modulation to account for hysteria and Claridge (1967) 
and Epstein and Coleman (1970) all suggested that a
*The systematising of the delusion may be an attempt by the individual 
to control arousal escalation with fragmentation occurring when this 
is beyond the ego/cognitive capacity of the individual. Systematised 
delusions may therefore imply a greater measure of control and less 
severe crisis than unsystematised.
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FIGURE 3
If excitation continually rises from some finite value 
but inhibition rises slowly at first and then decreases 
as excitation floods the system then a non-inverted U 
relation between creativity and arousal should result.
Given four levels of arousal and roughly a 40% spread 
in creativity scores from lowest to highest values the 
predicted pattern which should emerge is shown. The location 
of scores is within cells in a 4 x 4 matrix. The chances
4
of the predicted pattern emerging is 1 in 4 , i.e. 1 in 256.
It can be shown that with a 4 x 4 matrix the chance of 
any concave U shaped trend is 1 in 7.11; the chance of 
a quadratic trend of any form is 1 in 3. 55. However if 
one makes a specific prediction the likelihood of that 
predicted trend is, as shown, much reduced.
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modulation problem (albeit of arousal itself) was critical 
in explaining acute schizophrenia. *
The general pattern relating arousal to delusional 
thinking therefore seems to be as follows. "Quite high" 
arousal helps mediate the emergence of a dominant idea 
(Section A) and the search for evidence to confirm it.
The confirmation themselves, through their portentous 
implication, boost arousal further thus facilitating creative 
elaboration and ramification of the delusional system. 
Confirmation seeking and creative thinking go hand in 
hand during the ontogeny of the delusional episode both 
facilitated by high arousal which perhaps operates by 
enhancing relational judgement/similarity perception.
Ideas coalesce internally (creativity/similarity 
perception) and are matched and enriched by external 
stimuli (confirmation bias/assimilation/similarity 
perception) . The delusional and the mystical states could 
thus be said to be two modes of vastly enhanced similarity 
perception, the summit of relational judgement. Repeated 
boosts of excitation weaken inhibitory mechanisms pushing 
arousal to intense levels such that without modulation 
or control, organisation, fine tuning and differentiation 
are lost. At this stage the psychotic does not have 
delusions or confirmation bias, delusions and confirmation 
bias have them.
*There is a gradual decrease in dopamine excretion from states of 
alertness through 'activated' sleep to deep sleep (Baekeland, Schenker, 
Schenker and Lasky 1969). If this relates even roughly to brain dopamine 
levels it confirms a unitary arousal-dopamine level connection. However 
the above researches suggest that dopamine control may be more important 
than dopamine level or dopaminergic activity in the aetiology of this 
disorder.
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It would be wrong to argue that the psychotic 
loses control completely, many aspects of their thoughts 
and behaviour may show selectivity and differentiation, 
they do not emit the same response to all stimuli - which 
would be the result of a complete breakdown of inhibition 
(Milner 1957). Furthermore their crisis itself may 
represent the results of unconscious intent and during 
the crisis a preconscious intent of the form "I'm in great 
danger, gave me more power" may, to speak dualistically, 
be operating. Perhaps through a genetically mediated 
capacity, the psychotic's brain can respond to this 
instruction but the end result is a kind of "hyperfunctional 
malfunction" . Capacities for associative thinking and 
verification are amplified but these put the psychotic 
in an ever more threatening position leading to ever more 
excitation and arousal boosts being necessary to cope 
with the escalating dilemmas.
The limitations of an excitation-arousal approach 
are however fairly clear. Being a bottom-up intrapsychic 
approach it cannot explain similarities in theme in 
delusional thinking between patients which would seem 
to be partly due to environmental formative factors (e.g. 
vague knowledge of the power of computers; folklore about 
evil spirits etc. etc.). Many aspects of the organisation 
of delusional thought are thus left unaccounted for (Lapidus 
and Schmolling 197 5).
Obviously the total global picture of delusional 
psychosis cannot be explained by hyperarousal. The arousal
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model contains no environmental information and reduces 
the functions of an executive ego, which would deal with 
tolerance of stress, anxiety and arousal and control of 
impulses, to a vaguely specified "inhibitory mechanism".
The problem structure of a delusion cannot be described 
entirely in terms of internal representations, dynamic 
structures and processes or local brain processes.
Delusions may shift in content and style dramatically 
on the basis of the most "trivial" environmental stimuli 
or patterns which are totally outside the predictions 
of a cognitive; A.I.; psychoanalytic or arousal theory.
We must ask not only what is inside the psychotic's head 
but what the psychotic's head is inside of. The context 
within which the psychotic is living is not "much the 
same as for everyone". It is vastly, even uncannily 
different from that of the common stock of humanity and 
is considerably changed by their presence. Hence in looking 
at arousal processes we are looking merely at tendencies, 
at local patterns operating in a massive network of 
mutually interpenetrating relations which extend far outside 
and beyond the psychotic themselves.
Experimental Tests
The possibility that psychosis, which I am viewing 
in this part of the thesis as a kind of hyperfunctional 
malfunction, may open a "portal" - to use Oliver Sacks' 
term (1986) - to a deeper or higher level of reality is
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itself untestable by analytical criterion-referenced tasks. 
The evaluation of this form of assertion may well be more 
a task for Luria's "romantic science" or Shallis's and 
Schumacher's "descriptive science" (Shallis 1982, p. 137; 
Schumacher 1977) as opposed to causal instructional science. 
However it may be possible, within an instructional science 
framework, to seek evidence that certain conditions such 
as very high or very low arousal or low environmental 
or contextual constraint, which I suggest also operate 
in the psychotic episode, can facilitate creativity and 
permit Borderline experiences. I cannot hope experimentally 
to induce or find the heights of alert vigilance that 
characterise the acutely deluded psychotic, and it would 
be unethical to do so, but I am hoping that variation 
in certain factors will produce differences in creativity 
which point in the direction or which indicate, albeit 
distantly, the state achieved in psychosis and related 
experiences.
Creativity and arousal
As shown in Martindale's work, arousal itself 
changes during on-task activity (see also Pribram and 
McGuinness 1975 and M.W. Eysenck 1982). Hence resting 
or dispositional arousal levels may have little or nothing 
to do with those which obtain during, for example, a 
thinking task. On the other hand resting levels, through 
the law of initial values, may constrain or determine 
the direction of arousal change possible on-task.
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Furthermore there may be individual differences in 
preferential arousal change with some people reacting 
to thinking task demands with arousal boost, others with 
arousal drop. Martindale (1975) found that in a divergent 
thinking task (Uses test) high creatives tended to drop 
arousal while uncreatives boosted it. However in convergent 
reasoning tasks arousal boost, in the sense of heart rate 
boost, seems to be the norm (Pribram and McGuinness 1975).
Because of these complexities a number of 
different measures of arousal were used in this experiment^ 
as mentioned previously. Since it would be expected that 
stress and anxiety would also have arousing consequences, 
these were assessed via the pencil and paper measures 
of self-reported state and through the N scale of the 
EPQ - the latter being a measure of dispositional arousal. 
State autonomic arousal was assessed via measurements 
of blood pressure and pulse before, during and after the 
volunteer worked on a creativity task. Resting cortical 
arousal was assessed tentatively via the spiral-after- 
effect duration, long spiral after-effects suggesting 
high visual cortical arousal.
Because BP and pulse were taken before, during 
and after the volunteer worked on-task it was possible 
to assess whether high creativity went with high on-task 
arousal, high resting arousal or both. I predicted that 
the psychotics' style would be to boost arousal from an 
already higher resting arousal (autonomic and cortical) 
than the low N non-psychotics.
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As stated previously: a non-inverted U relation 
between arousal and creativity was expected particularly 
with reference to on-task arousal.
The creativity measures used were:
1) Uses of a brick test (Christensen, Guilford,
Merrifield and Wilson 1960) given with a gentle constraint ■ 
a time limit of two minutes. This was scored for both 
fluency and originality.
2) A fluency test - the volunteer was requested to
write down as many words as they could think of that began 
with the letter S, in two minutes.
3) The Drawing Completion Test (Barron 1962) in which
the volunteer is given a fragment of a pattern and asked 
to 'complete' or 'make something out of it', thus creating 
a picture (no time limit).
4 and 5) The 2-3 and 3-4 verbal thinking tests mentioned 
previously with no time limits. The 3-4 test was the 
test on which autonomic measures were taken during and 
after the volunteer's activity. The validity of these 
tests was assessed by comparing the scores of high "real 
world" creative volunteers against those of low creative 
volunteers (see Results section).
A self reported concentration score was the measure 
of effort, this was taken as part of the Nowlis state 
report inventory which was completed by each volunteer 
close to the start of the experiment.
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Creativity and personality
Following the work of Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) 
and Woody and Claridge (1977) it was expected that creativity 
scores would correlate positively with psychometric 
measures of psychoticism. Three measures were taken:
1) The score on the P (Psychoticism) scale of the
EPQ.
2) A short paranoia scale devised for this experiment
but using items from the E, P and N scales of the EPQ
and items from the special psychoticism scale discussed 
below.
3) A special psychoticism scale quite different in
content to the P scale, again devised for this experiment, 
basically covering aspects of psychoticism not dealt with 
in the EPQ.
If high creatives are dispositionally highly aroused 
then it would be expected that high creativity would be 
married with introversion. (For evidence that introverts 
are more cortically aroused than extraverts see H.J. Eysenck 
(1981)). Hence a negative correlation was expected between 
creativity score and E and also I (Impulsivity).
It was also expected that if the previously 
deluded psychotics are highly creative, then they should 
be more introverted than both the non-psychotic groups.
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Creativity and the paranoid/non-paranoid distinction
In the first experimental test ever done of the 
creativity of schizophrenics, Keefe and Magaro (1980) 
found that non-paranoid schizophrenics scored higher on 
creativity, as assessed by the Alternate Uses test than 
did a group of paranoid schizophrenics and a group of 
non-psychotic psychiatric controls. This was predicted 
on the basis of Magaro's (1981) scheme to the effect that 
paranoids are left hemisphere, controlled, serial convergent 
thinkers while non-paranoids are right hemisphere divergent 
thinkers. Keefe and Magaro (1980) also offered the 
hypothesis, following Forest (1976) and Prentky (1979) 
that schizophrenia and creativity reflect similar cognitive 
processes.
The present experiment offered an opportunity 
to attempt to replicate the important finding of Keefe 
and Magaro although admittedly with less pure samples.
I predicted that a paranoid/non-paranoid difference would 
again be found on the Alternate Uses test and indeed in 
all of the creativity tests with the non-paranoids being 
the higher scorers.
It would also be expected that in all the creativity 
tests non-paranoid psychotics would score higher than 
both the non-psychotic groups.
A direct "clean" attempt at replication of the 
Keefe and Magaro experiment was alas not possible as my 
previously psychotic sample contained four (out of
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seventeen) volunteers who had suffered predominantly from 
mood disorders with delusions, rather than from schizophrenia, 
However the general pattern found by Keefe and Magaro 
was expected to emerge.
Smoking effects
Somewhat out on a tangent from the body of this 
thesis but, so to speak, "hovering in the air" during 
Part One is the possibility that smoking may be of causal 
relevance to an understanding of psychosis. Although 
Alana J. and Alison were non-smokers, all the male case 
study volunteers were (as I was) and David B. was a heavy 
smoker. Shafiq - although not a smoker at the time of 
crisis onset - also deteriorated from 1981 onwards over 
a period when he was chain-smoking.
Important research with rats indicates that nicotine 
has an activating influence on the nigro-stratal dopamine 
system (Arqueros et al., 1978; De Belleroche and Bradford 
1978 ; Balfour 1982; Lichtensteiger et al. , 1982) and on 
dopamine secreting neurons in the hypothalamus (Goodman 
1974; Westfall 1974). Dopamine release from at least 
striatal slices can be produced by very low concentrations 
of nicotine (Giorguieff-Chesselet et al. , 1979) and 
nicotine can have long lasting effects on the firing of 
dopamine secreting neuronss(Lichtensteiger et al. , 1976; 
Lichtensteiger et al., 1978). Nicotine in humans also
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causes cortical arousal associated with desynchronisation 
of the EEG (Remond, Martinerie and Bâillon 1979).
In addition to the above it has been found that 
chronic nicotine administration in animals has effects 
similar to those of amphetamine (Izquerdo and Izquerdo 
1971) and of course continued ingestion of amphetamine 
by humans can produce experiences and behaviours almost 
indistinguishable from those involved in paranoid 
schizophrenia (Snyder 1974, 1981). Parkinson's patients 
who, of course, have reduced dopaminergic activity also 
show less evidence of cigarette smoking (Barucha et al., 
1986) and the reward from smoking seems also in part to 
be due to nicotine promoting dopamine secretion in parts 
of the brain associated with "pleasure centres" (Wise 
1978 , 1980) .
Given these pointers from pharmacological and 
physiological research of nicotine's nigro-stratal, limbic 
and cortical effects, is it possible that smoking is a 
causal factor in schizophrenia and paranoia? If so we 
should expect to see elevated scores for smokers on all 
the psychoticism scales and perhaps especially on the 
paranoia scale. Since mental distress no doubt helps 
also to cause smoking we should see evidence of this in 
differences in self reported stress, anxiety, depression 
etc. on the MacKay et al. (1978) and Nowlis (1965) self 
report inventories.
243
If the correlations between smoking and psychoticism, 
especially paranoia, are high and significant but the 
calming and stress reducing effects of smoking are small 
it would be reasonable to infer that smoking could be 
a risk factor in the development of paranoia and 
schizophrenia. If this is so then smokers should also 
be higher on dispositional concentration difficulties 
(assessed by an item on the previously mentioned 
scale) as are schizophrenics generally.
Clearly were such a link demonstrated, it would 
have considerable practical implications.
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CHAPTER 11
DESCRIPTION OF VOLUNTEERS
General comments
The fifty-nine volunteers in this experiment did 
not include a single undergraduate psychology student.
The vast majority were working or unemployed men and women. 
However some did have student status. Three were active 
students and four of the working men were part-time under­
graduates with The Open University studying a basic science 
course (physics; chemistry; biologyyand geology). Three 
of the women and three other men were also attending a 
once-per-week psychology class, consisting of one two 
hour lecture , while working. Two volunteers were 
"unemployed students" meaning that they were taking 
occasional classes with a view to either working or 
eventually going to university, one to study economics, 
the other French. However, as stated, none of the above 
were full-time or part-time undergraduate psychologists.
The ages of the volunteers ranged from 19 to 64 
(see Table 5) . There were twenty three women and thirty 
six men and their occupations (see Table 6) ranged widely 
from secretary; social worker; teacher and interior 
designer (for the women) to food technologist; radio 
journalist; film-maker; clerk and salesman (for the men).
The sample was thus a fair cross-section of society although 
fifteen volunteers alas were unemployed - a quarter of
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the sample. Interestingly none of these were from the 
Low N non-psychotic group; in contrast 19% of the high 
N group and 65% of the psychotic group were unemployed.
The volunteers were divided into three groups: 
previously deluded psychotics; high N and low N non- 
psychotics; the groups were matched for sex, reasonably 
closely for age and less closely for number of years of 
education. An attempt was made to match them also on 
the level, and in some cases even the exact nature, of 
their occupation although this was difficult (see Tables 
5, 6 and 7). Overall the volunteers averaged around 35 
years of age with about 13 years of education. Seventeen 
of the volunteers were friends of mine, 6 were in the 
psychotic group; 5 in the high N group and 6 in the low 
N group.
Detailed comments
A . Psychdtic sample
Despite repeated requests of innumerable 
institutions and departments over a four year period, 
only 17 previously psychotic volunteers could be obtained. 
These came largely from day hospitals, day centres and 
mental aftercare hostels - so were past the worst of their 
crises. Four of the cells for the female sample are empty 
and no control group of non-deluded psychotics could be 
obtained.
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The diagnoses of the psychotics were their 
psychiatrists' and treatment teams' diagnoses (see 
Table 8). The vast majority were, in my view, non- 
controversial and had been reviewed and confirmed. Two 
exceptions to this were those of volunteer 19 and 
volunteer 21. Volunteer 19 had initially been given the 
diagnosis of "schizophrenia" (in 1950) but this was 
regarded as a mistake by a different hospital to which 
he was admitted in 1967 on the occasion of his fourth 
episode. The diagnosis was changed to manic-depression 
and had stayed so since that date.
Volunteer 21 was given the (now defunct) diagnosis 
of simple schizophrenia in 1969 when he suffered his first 
episode at the age of 19. This diagnosis is usually taken 
to imply an absence of delusions, however is his case 
delusions/were present: he felt that his flatmate was 
The Devil and that good and bad were "fighting eaCh other" 
on the airways. For the purposes of the present research 
he is classified as a non-paranoid schizophrenic.
The psychotic sample thus contained 9 paranoid 
and 8 non-paranoid cases^ four of the latter being mood 
disorders. All but one of the previously psychotic 
volunteers however regarded their delusions as their 
illness. All but two were on medication at the time of 
testing, some on quite substantial amounts (see Table 8), 
but all were quite well and very cooperative.
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B . High N sample
The high N non-psychotic sample, who were 
selected on the basis that they scored 13 or more on the 
23 item N scale of the EPQ, did contain six volunteers 
who had suffered some degree of psychiatric disorder 
sufficient to warrant treatment. Volunteer 22 had suffered 
from neurotic depression twice, once at 20 and again at
29. She was taking 50 mg of Anafranil three times daily, 
a drug which does have an intended sedative effect and 
which may induce tachycardia (ABPI Data Sheet Compendium 
1985-86, pp.489-490). She had had psychotherapy where 
her "repressed anger" had been the focus of attention.
Volunteer 24 had suffered from epilepsy since 
the age of 10 (i.e. for 40 years) and was on anti­
convulsant medication - which can have a cognitive slowing 
effect. Volunteer 25, after being brought up in a convent, 
was a cured heroin addict. Volunteer 2 7 had once been 
sufficiently distressed by neurosis to convince her G.P. 
to recommend her for psychoanalysis. She said that the 
treatment had been of some benefit (although ironically 
it seemed to have had minimal effect on her N score on 
the EPQ, which (at 22) was the highest in the entire 
sample).
Volunteer 34 was rather vague about his disorder, 
for which he was hospitalised. It seemed to be a general 
total breakdown in self-confidence and ability to face 
the world; Volunteer 37 had suffered from neurotic
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depression (no delusions) after giving up drinking three 
and a half years previously. He was at the time of testing 
taking tranxene (15 mg 1 x daily nocte) but was trying 
to phase it out and had not taken it on the second night 
prior to the experiment. (Tranxene is reported to have 
little sedative effect although driving and the operation 
of dangerous machinery may be impaired (ABPI Data Sheet 
Compendium 1985-86, pp.211-212)).
Other than these cases the high N sample were 
unremarkable with respect to psychiatric morbidity and, 
inclusive of the people mentioned above, contained many 
individuals of outstanding personality and professional 
status. All were very cooperative.
C . Low N sample
This sample, which consisted of people scoring 
12 or less on the N scale of the EPQ, was notable for 
containing no unemployed individuals. Even the "retired 
photographer" was highly active in photography teaching 
and photography itself.
The only pathology in the group was in volunteer 
53 who had a gender identity disorder. At the time of 
testing he was a mildly fetishistic transvestite with 
strong transsexual leanings but did later more fully come 
to embody and live out the female role and came to regabd 
"himself" as a transsexual.
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Again this group contained many talented individuals 
who, like those in the high N group, would be a fair match 
for the predicted creative talents of the psychotic, 
especially the non-paranoid psychotic, volunteers.
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TABLE FIVE. Ages of Volunteers
Row Psychotics High N non-psychotics Low N non-psychotics
Females
A VI 33.86* V22 30.55 V43 32. 78
B V2 33. 47 V23 31.53 V44 30.92
C V3 45. 93 V24 49. 75 V45 59. 78
D V4 35.21 V25 33.71 V46 38.11
E V5 22.93 V26 20.28 V47 22. 78
F V6 - V27 34.50 V48 25.22
G V7 - V28 40.33 V49 40.04
H V8 - V29 31.40 V50 22.16
I V9 - V30 26.89 V51 21.24
Males
J VIO 24.92 V31 25.61 V52 25.05
K Vll 35.21 V32 35.32 V53 36. 58
L V12 35.96 V33 37.67 V54 33.37
M V13 27. 36 V34 28.21 V55 27. 30
N V14 36.94 V35 42.98 V56 42.78
0 V15 23.42 V36 19.61 V57 20. 93
P V16 60.14 V37 59.21 V58 64.73
Q VI7 26. 71 V38 28.16 V59 29.14
R V18 39.01 V39 42.00 V60 38.42
S VI9 59.64 V40 54.35 V61 56.12
T V20 34.75 V41 33.95 V62 30.81
U V21 34.95 V42 37.81 V63 34. 23
Mean 35.91 35.42 34.88
S.D. 10.83 10.20 12.42
*The digits after the decimal point refer to fractions of a year. 
Hence 34. 50 means that the volunteer was 34 years and 6 months of age 
at the time of testing.
TABLE SIX. Occupations of Volunteers
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Row Psychotics
Females
High N no n- psychotics Low N non- psy ch ot ics
A V1 U n em p l o y e d  nurse V22 Unemployed trainee nurse V43 Social worker
B V2 Se cr eta ry V23 Housewife V44 Typist
C V3 Ho us ewi fe V24 Unemployed (typist/ 
domestic)
V45 Domestic
D V4 Secr eta ry V25 Housewife V46 Interior designer
E V5 Secr eta ry V26 Active student V47 Teacher
F V6 - V27 Social worker V48 Social worker
G V7 - V28 Social worker V49 Student social worker
H V8 - V29 Teacher/mother V50 Civil servant
I V9 - V30 Library assistant V51 Active student
Males
J VIO Un em plo ye d st udent V31 Unemployed student V52 Accountant
K Vll Un em plo ye d en gi nee r (radar) V32 Salesman V53 Typewriter repair 
mechanic
L V12 Un em plo ye d t e a c her (maths) V33 University teacher V54 Ph ys icist/Social
worker
M V13 Clerk V34 Unemployed panel beater V55 Airfreight w a r e hou se ma n
N V14 U n e m plo ye d b u t c h e r ' s  asst. V35 Radio journalist V56 Driver
0 V15 U n e m plo ye d postman V36 Customer liaison clerk V57 Active student
P V16 U n e m plo ye d acco unt s clerk V37 Retired tax officer/ V58 Retired ph ot ogr ap he r
accounts clerk
Wa re hou se wo rk er/ 
storeman
Q V17 Un em plo ye d me s s e n g e r V38 Telecom engineer V59
R V18 U n em plo ye d ps y c h i a t r i c  nurse V39 Executive with British 
Telecom
V60 Florist /p ho tog ra phe r
S V I 9 U n em plo ye d bo o k s e l l e r ' s V40 Self-employed V6l Food technol og is t
d e sp atc h clerk
St or ema n/messengerT V20 Unem plo ye d o r g a nic chemist V41 Actor V62
U V21 C o n s e r v a t i o n  gardener V42 Chauffeur V63 Film-maker
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TABLE SEVEN. Number of years of education of volunteers
Row Psychotics High N: non-psychotics Low N non-psv
Females
A VI 17.0 V22 13.0 V43 18.0
B V2 18.0 V23 8.0 V44 11.0
C V3 11.0 V24 10.0 V45 9.0
D V4 11.0 V25 11.0 V46 12.0
E V5 10.0 V26 16.0 V47 17.0
F V6 - V27 18.0 V48 16.0
G V7 - V28 11.0 V49 11.0
H V8 - V29 17.0 V50 16.0
I V9 — V30 13.0 V51 12. 0
Males
J VIO 15.0 V31 11.0 V52 13. 0
K Vll 16.0 V32 11.0 V53 10.0
L V12 16.0 V33 16.0 V54 19.0
M V13 14.0 V34 11.0 V55 12.0
N V14 10.0 V35 10.0 V56 11.0
0 V15 10.0 V36 9.2 V57 9.5
P V16 16.0 V37 10.0 V58 11.5
Q V17 10.0 V38 19.0 V59 11.0
R Vie 17.0 V39 11.0 V60 12.0
S V19 8.5 V40 17.0 V61 16.0
T 'V20 24. 0 V41 15.0 V62 11.0
U V21 16.0 V42 10.0 V63 11. 0
Mean 14.09 12.72 12.8]
S.D. 4.05 3.26 2.92
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T A B L E  E I G H T .  D e t a i l s  of p r e v i o u s l y  d e l u d e d  p s y c h o t i c  v o l u n t e e r s
Age
Females
Oc cu p a t i o n
1 3 5 . 8 6  Unemployed nurse
2 3 3 . 4 7  Secr eta ry
3 4 5 . 9 3  Hous ewi fe
4 3 5 . 2 1  Se cretary
5 2 2 . 9 3  Se cretary
Diagnosis
Shizoaffective 
psychosis
Paranoid
s c hizophrenia
Paranoid
sc hizophrenia
Manic episode
Manic episode
Date of No. of 
Diagnosis episodes
1985
1978
1981
1979
1984
Me di cat io n
2 mg Pimozide nocte 
150 mg prothiaden nocte 
60 mg pr opanolol nocte 
40 mg propanolol mane
Depixol injection 
every 3 weeks (40 mg)
5 mg procycl id in e  
2 X daily
5 mg stellazine 
1 X daily
Oc ca sionally Tomazipam 
NO ME DI CAT IO N
(was on li th ium for 
9 months, two to three 
years prev iou sl y)
Lithium 400 mg 
2 X daily 
Tomazipam 10 mg 
1 X daily
(Cells V6-V 9 empty)
Males
10 24.92 Unemplo ye d st udent Paranoid
psychosis
11 3 5 . 2 1  Un e m p l o y e d  e n gi nee r Paranoid
(radar) sc hizophrenia
12 3 5 . 9 6  Unem plo ye d te acher Paranoid
(maths) sc hizophrenia
13 2 7 . 3 6  Clerk Hypomania
14 3 6 . 9 4  Unemployed bu t c h e r ' s  Paranoid
assi sta nt schizop hr en ia
1979 1 M o de cat e in jections
Kemadrin (no details)
1981 1 25 mg depixol injection
weekly
Sleeping tablets 
(no details)
197 4 2 25 mg modecate
injections weekly 
Kemadrin 5 mg 
3 X daily
1 9 7 3 2 800 mg lithium daily
19 6 8 (no de tails) 50 mg mo decate
injection every 3 weeks 
Kemadrin 5 mg 
2 X daily
... cont inu ed /2
T A B L E  E I G H T  ( C o n t i n u e d )
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V Age Oc cu pat io n Diagnosis
15 23-42 Un em plo ye d po st man Schizophrenic
episode
l6 60.14 Un em plo ye d a c co unt s Paranoid
clerk sc hi zophrenia
17 26.71 Unemplo ye d m e s s e n g e r  Paranoid
sc hizophrenia
18 39.01 U n em plo ye d '' Paranoid
p s y c h i a t r i c  nurse sc hizophrenia
Date of No. of Me dication 
Diagnosis episodes
1971 1 60 mg depixol
2 X weekly 
5 mg Kemadrin 
2 X daily
1961 (no details) Modecate in jections 
every month (no
1975
1981
details)
25 mg modecate 
in jections every
3 weeks 
Kemadrin 5 mg
4 X daily
NO M E DI CAT IO N FOR 
FOUR MONTHS PR EVIOUSLY 
Had been on 6OO mg 
ch lo rpr om az ine daily 
and 5-10 mg of 
ha loperidol daily 
plus depixol and two 
an t i - d e pr es san ts (no 
details)
19 59.64 U n e m plo ye d M a ni c-
b o o k s e l l e r ' s  depression
d e sp atc h clerk
20 3 4 . 7 5  Un em plo ye d organic Schizophrenic 
ch em ist episode
(non-paranoid)
21 3 4 . 9 5  C o ns erv at io n
gard ene r
Simple
sc hizophrenia
1967
1981
1969
Lithium 1000 mg 
per day
Imipramine up to 
four months previou sl y
Depixol 40 mg 
1 X monthly.
Kemadrin 5 mg 
3 X daily
M o decate 25 mg 
injection mo nthly.
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CHAPTER 12 
HOW THE EXPERIMENT WAS RUN
It is my hope that the reader will by now realise 
that 1 have not been labouring under the expectation that 
this experimental enguiry will reveal the cause of delusional 
thinking. Hyperarousal, overactive left or right hemispheres 
or peculiarities of cognitive style do not cause delusional 
experience in a direct one-to-one fashion. It is my belief 
that such factors predispose a person, if that person 
is operating in a certain evolving environmental and 
interpersonal context, to achieve a state where delusional 
phenomena are permitted. They, in a sense, help take 
the person to a realm where the magical, the uncanny, 
the spiritual, the dream-like and the mystical can be 
experienced. Hence the experimental study investigates 
some of the components on which delusional thinking depends 
but only in the full qualitative context of the individual 
can we see how the total pattern of delusional thinking 
depends upon those components.
My approach in running this experiment was therefore 
to try to set up conditions where the volunteer, despite 
knowing that they were under evaluation, could behave, 
think and feel freely and honestly. Despite the artificiality 
of the situation 1 wanted to pick up their spontaneous 
natural style. To this end every attempt was made to 
help the volunteer feel relaxed, safe, valued and appreciated.
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In the delusional crisis the psychotic gives of their 
best partly in order to survive; hence it was necessary 
to try to reproduce this "best" in another context where 
survival was not involved. I decided that the only way 
to achieve this was to try to create a warm, accepting 
and rewarding atmosphere where the volunteer could operate 
in an authentic way.
The experiment was therefore not run in a university 
laboratory or cubicle setting but in the kitchen of my 
fairly comfortable West London flat. Volunteers were 
requested to arrive at around 6pm and my wife, who by 
any standards is an exceptionally warm and friendly person, 
was always on hand to greet them and help make them feel 
at ease. Volunteers were told beforehand that the 
experiment involved "some personality questionnaires, 
word games, drawings and slides"; that it was basically 
fun and would be "a night out with a difference". The 
atmosphere was very informal and during all the performance 
tests my attitude was generally encouraging and rewarding. 
Hence 1 would make such statements as "Yes, you've got 
the idea"; "you're doing O.K."; "that's fine" etc. The 
exception to this was my behaviour during the Slide Viewing 
Task where, to avoid confirming or refuting volunteers' 
evolving hypotheses, 1 had to remain bland and quiet.
Given the above comments regarding the non- 
structural features of the experiment, the following 
procedure was adopted for every volunteer.
257
The evening began with a pre-experimental chat. 
Following this details were noted of their age, date of 
birth, education, and profession and details of any tablets 
they were taking were also jotted down. in addition 1 
recorded whether the volunteer was a smoker or non-smoker. 
(Because the arousal measures were such important independent 
variables and because nicotine is such a powerful stimulant, 
smokers were requested to refrain from smoking at the 
beginning of the experiment when resting blood pressure 
and pulse readings were taken, as were state measures, 
and also to refrain during the 3-4 test where BP and pulse
readings were taken while they were on task).
For the previously deluded psychotic volunteers, 
information was obtained on the number of episodes they 
had suffered; the age at which they suffered the first 
episode; their diagnosis and its date; brief details of 
their delusions (if they were willing to talk about them) 
and their current medication, if any.
The experiment was conceptually divided into two 
halves: the first half involved assessing the volunteer 
on the independent variables. These were, in the order
in which they were administered:
1) Resting systolic and diastolic BP and pulse rate
The device used for obtaining these readings was 
a Bresco U-Chek Super digital sphygmomanometer, model 
TMlOl made by the Brethro Corporation, Tokyo, Japan.
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This device had the advantage of automatically 
computing pulse at the same time as deriving blood pressure 
readings. It had several disadvantages: firstly it was 
very slow, readings would usually take between 80 secs 
and 2 mins from the beginning of pumping to obtain.
Secondly this long delay sometimes caused the volunteer 
pain, in one case extreme and in another case the long 
period of waiting under tension made a volunteer faint.
The experiment was discontinued in this instance and another 
matched volunteer found. Thirdly: diastolic readings 
were rather difficult to obtain and several pulse readings 
were impossible. Many times 1 had to request my wife 
to take the volunteer's pulse instead of relying on the 
digital sphygmomanometer reading. Fortunately 1 managed 
to obtain a full set of reasonable readings for all but 
one volunteer but 1 would not recommend the use of this 
device.
2) State arousal and stress levels
These were obtained via the pencil and paper state 
self-report questionnaires devised by Nowlis (1965) and 
MacKay, Cox, Burrows and Lazzerini (1978).
The Nowlis test allowed state scores on the 
following dimensions to be computed: Aggression; Concentration; 
Deactivation; Social Affection; Anxiety; Depression; Egotism; 
Pleasantness; Activation; Nonchalance; Scepticism and 
Startle.
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The MacKay test, which is an Anglicized version 
of the Thayer Activation-Deactivation Adjective Check 
List (Thayer 1970, 1971, 1975) produced scores on Arousal 
(out of 15) and Stress (out of 19). These are Thayer's 
Activation dimensions A and B.
3) Extraversion, Neuroticism, Psychoticism, Lie Score,
Empathy, Impulsiveness and Venturesomeness.
Scores on these dimensions were obtained by the 
volunteer taking the EPQ (Eysenck and Eysenck 1975); my 
own psychoticism questionnaire (see Table 9), and then 
the 1^ questionnaire of S.B.C. Eysenck (Eysenck and McGurk 
1980). A short paranoia score was obtained from responses 
on the first two of these personality questionnaires (see 
Table 10). (On my own psychoticism scale the responses 
to score were all keyed "Yes". This procedure, also used 
in the EPQ N scale, sets social desirability response 
bias (which biases to 'No') against acquiescence response 
bias (which biases to 'Yes'). Hence the two biases may, 
to an extent, cancel and the true response come through).
The two psychoticism scales 1 devised myself were 
necessary as the Eysenckian psychoticism scale (which 
will be referred to as P^) fails to discriminate psychotics 
from non-psychotics. Criminals score just as highly (Bishop 
1977; Block 1977). A paranoia scale is also not likely 
to produce truthful responding if given as a special 
paranoia questionnaire. Hence 1 distributed the items 
which"1 took to be relevant to paranoia across the EPQ
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TABLE NINE. Special Psychoticism Questionnaire (used 
as a research instrument only) (P^ scale
Question (All Responses scoring for
psychoticism were 'Yes')
1. Filler item
2. Filler item
3. Are you interested in astrology and the occult?
4. Are you unhappy because you are not famous?
5. Filler item
6. Do you often think that you have a mission to 
fulfil?
7. Filler item
8. Do you sometimes worry that people can read your
thoughts?
9. Do you believe in Fate?
10. Filler item
11. Do you ever worry about the end of the world?
12. Filler item
13. Are you sometimes afraid that you might kill
somebody?
14. Are you afraid of boredom?
15. Do you often have nightmares?
16. Filler item
17. Filler item
18. Do you often think that the neighbours are
"listening in" on you?
19. Do you like science fiction?
20. Filler item
21. Do you sometimes think that you are a special
person?
... continued/
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TABLE NINE (continued)
Question
22. Do you often feel that too much is happening around
you for you to concentrate?
23. Filler item
24. Do you often find it difficult to control your
own excitement?
25. Filler item
26. Are you superstitious?
27. Filler item
28. Are you a dreamer?
29. Are you afraid of losing control?
30. Would you call yourself a religious person?
31. Filler item
32. Filler item
33. Do you sometimes think you are being followed?
34. Filler item
35. Do you often worry that you might go mad?
36. Do you get easily upset by noisy surroundings?
37. Filler item
38. Do you often have difficulty making decisions
about the simplest things?
39. Are you ever afraid that you might blurt or shout
out something unpleasant that you are thinking?
40. Are you easily distracted?
41. Do you sometimes think that you are running away
from yourself?
42. Filler item
43. Do you often feel suicidal?
44. Do you tend to rush things?
45. Do you find classical music disturbing?
... continued/ ...
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TABLE NINE (continued)
Question
46. Filler item
47. Is a lot of emotion expressed in your home?
48. Filler item
49. Do you often think that things that happen were 
somehow meant to be that way?
50. Filler item
51. Do you often feel that your mind works quite
differently to other people's?
52. Filler item
53. Filler item
54. Are you ashamed of your thoughts?
55. Do you sometimes feel really elated and optimistic
about things for no good reason?
56. Filler item
57. Do your family criticise you a lot?
58. Do you often feel that your personality is false
or a put-on?
59. Do a lot of uncanny coincidences happen to you?
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TABLE TEN. Short Paranoia Scale (used as a research 
instrument only) (p scale)
Question Response scoring
foriparanoia
1. Do you lock up your house carefully at night? Yes
2. Do you often worry about things you should not
have done or said? Yes
3. Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt? Yes
4. Do you have enemies who want to harm you? Yes
5. Do you have many friends? No
6. Do you worry about awful things that might
happen? Yes
7. Do you like mixing with people? No
8. Are there several people who keep trying to
avoid you? Yes
9. Would you like other people to be afraid of you? Yes
10. Do people tell you a lot of lies? Yes
11. Are you touchy about some things? Yes
12. Do you often think you have a mission to fulfil? Yes
13. Do you sometimes worry that people can read
your thoughts? Yes
14. Are you sometimes afraid that you might kill
somebody? Yes
15. Do you often think that the neighbours are
"listening in" on you? Yes
16. Do you sometimes think that you are a special
person? Yes
17. Do you sometimes think that you are being 
followed?
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and my own psychoticism scale (which will be referred 
to as P^). Hence the paranoia scale was covert. It was 
17 items long.
c
The P scale consisted of items based on current 
theories and descriptive schemes of schizophrenic aetiology 
and symptomatology (e.g. "Do you often feel that there 
is too much happening around you for you to concentrate?" 
and "Do you often feel that your personality is false 
or a put-on?" related to filter (McGhie and Chapman 1961) 
and false-self collapse (Laing 1965) theories of schizophrenia, 
This scale was 36 items long.
4) Spiral-after-effect duration
The after-effect used in the analysis was the 
mean of four readings taken from each volunteer.
Volunteers were first primed to experience the 
spiral-after-effeet by showing them the rotating spiral 
for about 5 seconds and then stopping it. They were asked 
to report what they saw. All but one volunteer reported 
the after-effect. I then said: "I want you to look at
this rotating spiral for one minute. Then I will stop 
it. You will then see that the spiral seems to rotate 
in the opposite direction; that is the after-effect.
When the after-effect ceases I want you to say the word 
"Now". We will do this four times to get an average time 
for the after-effect" .
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The after-effect was therefore timed from the 
moment of cessation of the rotation to the moment when 
the volunteer said 'Now'. A pause of between half a minute 
and a minute was given between each determination.
The spiral-after-effeet device was a manually 
wound up device (driven by springs) consisting of an 85 
revolutions per minute turntable with two spirals available 
both 14.3 cms in diameter. One was "left handed" which 
expanded on clockwise rotation giving a contracting after­
effect and one was "right handed" which contracted on 
clockwise rotation giving an expanding after-effect.
Each spiral consisted of five turns and was in 
black on a white background with a central hole of 9 mm 
in diameter. The device was manufactured by C.F. Palmer 
of London.
The spiral rotation was stopped by throwing a 
switch while simultaneously starting a stopwatch. The 
stopwatch was a Swiss made Nero Lamania one-fifth of a 
second stopwatch with 60 second and 30 minute dials.
Both devices worked very satisfactorily.
Contracting after effects were measured (two 
readings) and then expanding after effects (two readings). 
The mean and standard deviation of the four readings from 
each volunteer was computed.
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Following these "volunteer characterising" measures, 
the second half of the experiment consisted of the obtaining 
of eight sets of performance measures. In brief these 
were :
Digit Span
Verbal fluency (S test)
Flexibility of thought (Uses test)
Vocabulary
Verbal associative thinking (2-3 test)
Verbal divergent thinking (3-4 test)
Visual divergent thinking (Drawing Completion Test)
Visual judgement (Slide Viewing Task)
These tasks were given to each volunteer with 
their order of presentation individually semi-randomised 
except for the fact that the digit span task was always 
given first. This was to minimise the delay between the 
obtaining of the resting measures of arousal and the 
obtaining of this vital performance measure.
The task will now be described in more detail.
1) Digit Span
Digit span was assessed both forwards and 
backwards using the digit sequences given in task 5 (Digit 
Span) of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) 
(Wechsler 1958) . The volunteer was allowed two attempts 
at each digit sequence length. Digits were read out at 
a rate of approximately three digits every two seconds 
keeping inflexions of tone and pauses to a minimum.
267
Volunteers had to repeat the digit sequences back to me, 
in the same order, orally. Forward digit span was tested 
first, then backward digit span.
The WAIS only provides digits up to a maximum 
of nine forwards and eight backwards. These are the limit 
scores. For my purposes however I had to be able to assess 
digit spans beyond these extremities and hence I devised 
digit sequences up to a maximum of twelve forwards and 
ten backwards.
The following digit sequences were used, with 
the second sequence in each pair being given only if the 
volunteer failed the first. The maximum sequence length 
reported back was the recorded digit span.
Forwards Digit Span
Digits Score
5-8-2 3
6-9-4 3
6-4-3-9 4
7-2-S-6 4
4-2-7-3-1 5
7-5_8-3-6 5
6-1-9-4-7-3 6
3_9_2-4-8-7 6
5-9-1-7-4-2-8 7
4-1_7_9_3_8-6 7
5-8-1-9-2-6-4-7 8
3-8-2-9-5-1-7-4 8
2-7-5-S-6-2-5-8-4
7—1 — 3 — 9 — 4 — 2 — 5 — 6 — 8
3-9-7-4-5-2-8-6-1-7 
5 — 2 — 9 — 3 — 8 — 2 — 7—4 — 6 — 3
5 — 9 — 7 — 1 — 4 — 2 — 8 — 3 — 6 — 5 — 9
2-8-6-5-4-1-3-7-9-5-2
3-2-8-4-7-6-1-5-3-9-4-6 
9-l_7-6-3-5-2-4-8-7-l-3
9
9
10
10
11
11
12
12
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Backwards Digit Span
Digits Score
2-4
5-8
6-2-9 3
4-1-5 3
3-2-7-9 - 4
4 — 9 — 6 — 8 4
1_5_2-8-6 5
6-1-8-4-3 5
5-3—9—4—1—8 8
7_2-4-8-5-6 6
8-1-2-9-3-6-5 7
4—7—3—9—1—2—8 7
9-4-3-7-6-2-5-8 8
7—2—8—1—9—6—5—3 8
6-4-9-1-8-7-5-2-3 9
5_2-3-8-6-4-1-7-2 9
7-9 — 2 — 8 — 1 — 5 — 4 — 3 — 6 — 2 10
8-3-7-5-9-1-4-2-6-3 10
2. Fluency test
In order to assess fluency of the creative 
process, volunteers were requested to write down as many 
words as they could think of that began with the letter S, 
in two minutes. Volunteers' scores were the number of 
different words written.
Only fluency scores were used in the analysis 
as it seems that originality scores on this test give 
little extra information.
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3. Flexibility of thought
This was assessed via the Alternate Uses test 
(Christensen, Guilford, Merrifield and Wilson 1960). 
Volunteers were requested to write down as many categorically 
different uses as they could think of, for a brick, in 
two minutes.
Volunteers' scores were the number of different 
uses recorded. Keefe and Magaro's (1980) four point scale 
scoring method based on the subjective strikingness and 
novelty of the responses given was itself tested (see 
Results chapter). Originality scores on the Uses test 
were also computed.
4. Vocabulary
Vocabulary level was obtained via testing the 
volunteers with the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale, Form 1 
Senior (1977 revision. Raven 1976). This consists of 
two sets each of 33 questions. Set A, Definitions, asks 
of the volunteer:
"Write down in a few words the meaning of each 
of the following words as it has been done for the first 
word".
Example
Brag: Answer "Boast".
Set B, Synonyms, asks of the volunteer:
"In each group 6f six words below underline the
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word which means the same as the word in heavy type above
the group, as it has been done in the first example:
MALARIA 
basement fever
theatre fruit
ocean tune
Volunteers were timed on both Set A and Set B, 
knew that they were being timed, but no time limit was 
set. Responses to both Sets A and B were scored for the 
following :
Number correct 
Number incorrect 
Number completed
Number abandoned or not attempted 
Mean time per response
5. • Verbal Associative Thinking
Fairly convergent verbal thinking was required 
on this the 2-3 test. Two words were presented e.g. "Head" 
and "Box" , and a third word was required which was an 
associate of both these two e.g. "Letter". To assess 
forward and backward thinking skills half the items 
tempted answers which were suffixes to the two word 
item e.g.
High Ski: Answer "Jump" 
whilst other answers were prefixes, e.g.
Giving Fight: Answer "Prize"
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For the actual test with the instructions and favoured 
answers see Table 11.
The Prefix/Suffix score was based on the form 
of the volunteer's answers rather than on the form of 
the questions or the expected response. The time spent 
on the test was recorded but no time limit was imposed.
Total score, number correct, number incorrect, number 
completed and number abandoned was also noted as was mean 
time per response.
Unlike the responses to the 3-4 test, next to 
be described, the answers given on this test were closely 
the same as the expected answers, testifying, I think, 
to the test's convergent nature.
Confirmation bias on this test was assessed by 
the number of responses which matched with only one of 
the two word items - as a percentage of the total number 
attempted.
6. Verbal Divergent Thinking
The test used to obtain a measure of verbal 
creativity was my own version of Mednick's Remote 
Associates Test (Mednick 1962). Mednick's own version 
was not used firstly because the scores usually obtained 
on this test seemed to be rather low and I wished to avoid 
floor effects, secondly because of the worryingly high 
correlations of scores on the test with scores on intelligence
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TABLE ELEVEN. 2 to 3 Verbal Thinking Test
In this test you are presented with two words e.g. Tricks 
and Chocolates and asked to find a third word which is 
in some way related to or associated with them. In the 
example one possible answer would be "Box" which would 
give us "Box of Tricks" and "Box of Chocolates". Here 
are some more examples with possible answers provided:
Stone Tree: Lime
Head Box: Letter
Maker Stick: Match
Beat Stick: Drum
Wall Cell: Prison
If you are quite clear about what is required go ahead 
and try the items on the next page. If you are not clear 
or have any questions then do ask. The test is quite 
hard so do not be disappointed if you cannot do all of 
it, few people can.
Added orally: "Although all of the answers given
above happen to come before the two words in the question 
this is not necessarily the case in the test - where the 
answer may come before or after the question words.
For example in
Atomic, Sex: Answer 'Bomb'
the answer comes after the words in the question. Please 
be mindful of this".
... continued/ ...
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TABLE ELEVEN (continued)
2 to 3 Verbal Thinking Test (here given with answers) 
Su = Suffix answer 
Pr = Prefix answer
1 High Ski: Jump (Su)
2 Giving Fight: Prize (Pr)
3 Baby Gun: Powder (Su)
4 Stump Ball: Cricket (Pr)
5 Smoking Factory: Chimney (Su)
6 Salts Room: Bath (Pr)
7 Sweet Day: Dream (Su)
8 Slipper Bottle: Glass (Pr)
9 Birthday Christmas: Present (Su), Happy (Pr
10 Headed Crossing: Level (Pr)
11 Mountain Table: Top (Su)
12 Dream Shift: Day (Pr)
13 Door Pan: Handle (Su)
14 Note Hole: Key (Pr)
15 Sound Raileay: Track (Su)
16 Lady Mine: Land (Pr)
17 Obstacle Rat: Race (Su)
18 Cushion Hole: Pin (Pr)
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tests and thirdly (and related to my second reason) because 
I wished to give the volunteer a wider range of response 
modes so that they could really exercise their spontaneous 
verbal styles of answering.
I therefore chose 53 items from an initial pool 
of 177 items (see Appendix) which I had devised myself 
and had given to a pilot sample of 35 volunteers (consisting 
of students, shop assistants, librarians and teachers).
The final booklet administered to each volunteer in the 
current experiment is shown in Table 12 with favoured 
answers supplied.
Many commentators on the original version of the 
RAT have argued that it only tests "word game" skill. 
Volunteers were therefore asked to provide a self rating 
of their ability in certain games to see if this rating 
did predict their final scores on my version of the RAT 
to a satisfactory degree. If the correlation between 
self rating and score was extremely low then my argument 
was that perhaps this form of the RAT tapped a more general 
ability.
The reader can see from the examples provided 
on the first page of the booklet that the range of permissible 
responses was very wide, both associative and various 
forms of non-associative response were allowed and no 
time limit was imposed (a 40 minute time limit is given 
in Mednick's test).
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TABLE TWELVE. 3-to 4 Verbal Thinking Test
This is a test which assesses people's ability to think 
up appropriate words. It is quite difficult so do not 
be disheartened if you find that you can only do a moderate 
or a small percentage of the questions. The form of the 
test is as follows: three separate words are presented 
and your task is to find a fourth word which is in some 
way associated with or related to all of the previous 
three. The test is somewhat open-ended as there often 
is more than one word which could be related to a particular 
triad. You, however, have only to find one word.
Here are some examples with possible answers 
provided :
Atomic Sex Shell: Bomb 
Record Theatre Doodle: Play 
Coffee Drinking Championship: Cup 
Laser Ray Girder: Beam 
Illegal Row Tennis: Racket 
Trick Trot Beast: Fox 
Monkey Lion Giraffe: Animal 
Extract Shake Teeth: Milk 
Drugs Vehicles Lights: Traffic 
Bell Film Bottle: Blue 
Sill Frame Glass: Window
... continued/. . .
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TABLE TWELVE (continued
As you can see, the answer can be related in many different 
ways, in different questions, to the items provided.
This means that a number of different aspects of verbal 
thinking are tapped by this test. It also means that 
you should not only look for one type of solution word.
Try a number of different approaches in your attempts 
at solutions.
One final point: some people have said that this form
/
of test only taps a special form of talent such as that 
required to solve crossword puzzles and the like. In 
order to obtain some evidence of how true this kind of 
criticism may or may not be it would be quite useful if 
you would rate how good you think you are at certain word 
games on the scale provided, then we can see if performance 
on this test correlates at all with the self-ratings and 
if so, to what extent it does so.
Self-Rated Ability at Verbal Games such as Crosswords/ 
Scrabble/Lexicon etc.
1. Absolutely hopeless, no good at all.
2. Almost hopeless.
3. Very poor but could be worse.
4. Poor but not too bad.
5. O.K. but not really good at them.
6. Quite good but nothing special.
7. Good, better than most people.
... continued/ . ..
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TABLE TWELVE (continued)
8. Very good indeed
9. Excellent, a real whizz at those kind of games.
Just encircle the number which refers to the wording 
which most appropriately describes your ability. Do not 
be reticent about using the extremes of the scale and 
try to encircle just one number. For obvious reasons, 
make sure that you complete the self-rating task before 
you attempt any of the items, not afterwards.
3 to 4 Verbal thinking test (with favoured answers)
Abs = Abstract answer
Cone = Concrete answer
Su = Suffix answer
Pr = Prefix answer
+ve = Positive wording
-ve = Negative wording
4 Good Thin Art: Fine (+ve)
6 Ship Pole Stone: Flag (Pr)
14 Easy Arm Deck: Chair (+ve)
20 Finishing Red Ticker: Tape (Su)
22 Table Face Dish: Cloth (Su)
23 Ice Fresh Face: Cream (+ve)
25 Two Old Egg: Timer (Su)
26 Judge Jury Law: Justice (Abs)/Court (Cone)
... continued/...
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TABLE TWELVE (continued)
28 Wall Gate Door: Barrier (Abs)/House (Cone)
30 Dirty Drab Dishevelled: Scruffiness (Abs)/
Tramp (Cone) (-ve)
35 Jug Pan Kettle: Receptacle (Abs)/Handle (Cone)
36 Angry Double Fire: Cross (-ve)
38 Umbrella Coat Hat: Protection (Abs)/Stand (Cone
41 Miscalculation Misprint Blunder: Error (-ve)
42 Valid Correct Right: True (+ve)
45 Newspaper Memo Letter: Communication (Abs)/
Office (Cone)
46 Typewriter Telephone Calculator: Device (Abs)/
Office (Cone)
49 Pen Kitchen Bread: Knife (Su)
51 Net Madam Flutter: Butterfly (+ve)
57 Asleep Track Barrier: Sound (Pr)
59 Land Hopper Roots: Grass (Pr)
64 View Stand Position: Opinion (Abs)/Football
Match (Cone)
75 After Second Abstract: Thought (Su)
77 Sherry Humour Atmosphere: Dry (+ve)
79 Car Landing Course: Crash (-ve)
82 Edge Insult Mouth: Lip (-ve)
85 Healthy Shaft Water: Well (+ve)
94 Fall Under Hill: Down (Pr)
96 House Weight Year: Light (Pr)
98 High Sun Torch: Light (Su)
100 Line Stream Land: Main (Pr)
105 Railway Fashion Washing: Line (Su)
... continued/...
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TABLE TWELVE (continued)
108 Bask Star Tan: Sun (+ve)
113 High Line Diver: Sky (Pr)
118 Killer Nagging Unbearable: Pain (-ve)
120 Fire Socialism Anger: Red (-ve)
124 Punish Cover Pile: Carpet (-ve)
126 Surprise Dress Line: Party (+ve)
128 Water Fire Shock: Proof (Su) (-ve)
130 Fall Bow Storm: Rain (Pr)
141 Mad Nuclear Game: Power (-ve)
143 Cold Pan End: Dead (-ve)
148 Ash Can Beer: Can (Su)
149 Wedding Dream Shift: Day (+ve)
155 Dancing Drinking Eating: Enjoyments (Abs)/
Party (Cone) (+ve)
156 Compliance Eagerness Helpfulness: Willingness (+ve
158 Enthusiasm Fanaticism Fervour: Zeal (+ve)
160 Altruist Samaritan Saint: Philanthropist (+ve)
161 Bitterness Envy Spite: Malevolence (-ve)
164 Overt Brazen Shameless: Undisguised (-ve)
167 Barge Boat Ship: Transport (Abs)/Water (Cone)
172 Bruise Scratch Lesion: Wound (-ve)
177 Corner Fisted Fit: Tight (Pr)
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Scores on this test were designed to measure the 
following aspects of thinking:
A) Preference for associative or non-associative
thinking. Twenty six items tempted non-associative
responses and twenty seven tempted associative responses.
The scoring of the volunteers' responses as associative 
or non-associative was however done on the basis of the 
actual form of their answers, not on the item nature.
However items were selected from the original pool of 177 
so that both styles were permitted to a fairly equal degree.
B) Preference for thinking forwards (more answers
being suffixes to the items) or backwards (more answers 
being prefixes to the items). Nine items tempted suffix 
answers and nine items tempted prefix answers. Again scoring 
was on the basis of the volunteers' answers, not on item 
content, but the latter gave equal opportunity for both 
types of answer.
C) Preference for abstract or concrete thinking.
Ten items were selected from the pool of 177 and included 
in the test such that they could be answered in an abstract
or concrete way:
e.g. Jug Pan Kettle: Abstract answer - Receptacle
Concrete answer - Handle
Umbrella Coat Hat: Abstract answer - Protection
Concrete answer - Stand
Abstract answers were scored 2, concrete were scored 1.
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D) Given the importance of the mood-congruent/mood
incongruent dimension in delusional thinking (Winters and 
Neale 1983) it was thought worthwhile to assess the congruence 
of thinking with feeling tone in a Baconian "see what happens" 
manner. Feeling tone on a pleasant-unpleasant dimension
was assessed using the state questionnaires. This was 
then related to the volunteers' scores on items which were 
pleasant or unpleasant in content.
Pleasant items included:
Bask Star Tan: Answer "Sun"
Wedding Dream Shift: Answer: "Day"
Unpleasant items included:
Angry' Double Fire: Answer "Cross"
Mad Nuclear Game: Answer "Power"
Here scoring was tied strictly to responses to these 
critical forms of item.
E) Confirmation bias.
As discussed previously, confirmation bias was 
assessed by recording the number of answers which matched 
only with two or one of the three word items as a percentage 
of the total number attempted.
F ) Arousal and thinking relations
Blood pressure and pulse readings were taken when 
the volunteer stated that they were about half way through 
the test and again about three to five minutes after they 
had finished. As many readings as were practicable were
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taken from each volunteer both mid-way through the test 
and (more easily) after it.
G) Tendencies to "dominant response responding" were
also assessed by comparing scores on easy, slightly 
difficult, moderately difficult and very difficult items. 
Performance of dominant response responders should 
deteriorate more rapidly with increasing difficulty than 
should the performance of volunteers with flatter response 
hierarchies. In this way the test would be able to measure 
flatness of associative hierarchy. The most creative people 
should have the gentlest slopes of all in their scores 
across their categories. The four categories were 
constructed on the basis of the scores of the pilot sample 
volunteers on those items used in the current test. The 
range of the slightly difficult category was one S.D. above 
the mean score on the items provided, the moderately difficult 
category covered items one S.D. below the mean. Very 
difficult and easy items were those for which scores fell 
at the extremities of the distribution. The ranges of 
pilot sample scores within each of the four categories 
was very closely the same.
Other measures recorded were 
Total score
Total number correct (scoring 2 or 1)
Total number incorrect
Total number completed
Number abandoned or not attempted
Time on test and hence mean response time.
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H) Visual Divergent Thinking
Ability in this domain was inferred to be reflected 
in the volunteer's score on the Drawing Completion Test 
(Barron 1962) . Volunteers were requested to elaborate 
on the fragmentary patterns shown in Figure 4 so as to 
"make something out of them". The patterns were presented 
in a small A4 booklet with three patterns on each page.
All volunteers attempted them in the same order. Volunteers 
were timed but no time limit was imposed.
In order that originality scores could be 
computed, volunteers were asked to write down by the side 
of their drawings what each one represented in case of 
doubt arising as to their interpretations.
Only originality scores were used from the responses 
on this test as no consistently deployable measure of 
fluency could be devised.
I) The Slide Viewing/Visual Judgement task
In this task the following instructions were given 
to each volunteer:
"Now I am going to show you seven slides. Each 
one starts very out of focus at focussing position seven 
and I gradually bring each one into focus by rotating this 
lens through focussing positions six, five, four, three, 
two, one until on zero the slide is in full focus. What 
I want you to do is to guess, at each focussing position, 
what the slide is or depicts. I'd like you to write down
FIGURE 4. The Drawing Completion Test
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your guess or hypothesis in this booklet next to the 
focussing position number, don't say it out loud, and also 
record a measure of your confidence in your hypothesis 
using this six point scale which is written on this piece 
of paper here:
0 Pure guess
1 Almost a guess
2 Possibly
3 Probably
4 Almost certain
5 Certain
So we begin with slide number one, focussing position 
seven; now make a hypothesis as to what this slide is and 
record it" .
After these instructions the experiment was under 
way. What the seven slides actually depicted was as 
follows :
1. Canada goose (duck acceptable)
2. Blue stapler on a window sill
3. Kettle on a stove
4. Blue horsebox in a street
5. Blue roundabout in a children's playground
6. Single moccasin slipper on a duvet
7. Red baloon and a bunch of bananas in a bowl. 
All slides were presented in the same order with the 
kitchen darkened but with the hall light on so that the 
screen (cream kitchen wall) was in shadow but the location 
where the volunteer was writing was illuminated. The
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lens-screen distance was 94 cms, predetermined each time 
by guide marks in the kitchen; the lens was 3 cms in 
diameter and the projector was a Leitz-Wetzlar Pradovit 
slide projector with a capacity for 36 slides. White marks 
were painted on the lens tube to indicate the focussing 
position. A white line parallel to the lens axis was used 
for odd numbered focussing positions and a short dash on 
the opposite side of the tube at right angles to the lens 
axis indicated the even focussing positions. Hence each 
half turn of the lens changed the focussing position by 
one unit - except in the case of the change from focussing 
position one to zero, which was about one and a half turns.
The picture size at each focussing position was 
as follows (+0.5 cms):
7. 35 cms X 24 cms
6. 36 cms X 24. 5 cms
5. 37 cms X 25 cms
4. 39 cms X 26 cms
3. 41 cms X 27 cms
2. 43 cms X 28 cms
1. 45 cms X 29 cms
0. 48 cms X 31 cms
The following data was obtained from this test:
1. Focussing position at which each slide was guessed
accurately and hence mean focussing position for accurate 
detection over the seven slide sequence. Performance on 
slide number seven (i.e. the focussing position at which 
it was guessed) was particularly of interest here as poor
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performance on it could indicate dominant response 
responding.
2. Confidence level and confidence level change as 
a function of focussing position. This gives a measure 
of the change in confidence as stimulus factors become 
increasingly important.
3. Total number of focussing position changes over
which false hypotheses were hung onto divided by the total 
number of incorrect hypotheses (measure of confirmation 
bias) .
4. Sensitivity - i.e. ability to distinguish signal
^from noise events,, in this case correct from incorrect 
hypotheses (d'^^2\^). False hypotheses held at high 
confidence levels were false alarms, incorrect hypotheses 
held at low confidence levels were correct rejections, 
correct hypotheses held at low confidence levels were misses 
and correct hypotheses held at high confidence levels were 
hits.
5. Measure of bias in confidence to either caution
or risk (B index) .
6. Number of incorrect hypotheses held at a confidence 
level of 4 or 5 as a percentage of the total number of 
incorrect hypotheses.
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7. Mean confidence level in incorrect hypotheses.
8. Mean confidence level in correct hypotheses (excluding
confidence levels at focussing position zero as this did
not represent viewing under conditions of stimulus 
impoverishment) .
After the experimental tasks were over I usually 
had a general chat with the volunteer and asked for their 
reflections on the experiment. These chats were very 
useful. The vast majority also said that they had, in 
effect, found the evening interesting and enjoyable.
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CHAPTER 13
RESULTS AND ANALYSES
The experiment was organised in a pr.q split-plot 
design with two between block treatments (group and sex) 
and a within block treatment consisting of the 167 variables 
on which volunteers were assessed. The 59 volunteers were 
divided by group (C3=3; 3: Psychotic, 2: high N group and 
1: low N group) and by sex (C2=2; 2: Male, 1: Female). 
Overall there were 23 females and 36 males. These 
volunteers provided scores on variables C4 (age) through 
to C170 (originality score on the Drawing Completion Test), 
that is 167 variables altogether. Correlations were also 
computed between all 167 variables but attention was usually 
only focussed on those correlations for which a priori 
hypotheses were available. Analysis was by SPSS. The 
SPSS program only accepted data from 33 volunteers for 
the purpose of computing correlations as only 33 people 
provided 100% complete data. However, as can be seen from 
the data presented later, on smoking and psychoticism - 
where correlations over all 59 volunteers were also 
computed - it seems unlikely that this would change the 
general picture which has emerged.
For clarity this chapter will be divided into four 
sections followed by a conclusion:
Section 1: Results of analysis of characterising 
variables
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Section 2 
Section .3 
Section 4
Internal consistency of measures 
Analysis of performance measures 
Smoking, psychoticism and psychosis
Section 1
Results of analysis of characterising variables (A-H)
Scores on certain variables were designed to be 
matched across groups. The analysis shows that these were 
in fact so matched.
Aj_________Age
The psychotics were closely the same in age (35.91 
years, S.D. 10.83) as the high N group (35.42 years,
S.D. 10.20) and the low N group (34.88 years, S.D. 12.42)
(F = 0.015, p = 0.985 (two tailed), the Sex by Group
interaction was also not significant at F = 0.028,
p = 0.973 (two tailed)). The overall mean age of the 
sample was 35.37 years, (S.D. 11.03) with a range from 
19.61 to 64.73 years.
B :_______Education
The groups were closely the same on number of years
of education (Psychotics: 14.09 years (S.D. 4.05); high N.
12.72 years, (S.D. 3.26) and low N: 12.81 years (S.D. 2.92) 
(F = 0.849, p = 0.434 (two tailed), Sex by Group interaction 
F = 0.376, p = 0.689 (two tailed)).
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c :_______Times of day tested
The times of day at which the three sets of blood 
pressure and pulse readings were taken for the three groups 
(before, during and after the creativity test) were all 
closely similar (two tailed probability values of 
differences across groups ranging from p = 0.49 to 
p = 0.67). The times of day at which the MacKay et al.
(1978) self report inventory was taken were closely the 
same for all three groups (F = 0.295, p = 0.746 (two tailed)) 
as were those at which the Nowlis inventory was taken 
(F = 0.296, p = 0.745 (two tailed)). These inventories 
were taken at around 6.15pm; the resting B.P. and pulse 
at about 6.10pm; the B.P. and pulse readings during the
3-4 test were taken at around 8pm and those taken after 
it were taken around 8.15pm.
Pj_______Time of year tested
Considering the dates on which each volunteer 
participated and dividing the year into four quadrants 
(1: December/January/February (Winter), 2: March/April/May 
(Spring), 3: June/July/August (Summer) and 4: September/ 
October/November (Autumn)) there were no time-of-year 
differences between the groups or scores (by group:
F = 1.244, p = 0.247; by sex: F = 1.481, p = 0.229, two 
tailed tests) .
Ej_______Arousal of Control Group
The high N group was included as an overaroused 
control group for the psychotics in the absence of a
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non-deluded psychotic group - which proved impossible to 
find. The scores on the different measures of arousal 
for the three groups are given in Table 13. On the two 
self report measures of arousal the high N groupremerged 
highest in arousal on the MacKay test with the psychotics 
second and the psychotics were highest on activation on 
the Nowlis measure with the high N group second. The 
combined MacKay and Nowlis scores for the psychotics and 
high N volunteers were very similar (16.23 versus 15.71) 
with the low N group least aroused (13.19). The psychotics 
and the high N group were also similar in mean and resting 
pulse and in spiral after effect duration with the low 
N group lower on these measures. For some reason which 
is not clear the high N group are very similar indeed to 
the low N group on all the blood pressure readings with 
the psychotics low in blood pressure. This is perhaps 
a medication effect. It would seem that anti-psychotic 
medication has a much greater effect on blood pressure 
than on pulse.
I conclude from this analysis that the high N group 
are, given the great vicissitudes of the measures, a 
reasonable over-aroused control group for the psychotics 
although the medication that 15 out of 17 of the psychotics 
were taking does, not surprisingly, complicate the picture.
F : Predicted personality differences
The previously deluded psychotics were, as expected,
lower on Extraversion (10.59 (S.D. 5.73)) than the high
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TABLE 13. Arousal levels of the three groups of volunteers
Psychotics High N Low N p(two- 
tailed)
MacKay et al. arousal score 10. 41 
(3.10)
11.10
(2.61)
9. 71 
(3.52)
0.38
Nowlis activation score 5.82
(2.65)
4.62 
(2. 77)
3.48
(2.52)
0.04
MacKay + Nowlis score 16.23 15. 71 13.19 -
Resting Pulse 74.23
(12.50)
73.48
(12.35)
69. 68 
(9.46)
0. 45
Mean Pulse 74.83
(11.02)
73.20
(9.85)
68.57 
(7. 76)
0.12
Resting Systolic B.P. 120.63 
(15. 04)
130.14 
(18.23)
130. 48 
(20.62)
0. 04
Mean Systolic B.P. 117. 70 
(15.99)
127.23
(16.38)
127.23
(19.59)
0. 08
Resting Diastolic B.P. 84.53
(15.67)
93.67 
(15.31)
90.92
(13.82)
0.29
Mean Diastolic B.P. 84.13 
(14. 09)
92.46
(13.66)
92.81 
(13.91)
0.23
Spiral-after-effect duration 13.01 
(6. 90)
13. 41 
(5.27)
12.50
(4.49)
0.85
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and low N non-psychotics (13.38 (S.D. 4.35) for the high 
N group and 14.952 (S.D. 5.00) for the low N group 
(F = 3.945, p = 0.013 (one tailed)). They were also, as 
expected, lower on Venturesomeness at 7.47 (S.D. 3.22) 
compared to the high N group (8.95 (S.D. 3.58) and the 
low N group (9.95 (S.D. 4.14), (F = 3.365, p = 0.021 (one 
tailed) ) .
G:_______Validity of Psychoticism scales
E CAlas, the P and P psychoticism scales did not
produce higher scores in the (medicated) psychotic sample. 
EOn the P scale the low N group had the highest score at 
4.71 (S.D. 2.72) with the psychotic group lowest at
3.35 (S.D. 3.00). On the P^ scale the high N group had 
the highest score at 17.81 (S.D. 5.34) with the psychotics 
second at 14.88 (S.D. 4.79). The P^ scale did not produce 
any between group differences at all (F = 1.574, p = 0.108 
(one tailed)) (the differences were anyway in the opposite 
direction to intended) while the very low score of the 
low N group (9.76 (S.D. 3.91)) did produce a significant 
between group difference on the P scale (F = 15.50, 
p < 0.001 (one tailed)).
The P^ scale however was more successful. Although 
alone it did not discriminate paranoid (N=9) from non­
paranoid (N=8) psychotics this is perhaps not surprising 
given that the paranoid psychotics were on medication 
specifically designed to counter paranoid ideation. Even 
were this medication not to have been entirely successful
295
it is difficult to expect paranoid psychotics to answer 
paranoia related items truthfully. That social desirability 
effects were influencing the psychotics is shown by the 
fact that their mean lie scale score is markedly higher 
(at 8.29) from that of the high N (5.19) and low N groups 
(5.52). This difference is significant (F = 3.511, 
p = 0.018, one tailed). Further analysis reveals that 
the source of the high lie score is specifically in the 
paranoid psychotic sample (mean lie scale score of 10.44 
(S.D. 4.67) compared to 5.875 (S.D. 2.80) for the non­
paranoid psychotics (t = 2.401, p = 0.015 one tailed, 
df 15). When the and L scale scores were combined, 
the total score, given the rather restricted sample, did 
reasonably discriminate (16.33 versus 13.25 for the non­
paranoids, t = 1.444, r phi = 0.349, p = 0.087, one tailed, 
df 15) .
E CWhen lie scale scores are added to the P and P 
scores the psychotics do emerge slightly higher in total 
score than the two non-psychotic groups but the differences 
are not significant and of course neither scale is really 
designed to uncover a paranoid-non-paranoid difference.
It is specifically in that context that lie scale scores 
differ most and are most relevant, it seems, to the power 
of the scales to discriminate. However, having said this, 
it does seem that if lie scale scores are added, the three 
psychoticism scales do emerge producing higher scores in 
the groups that were predicted to have these higher scores. 
More work, however, is clearly needed in the construction 
of psychoticism scales.
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Hj_______Verbal ability
Because three of the five creativity tests 
administered were of a strongly verbal nature it was 
considered important that the groups be very similar in 
verbal IQ and the Mill Hill Vocabulary test was the 
instrument used to see if this was the case. Fortunately 
the three groups differ hardly at all on total score 
on the Mill Hill. The psychotics average a score of 37.18 
(S.D. 12.22); the high N group 38.14 (S.D. 12.46) and the 
low N group 38.48 (S.D. 11.11) (F = 0.021, p = 0.979, two 
tailed). (This close matching of the scores is also 
maintained when the scores on the Definitions and on the 
Synonyms parts of the test are considered separately 
(p = 0.958 for group differences in Definitions score 
and p = 0.853 for group differences in Synonyms score,
(two tailed))).
The correlation between scores on the Definitions 
and on the Synonyms parts of the Mill Hill was +0.937 
(p < 0.001, one tailed). Since the Synonyms test usually 
took only about two thirds as long to complete as the 
Definitions with negligible loss of information (both 
correlate with total score +0.98) the Synonyms test could 
be used alone if an investigator wanted a more rapid measure
or wished to stress a patient as little as possible.
In self rating on verbal games - information provided
when the volunteers took the 3-4 test - the three groups
differed hardly at all (Psychotics: 4.55 (S.D. 1.83),
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High N: 4.86 (S.D. 1.42) and Low N: 4.57 (S.D. 1.91 
(F = 0.172, p = 0.843, two tailed).
Section 2
Internal consistency of measures (A-E)
Aj______ Arousal measures
For the purpose of relating arousal to performance 
scores the correlations of the arousal measures with one 
another were computed to extract a best measure (Table 14). 
Apart from the high correlation between the Nowlis and 
the MacKay tests (+0.714) the other correlations are low, 
virtually all below 0.3. The Nowlis activation measure 
correlates highest with all the other measures (mean 
correlation of +0.238) and hence will be the one chiefly
used to test arousal theory predictions from hereon.
Bj_______Creativity measures
To help derive the best measures of creativity, 
the correlations between them were computed (Table 15). 
Clearly there is a fairly high degree of correlation between 
these measures but, alas, also between them and the Mill 
Hill (Table 15). The correlations between creativity 
scores however are often higher than 0.5, although the 
Drawing Completion Test tends to have lower correlations 
with the other measures. The four best measures would 
seem to be the 3-4 test, (which is the only one having 
a higher mean correlation with all other measures than 
the Mill Hill) , the originality score on the Uses test.
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the fluency score on this test and the score on the 2-3 
test. The Drawing Completion Test however should perhaps 
not be entirely forgotten as it shows, (usefully), little 
correlation with intelligence but a significant correlation 
with the 3-4 test.
The validity of the creativity measures was also 
assessed by correlating them with criterion. Some of 
the volunteers had already demonstrated real world creative 
effectiveness: one had written a novel; another a PhD 
thesis in chemistry; another had produced publishable 
work in theoretical physics and was a talented and creative 
carpenter; another was a professional writer, one a free­
lance interior designer and so on. I therefore distilled 
out eleven volunteers who were unambiguously creative.
These included not only Chris (who had produced a number 
of remarkable drawings published as illustrations accompanying 
articles) but also Alana J. whose abstract art bore a 
striking resemblance to the work of the prizewinning 
sculptor Paul Neagu. I then compared all their test scores 
with those of the remaining volunteers. The results are 
shown in Table 16. All measures except the originality 
scores on the Drawing Completion Test correlate significantly 
with criterion, the fluency score on the Uses test being 
the most successful measure. Again, however, the Mill 
Hill outperforms all creativity measures but one.
The results are obviously not conclusive proof 
of the validity of these measures but they do tend to
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TABLE 16. Correlations of creativity test scores with
criterion (real world creative effectiveness; 
creatives versus non-creatives)
Test r phi t P
(one tailed)
df
S test (fluency) +0.344 2. 744 <0.005 56
Uses (fluency) + 0. 401 3.280 0. 001 56
Uses (originality) + 0. 228 1. 753 <0. 05 56
2-3 score +0.227 1. 757 <0. 05 57
3-4 score + 0. 274 2. 128 <0. 025 56
DCT (originality) + 0. 113 0. 859 NS 57
(Mill Hill score +0.371 3. 018 <0.005 57
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suggest that the pessimism concerning measures of 
ideational fluency and flexibility and especially about 
the Uses test in this context, expressed by Mansfield 
and Busse (1981) and by Perkins (1988), may not be entirely 
justified.
I therefore conclude that the measures of ideational 
fluency and flexibility deployed in this experiment are 
reasonable measures of creativity.
Cj_______ Personality measures
Correlations of personality measures with one
another are given in Table 17. As expected the Eysenckian
Epsychoticism scale (P ) showed low correlations with 
Extraversion (+0.046) and Neuroticism (+0.097) as intended. 
However there was a noticeable negative correlation between 
Extraversion and Neuroticism (-0.338). Extraversion also, 
as expected, showed a positive correlation with Impulsivity 
(+0.230) and with Venturesomeness (+0.493) and Neuroticism 
showed a positive correlation with Empathy (+0.557) (as 
Jung said, nature knows no splendour like the empathy 
of a neurotic(1)).
E CThe three psychoticism scales (P , P and P^) 
showed only low positive correlations with one another,
Q
the P scale in fact correlating very highly indeed with 
Neuroticism (+0.735) and with Empathy (+0.431) as did 
the P^ scale with these variables (+0.619 and 0.439 
respectively). The P^ scale in contrast shows virtually
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no correlation with Neuroticism and Empathy. The facet
of psychoticism measured by the scale (which contains
no 'tough mindedness" or psychopathy items) is clearly
very different from that measured by the scale if indeed 
(2
the P scale, whatever its face validity, is measuring 
psychoticism at all.
D :________Measures of Confirmation Bias
The correlation of confirmation bias measures
with one another are shown in Table 18. The confirmation
bias score on the 2-3 test does correlate highly with 
that on the 3-4 test (+0.579) as intended but both correlate 
slightly negatively with the confirmation bias measure 
on the Slide Viewing Task. It would seem (see later) 
that the verbal and visual confirmation bias measures
are to a certain degree in a see-saw relationship with
one another.
Ej________Personality and arousal
Although not absolutely central to the body of 
this thesis there is much interest in the relations between 
personality variables and arousal (Blake 1967; Claridge 
1967; Eysenck 1967; 1981; Revelle, Humphreys, Simon and 
Gilliland, 1980; M.W. Eysenck and Folkard, 1980).
Results on the relations between these sets of variables
is also important here to assess the internal consistency
of the measures used and of the constructs on which they 
are based. Hence, given that considerable relevant data
305
TABLE 18. Correlations of Confirmation Bias (C.B. 
measures with one another
Visual C.B.
2
2-3
C.B
3
3-4
C.B.
4
Verbal
C.B.
1. C.B. on Slide 
Viewing Task 
(Visual C.B.)
2. C.B. on 2-3 test
3. C.B. on 3-4 test
4. Combined C.B. 
score on 2-3 
and 3-4 tests 
(Verbal C.B.)
-0. 074 
-0. 076
-0.066
-0.074 -0.076 -0.066
+0. 579***
+0. 579*** +0. 761***
+0. 965***
+0.761*** +0.965***
***p < 0.001 (one tailed)
306
has been collected on this issue during this research 
it is presented in Table 19. It is important to note 
that arousal seems to vary with time of day (Blake 1967) 
and that the measures presented in Table 19 were largely 
taken in the vicinity of 6.15pm. The only exceptions 
to this were the mean pulse and blood pressure readings 
and the ranges and standard deviations (for each volunteer) 
of their readings which relate to determinations taken 
over the course of the evening when the experiment was 
run.
Given that there were no less than 27,889 correlations 
generated by the analysis of this whole experiment 
Table 19 obviously has to be read very very cautiously 
as overall, nearly 300 of the correlations would be 
significant at the p<0.02 level (two tailed) by chance 
alone. Hence I will only comment on theoretically and 
empirically guided observations of this table and on 
results significant at p<0.002 level.
Firstly there appears to be little difference 
in arousal of extraverts and introverts. The Nowlis 
Activation measure correlates only -0.054 with 
Extraversion although pulse rates of Extraverts are down 
(-0.243 and -0.308 correlations between E and resting 
and mean pulse). At 18.15 hours however (see Blake 1967, 
Figures 1 and 2) extraverts and introverts would not be 
expected to differ at all in arousal and hence the results 
in Table 19 confirm, in a limited way, the findings of
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Blake (1967) with the extraverts being perhaps, if anything, 
rather less aroused. Arousal score seems to be unrelated 
to Impulsivity score at this time of day (r = -0.05) 
between Nowlis Activation score and Impulsivity).
Neuroticism, however, does seem to correlate with 
arousal and scorers high on Neuroticism do seem to be higher 
in self rated stress and anxiety. Neurotics (as defined 
by the N scale) are also higher in pulse (which would 
be expected if they are limbically overactivated (Eysenck 
1967)) but do not seem (contrary to Eysenck 1967) to have 
the more volatile or variable pulse and blood pressure 
readings.
Extraverts seem to have lower pulses and higher 
blood pressure than Introverts and Neurotics have higher 
pulses and (perhaps) fractionally lower blood pressure 
than stable people.
Generally speaking, little df interest emerged 
from the study of the ranges and standard deviations in 
pulse and blood pressure other than the negation of the 
expected higher scores in neurotics. For some reason 
volunteers high on Venturesomeness had very low range 
in diastolic blood pressure (-0.595) and a low standard 
deviation in this (-0.591) (both p<0.002, two tailed).
The conceptual significance of this, however, is very 
obscure.
More interestingly: there was a high negative 
correlation between Lie score on the EPQ and self reported
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stress (-0.529, p<0.002 two tailed). This implies that 
the volunteers were lying on the socially undesirable 
items of the stress scale of the MacKay et al. (1978) 
inventory as well as on the EPQ, hence they obtained low 
scores on the former (which is a more transparent scale). 
Similarly they obtained a low score on the Nowlis anxiety 
scale which also necessarily contains items which, to 
agree with, would be socially undesirable. Hence these 
two scales are subject to social desirability effects.
The results also provide validation for Eysenck and Eysenck's 
L scale as generally unfakeable signs of stress such as 
pulse and blood pressure readings, were all high in high 
L scorers (see column 4 of Table 19).
The general view that pulse rate increases during 
intense cognitive activity would seem to be mistaken.
Pulse reaction to thinking would seem to depend on 
personality: going down in Extraverts but up in neurotics 
and empathie people (see rows 6 and 8 in Table 19) .
On the measure specifically of cortical arousal
(the spiral after effect) where Extraverts should be low
and high scorers in psychoticism high, these expectations
were generally borne out by the data. Spiral afer effect
duration correlated -0.206 with Extraversion and positively
E
with all three measures of psychoticism: +0.271 with P ; 
+0.191 with P^ and +0.142 with P^. To what extent this 
implies a general cortical arousal however is obscure.
High scorers on psychoticism were also more aroused on 
the Nowlis Activation scale, the correlation of Activation
310
with psychoticism scores being +0.212 with ; +0.239
Q
with P and +0.070 with P^. This may imply that the Nowlis 
scale is of some relevance to the assessment of cortical 
arousal.
Section 3
Analysis of performance measures (A-H)
A) Visual and Verbal confirmation bias
In Chapter 10 it was argued that confirmation 
bias would be amplified if capacity was reduced at high 
arousal. The measure of capacity used was backward digit 
span.
Hence :
a) A negative correlation of backward digit span 
(reduced capacity) was expected then with arousal as 
measured by the Nowlis (196 5) inventory. In fact the 
correlation was positive (0.241). However when volunteers 
were grouped into four egually spaced categories of arousal 
as measured by the Nowlis inventory (low; moderate; high; 
very high) and their backward digit spans computed, the 
pattern was an inverted U (scores being 4.75; 5.36; 5.43 
and 5.24) . Very tentatively then it seems that capacity 
first rises and then falls, as expected, at very high 
arousal.
b) A negative correlation between backward digit 
span and both visual and verbal confirmation bias was
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expected. In fact the correlation of backward digit span
with visual confirmation bias was positive (0.294) and
with verbal confirmation bias was, although negative,
very low (-0. 08 5) . (Itmay be that backward digit span is related
particularly to the storage aspect of capacity via visual image persistence
as its correlation with spiral-after-effect duration was
no less than +0.504 (p<0.02, two tailed)).
c) A positive correlation was expected between 
arousal and both visual and verbal confirmation bias.*
In fact the correlation of Nowlis Activation score with 
visual confirmation bias was negative at -0.135 and with 
verbal confirmation bias was only very low positive 
(+0.031). The same pattern, however, is found with the 
MacKay et al. (1978) measure: a negative correlation with 
visual confirmation bias (-0.305) and a positive one with 
verbal confirmation bias (+0.210). Again using the measure 
of dispositional arousal, the N scale score the same pattern 
emerges: a negative correlation with visual confirmation 
bias (-0.177) and a positive one with verbal confirmation 
bias ( + 0.115) . Slight effects in the same directions
^Because the assessment of verbal confirmation bias was 
subjective three procedures were used to minimise bias 
in my scoring:
1) When doubt arose regarding whether or not a response 
should be scored for confirmation bias, scoring was slanted 
against the hypothesis. Hence the C.B. scores for the 
psychotics are a minimum and the scores for the non- 
psychotics are a maximum.
2) All answer sheets for the 2-3 and 3-4 tests were scored 
twice.
3) When an answer was extremely ambiguous in regard to 
how it should be scored it was discussed at length with 
an independent rater.
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occur when correlations of reported stress with 
confirmation bias are studied: a positive correlation 
with the verbal measure (+0.047) and a negative one with 
the visual (-0.079).
It was expected that if capacity decreased, at 
least at very high arousal, then confirmation bias should 
accelerate at that level. Considering the scores of 
volunteers in the four levels of arousal categories the 
highest level of verbal confirmation bias was indeed in 
the very high arousal category (11.77%). The mean verbal 
confirmation bias score over the three lower levels of 
arousal was only 7.39%.
The predictions of confirmation bias via a capacity 
model therefore only appear to apply, and then only 
tentatively, for verbal confirmation bias.
The results described above do however confirm 
in a more general sense the predictions of the Drake model ■ 
that is if one regards self report measures of arousal 
as roughly indicating general cortical arousal. General 
cerebral activation should on Drake's (1983) theory cause 
increased verbal confirmation bias (left hemisphere) 
(lose-stay responses) but decreased visual confirmation 
bias (right hemisphere)* and hence a negative correlation
*That visual confirmation bias score reflects fight 
hemisphere functioning is particularly likely as out-of- 
focus slides present the viewer with low spatial frequency 
information and these seem to be processed largely by 
the right hemisphere (Sergent 1982, 1983).
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between arousal and visual confirmation bias. The pattern 
of the results is in accordance with such a scheme.
If we consider smoking as a stimulant likely to 
operate on both hemispheres (?) the same patterns should 
emerge in correlations with confirmation bias, and they 
do: smoking correlates positively with verbal confirmation 
bias (0.225) but negatively with visual confirmation bias 
(-0. 361) .
The spiral-after-effeet correlations were the 
reverse of this pattern (+0.075 with visual confirmation 
bias and -0.200 with verbal). However being involved 
in 'where' perception as well as 'what' perception this 
after-effect may heavily involve subcortical as well as 
cortical structures (e.g. Sekuler and Blake 1985) (see 
also p. 3 2 0  ) .
If we consider the visual and verbal confirmation 
bias scores across groups, where it was expected that 
the psychotics would be higher on such biases, the general 
picture is in accordance with these predictions. The 
verbal confirmation bias scores on the 2-3 and 3-4 tests 
were very similar (correlation +0.579, p<0.001, one tailed 
hence the two scores were pooled by taking the total 
confirmation bias score on both tests, dividing it by 
the total number of questions completed and multiplying 
the result by 100. This is, in this chapter, the "verbal 
confirmation bias" score.
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The psychotics are much higher on verbal 
confirmation bias (18.77%, S.D. 12.50) than the high N 
non-psychotics (7.84%, S.D. 6.88) and the low N non- 
psychotics (2.87%, S.D. 3.25) (F = 18.746, p < 0.001).
The psychotic mean differs, as expected, from the mean 
for the low N sample (F = 39.413, p «  0.001, df 1.52) 
and hence, there is a linear trend in these scores. The 
paranoid psychotics were, as expected, higher than the 
non-paranoid psychotics on verbal confirmation bias 
(24.04%, S.D. 13.08 compared to 13.51%, S.D. 10.03, 
r phi = 0.435, t = 1.808, p < 0.05, one tailed, df 14).
(See also Figure 5). If the above findings were merely 
due to carelessness or haste in responding on the 
psychotics' part one would expect to see evidence of this. 
In fact the psychotics had, if anything, fewer, not more, 
incorrect answers on the Mill Hill vocabulary test than 
the other groups (11.35, S.D. 7.08 compared to 12.52,
S.D. 8.27 for the high Ns and 12.19, S.D. 6.18 for the 
low Ns). They also had longer, not shorter, mean response 
times on the Mill Hill, the 2-3, the 3-4 and the Drawing 
Completion tests. They were also slightly less 
impulsive,, if anything, than the high N group not more 
impulsive (10.29, S.D. 3.24, on the Impulsivity scale 
compared to 11.86, S.D. 4.44, for the high Ns. The low 
N group was slightly lower at 9.43, S.D. 4.52), These 
group means are, df course, not significantly different 
(F = 1.903, p = 0.159, two tailed) but are in the opposite 
direction to what would be expected if the psychotics 
were performing more thoughtlessly.
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FIGURE FIVE
Verbal and visual confirmation bias (C.B.) scores in:
PA: Paranoid psychotics (N = 9)
NON PA: Non-paranoid psychotics (N = 8)
HIGH N : Non-psychotics high in Neuroticism (N = 21
LOW N : Non-psychotics low in Neuroticism (N = 21)
Verbal C.B. score is total number of answers on the 2-3 
and 3-4 tests in which confirmation bias was manifest, 
divided by the total number of answers on both tests, 
expressed as a percentage.
Visual C.B. score is the total number of focussing position 
changes through which incorrect hypotheses were maintained, 
divided by the total number of incorrect hypotheses 
generated on the slide viewing task as a whole.
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Backward digit span was, as expected, shorter in 
the psycnotic group (4.76, S.D. 1.39) than the high N 
(5.38, S.D. 1.56) and low N groups (5.333, S.D. 1.07).
These differences however are not significant (F = 1.242, 
p = 0.148 one tailed) . (Forwards minus backwards digit 
span was also greater in the psychotics (+2.12) than the 
high N (+2.05) and low N (+2. 09) groups, but again not 
significantly so (F = 0.012, p = 0.494, one tailed)).
In visual confirmation bias (total number of 
focussing position changes through which hypotheses are 
maintained divided by the total number of incorrect 
hypotheses) the psychotics do score fractionally higher 
(0.641, S.D. 0.315) when compared to the high N group 
(0.536, S.D. 0.302) and the low N group (0.594, S.D. 0.319). 
These differences however are not significant (F = 0.529, 
p = 0.30, one tailed). The paranoids are, as expected, 
also slightly higher than the non-paranoids (0.669,
S.D. 0.417, compared to 0.612, S.D. 0.192) but not 
significantly so (r phi = 0.0934, t = 0.351, df 14).
(See Figure 5).
All of these values are less than unity and hence 
reveal that on the Slide Viewing Task volunteers usually 
changed hypotheses at each new focussing position. Hence 
these scores are not really measures of confirmation bias 
so much as confirmation scores. The low values also lead 
to the possibility that group differences are underestimated 
due to floor effects.
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Since the confirmation measures only show any 
relation with capacity on the verbal tests it would seem 
wiser to interpret these findings in general in accordance 
with the Drake model since the latter receives wider 
empirical support.
The inflated scores of the psychotics, especially 
the paranoid psychotics indicate that their left hemispheres 
are more aroused than the non-psychotics' (higher verbal 
confirmation bias) but that their right hemispheres are 
perhaps slightly less aroused than the non-psychotics'
(less tendency to shift hypotheses on the Slide Viewing 
Task and hence higher visual confirmation score). This 
hemisphere imbalance would seem to be greater in the paranoids 
than the non-paranoids (interestingly backward digit span 
was shorter in the paranoid psychotics compared to the 
non-paranoid psychotics (4.33 compared to 5.25) and their 
arousal was also higher, as assessed by the Nowlis (6.00 
compared to 5.62)).
The fact that the non-paranoids showed higher verbal 
confirmation than the non-psychotics' shows that the Magaro 
model (1981) which represents non-paranoids as data driven, 
is mistaken. The non-paranoids are also conceptually 
driven, like the paranoids, but rather less s o l  than the 
latter.
The relation of verbal and visual confirmation 
bias to cortical arousal seem to be reasonably clear and 
it may be that the actual psychological process that mediates
319
the link between cortical arousal and verbal confirmation 
bias involves a capacity drop at least at very high 
arousal.
Relations with autonomic arousal were assessed 
by correlating verbal and visual confirmation bias score 
with pulse and blood pressure readings (Table 20).
Although no guiding predictions were available to assist 
evaluation of this data the overall pattern of the 
correlations in Table 20 suggests that high verbal 
confirmation bias is related to low autonomic activation 
and high visual confirmation score with high autonomic 
activation. The theoretical significance of this pattern 
is unclear but the association of low autonomic and high 
cortical activation that may produce high verbal 
confirmation bias is similar to the arousal pattern 
associated with mystical experiences (see Part One, 
p. 116). The imbalance which produces high verbal and 
visual confirmation bias in the same person would therefore 
seem to be an imbalance at both cortical and subcortical 
levels in both hemispheres.
B) Performance on the Slide Viewing Task
Perceptual judgemental ability was assessed in 
three different ways on this task:
(i) By mean focussing position at which the 
slides were accurately guessed - this I will call the 
recognition position. It was expected that the psychotics.
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TABLE 20. Correlations of verbal and visual confirmation 
bias with autonomic arousal measures
Verbal C.B. Visual C.B,
Resting Pulse 
Mean Pulse
Pulse during thinking test 
Pulse after thinking test
-0.089 
-0. 045 
-0.171 
-0. 023
-0.044 
-0. 051 
+0.117 
+0.023
Resting Systolic B.P. -0.158
Mean Systolic B.P. -0.287
Systolic B.P. during thinking test -0.335
Systolic B.P. after thinking test -0.371
+0.117 
+0.154 
+0.197 
+0.154
Resting Diastolic B.P. -0.181
Mean Diastolic B.P. -0.322
Diastolic B.P. during thinking test -0.370
Diastolic B.P. after thinking test -0.388
+0. 034 
- 0.020 
+0. Ill 
- 0.122
(Spiral-after-effect duration - 0.200 +0. 075)
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being less responsive to stimulus factors than ideational 
factors, would guess the slides later (i.e. at a numerically 
lower focussing position). This was the case for every 
slide except the moccasin slide, their mean recognition 
position over all seven slides was 1.464 (S.D. 0.624) compared 
to 1.693 (S.D. 0.604) for the high N group and 1.728 (S.D. 
0.431) for the low N group. Alas these group differences 
are not significant (F = 1.211, p = 0.153, one tailed) 
although the means are, as stated, in the expected 
direction. There were unfortunately no group differences 
in the recognition position at which the "balloon slide" 
was guessed (p = 0.286). It should have been guessed 
significantly later by the psychotics. Nowlis Activation 
also correlated positively (+0.153) not negatively with 
recognition position on this slide.
(ii) Perceptual sensitivity measure d'^„was also 
used to assess the groups. It was expected that the 
psychoticsjhaving difficulties in reality testing,would 
generally be less sensitive and this was confirmed: the 
mean d '^  values for the psychotic group was 2.47 (S.D.
0.63) compared to 2.75 for the high N group (S.D. 0.65) 
and 3.17 for the low N group (S.D. 1.0). These group 
differences were significant (F = 3.839, p = 0.014 one 
tailed). The mean for the psychotic sample is significantly 
different from that for the low N sample (F = 7.177, 
p < 0.005, one tailed, df 1.52) and hence there is a linear 
trend in these means.
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FIGURE SIX
Signal detection analysis of the slide viewing task.
ROC lines of the three groups:
Low N: Non-psychotics scoring low on Neuroticism.
High N : Non-psychotics scoring high on Neuroticism.
P: Previously deluded psychotics.
ROC lines fitted by eye.
Sensitivity values for the three groups from this group data
P High N Low N
d'e 2. 64 2.90 3.10
^ m  3.000 3.375 3.915
These values differ slightly in magnitude from the means 
of the individual volunteers' values due to the difficulty 
in accurately plotting ROC lines at the individual level.
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FIGURE SEVEN
Signal detection analysis of performance 
in the slide viewing task by paranoid (pa) 
and non-paranoida(non-pa) psychotics.
Sensitivity values from group data were as follows:
Paranoid psychotics Non-paranoid psychotics
d'e 2.80 2.48
^ m  3.02 2.69
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The paranoids were perhaps slightly more sensitive 
than the non-paranoids (2.61, S.D. 0.53, compared to 2.32, 
S.D. 0.72) (r phi = 0.238, t = 0.916, df 14).but clearly 
were not more sensitive than the non-psychotics (see 
also Figures 6 and 7.
(iii) The perceptual sensitivity measure
also was used to assess the groups (both d ' and A ^ e m
are advisable replacement measures for d ' when signal and
signal plus noise distributions are not of equal variance
(McNicol (1972) pp.88-90)). Again psychotics were expected
to be lower in A and this was confirmed. Mean A form m
the psychotics was 2.76 (S.D. 1.02), that for the high 
N group was 2.98 (S.D. 0.72) and that for the low N group 
was 3.80 (S.D. 1.08). These group differences are 
significant (F = 7.350, p = 0.001 one tailed). The psychotic 
mean differs from the mean for the low N sample (F = 11.610, 
p < 0.005, one tailed, df 1,52) and hence a linear trend 
again exists in these means.
1
Again the paranoids are slightly higher in 
sensitivity than the non-paranoids (2.87, S.D. 0.89 compared 
to 2.65, S.D. 1.19) but are not more sensitive than the 
non-psychotics. (Paranoid/non-paranoid A^ difference is 
however not significant: r phi = 0.110, t = 0.414, df 14).
In addition to performance and sensitivity measures 
on the Slide Viewing Task, volunteers were also assessed 
on their degree of bias in their judgements on this task
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on a dimension from risk to caution. In B index terms 
(McNicol 1972, pp.123-129) the psychotics seemed to be 
fractionally more risky (B = 3.46, S.D. 1.29, compared 
to 3.35, S.D. 1.27 for the high N group and 3.09, S.D.
0.89., for the low N group). The differences are however 
not significant (F = 0.412, p = 0.664, two tailed).
There is no confirmation of the idea that riskiness 
is due to high arousal, the correlation between Nowlis 
score and B index is -0. 131. (The correlation of B index 
with reported stress was also in the wrong direction 
(-0.034)).
The paranoids are the most risky group of all 
however, as expected, (B = 3.72, S.D. 1.60) and the non­
paranoids the moàt cautious (B = 3.20, S.D. 0.93). Clearly, 
however, the differences between groups are all very 
slight.
It was expected that the previously deluded psychotics 
would be more likely to hold incorrect hypotheses at 
confidence levels of 4 ('"almost certain") or 5 ("certain") . 
This was confirmed, the percentage of total incorrect 
hypotheses held at a confidence level of 4 or 5 was 11.32,
S.D. 11.26 in the psychotic group? 9.69, S.D. 14.20 in 
the high N group and 4.34, S.D. 4.40 in the low N group 
(F = 2.313, p = 0.05, one tailed).
Because all volunteers were asked to record a measure 
of their confidence at each focussing position for each
^  teah-, 5~ / û U U
htfy ca l o ^  ■
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slide it was possible to see how mean confidence level 
in hypotheses constructed changed as the slide was brought 
into focus (Figure 8). Here it can be seen, interestingly, 
that the psychotics are more confident in hypotheses held 
at high (very out-of-focus) focussing positions, than the 
non-psychotic groups but less confident than the latter 
groups at numerically low focussing positions - where stimulus 
factors are more dominant. Hence, as in their delusions, 
they are more confident than non-psychotics in hypotheses 
enriched by internal factors but less confident than non- 
psychotics in hypotheses held when the hard evidence is 
actually clearer. Medication obviously does not eliminate 
this bias. The cross-over interaction in Figure 8 is 
significant (F = 3.23, p < 0.001, two tailed).
Perhaps not surprisingly given the pattern in 
Figure 8, it was found that psychotics had more confidence 
in incorrect hypotheses than did non-psychotics (these 
tend to be held at higher focussing positions) and less 
confidence in correct hypotheses (which tend to be held 
at low focussing positions) than did non-psychotics 
(Figure 9) . The cross-over interaction in Figure 9 is 
also significant (F = 4.73, p = 0.013, two tailed). They 
therefore have less insight into the accuracy of their 
own decisions than do non-psychotics. This confirms the 
findings of Mintz and Alpert (1972) who obtained a similar 
pattern in an auditory analogue of the Slide Viewing Task.
So far, one general pattern seems to be becoming 
clear. On most variables there is a monotonie trend from
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FIGURE EIGHT
Change in confidence level (C.L.) with which hypotheses 
were held as focussing position (F.P.) changed in the 
slide viewing task.
Focussing Position 7: very out of focus 
Focussing Position 0: in full focus.
Confidence Level "Pure guess" 
"almost a guess" 
"possibly" 
"probably" 
"almost certain" 
"certain"
Compared to the high N and low N non-psychotics, the 
psychotic (P) group were more confident in hypotheses held 
at very out of focus focussing positions and less 
confident in hypotheses held when the slide was coming 
into focus.
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FIGURE NINE
Confidence levels in correct (/ ) and incorrect 
(x) hypotheses held in the slide viewing task.
The psychotics are more confident than the 
non-psychotics in hypotheses which were in 
fact incorrect and less confident than non- 
psychotics in hypotheses which were in fact 
correct.
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psychotic group scores to low N group scores with the 
scores of the high N group being intermediate. Even though 
the psychotics are reasonably matched on arousal with the 
high N group there the similarity ends. The picture which 
tends to be emerging then is that, at least on these 
objective tests, high N volunteers are on a continuum between 
stability and psychosis and the scores of the psychotic 
group are not only due to an arousal factor but to a 
psychoticism factor in addition to the contribution to 
performance provided by high arousal. There is, however, 
little doubt that, despite medication, the psychotics are 
highly aroused and share more similarities with high N 
non-psychotics than they do with low N non-psychotics.
C ) Performance on creativity tests
Contrary to expectations, the previously deluded 
psychotics did not score more highly than either of the 
non-psychotic groups on any of the creativity measures 
or tests (Table 21). In all cases the low N non-psychotics 
produced the highest scores followed by the high N non- 
psychotics with the psychotic group third. From this 
analysis it would seem that both neuroticism and psychoticism 
are damaging of creativity.
Similarly when the three measures of psychoticism 
used here (P^, P^ and P^) were correlated with all the 
six creativity measures, 13 out of 18 of the correlations 
were negative (Table 22). The highest positive correlation
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TABLE 21. Mean scores of Psychotic (P), high N (N) and 
low N i s ) groups on creativity measures
P N S p(2 tailed
S test (fluency) 23.41 26.29 28.05 0.145
(7.07) (6.54) (6.28)
Uses (fluency) 4.47 6.38 6.80 0.032
(2.40) (3.06) (2.14)
Uses (originality) 32.08 36.71 39.39 0.056
(12.19) (8.12) (4.90)
2-3 score 16.12 21.91 23.14 0.003
(7.16) (5.52) (5. 02)
3-4 score* 34.31 40.19 49.10 0.006
(15.14) (12.70) (11. 60)
Drawing Completion 52.70 53.63 54.31 0.394
Test (originality) (6.47) (2.52) (2.26)
*Correlation of scores on this test 
with self-rating at verbal games was 
quite low at +0.117.
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TABLE 22. Correlations of measures of Psychoticism with 
measures of creativity
P^ P^ Pa
S test (fluency) +0.128 -0.176 -0.295
Uses (fluency) +0.078 -0.181 -0.050
Uses (originality) -0.134 -0.310 -0.348
2-3 score +0.032 +0.013 +0.078
3-4 score -0.212 -0.159 -0.161
Drawing Completion -0.041 -0.051 -0.138
Test (originality)
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is +0.128 which is the correlation between S test score 
(a fluency score) and Eysenckian psychoticism. These 
findings clearly fail to confirm those of Woody and 
Claridge (1977) (who used a sample of Oxford undergraduates) 
The full picture of correlations of the creativity measures 
with all the state, trait and ability measures used in 
this experiment is given in Table 24. (Keefe and Magaro's 
(1980) method of scoring the Uses test on the basis of 
the strikingness of the offered uses (their "graded measure" 
was not deployed as, here, inter-rater reliability was 
only +0. 0 7) .
At first glance the perhaps rather romantic 
association of psychopathology and creativity seems to 
be totally and utterly destroyed. The association starts 
to seem more plausible however when we examine separately 
the scores of the paranoid and the non-paranoid psychotics. 
When this is done it emerges that on every single creativity 
measure the low scores of the psychotics (like their high 
lie scores) are largely due to the scores of the paranoids. 
The non-paranoid sample are in fact on a par with the two 
non-psychotic groups. Never do the paranoid psychotics 
however outperform the non-paranoid psychotics, (Table 23). 
The fact that the non-paranoids do not outperform the low 
N non-psychotic group (although they do score higher than 
the high N group on 3 of the 6 measures) may be due to 
the fact that the non-psychotics contained some really 
quite talented people and may have presented quite a stiff 
challenge to the psychotics.
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TABLE 23. Mean scores of Paranoid and Non-paranoid 
psychotics on creativity measures
Paranoid Non-paranoid t p(one tailed)
S test (fluency) 20.11 27.125 -2.298 0.017
(5.01) (7.47)
Uses (fluency) 3.00 6.125 -3.492 0.002
(1.50) (2.17)
Uses (originality) 27.08 37.70 -1.944 0.037
(14.11) (6.59)
2-3 score 14.56 17.88 -0.952 NS
(8.05) (6.03)
3-4 score 29.25 39. 38 -1.426 NS
(11.85) (17.09)
Drawing Completion 51.65 53.89 -0.700 NS
Test (originality) (8.78) (2.15)
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The low scores of the paranoids and the usually 
negative correlations of creativity with paranoia 
(Table 22) support Keefe and Mogaro's (1980) findings 
even though different scoring methods and more measures 
were deployed here than in their study.
Referring to Table 24 it can be seen that the 
Nowlis Activation score correlates positively with every 
creativity measure as does the Nowlis Concentration score. 
The Concentration (effort) and Activation (arousal) scores 
also correlate highly with each other (+0.417, p < 0.02, 
two tailed) .
When, as was intended, creativity score was plotted 
as a function of four levels of arousal - to test the 
predicted non-inverted U relation between arousal and 
creativity - the result is as shown in Figure 10. The 
Nowlis Activation score was used to measure arousal and 
creativity was assessed by reducing every volunteer's 
score to a percentage of the maximum score obtained on 
a particular test. Figure 10 is based on creativity 
scores averaged over the four best measures: Uses (fluency); 
Uses (originality); 2-3 score and 3-4 score. All four 
tests showed the same trend with arousal as that shown 
in Figure 10 except for one reversal on the 3-4 test.
Creativity does then seem to vary with arousal 
as predicted except at the highest level of arousal where 
it decreases instead of continuing to increase. The 
chances of the obtained pattern occurring, given the
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FIGURE TEN
Relationship between arousal and creativity score.
A) Arousal measured by the Nowlis (1965) nine point 
scale.
Creativity score is the mean score over four 
creativity measures: the Uses fluency score, 
the Uses originality score, the 2-3 and the
3-4 scores.
N = Number of volunteers in each arousal level 
category.
B) Expected relationship between arousal and 
creativity where creativity scores range 
over 4 0% and arousal over four categories.
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predicted pattern at bottom, are 1 in 64 (p = 0.016) 
which is reasonably satisfactory. Creativity therefore 
does seem to relate to arousal in part as predicted but 
the full relationship may be cubic with a decrease in 
creativity at very high arousal levels. With only four 
levels of arousal as the independent variable it is not 
possible to Comment further on this.
Overall the best predictors in a positive sense 
of creativity test score are: forward and backward digit 
span; Mill Hill score; MacKay arousal; Nowlis Activation 
and Nowlis Concentration score. These are indicated 
with a (+) sign in the last column of Table 24.
On the other hand the negative predictors (indicated 
by a (-) sign in Table 24) are scores on Paranoia; 
Chadwickian Psychoticism; Impulsivity and Nowlis Scepticism.
Hence if a person is bright; alert (though not 
too alert); trusting; stable; careful and tries hard 
they are likely to do well on these tests. This is not 
exactly very surprising.
Generally, volunteers on the 3-4 test preferred 
to give superordinate and/or synonym solutions to the 
three test words rather than strictly associative Mednickian 
style responses when, as here, given the chance to do 
so. There were no group differences in facility with 
superordinate/synonym style answers (F = 0.975, p = 0.384, 
two tailed) however the psychotics were markedly poorer
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at strictly associative type answering with the low N 
group best (F = 5.615, p = 0.006, two tailed).
The correlation of Nowlis Activation score with 
associative and with superordinate style scores however 
was the same at +0.10. Hence if arousal produces activation 
spread through an associative network it does so just 
as easily to within-level or same level linked words 
as it does to superordinately linked category words.
From this analysis it looks as if psychotics are 
hampered or disturbed, as Jung of course always said, 
in associative thinking. However the 3-4 test contained 
test items of a range of difficulty from very difficult, 
e. g. :
Water Fire Shock; Answer "Proof" 
through moderately difficult such as:
Two Old Egg: Answer: "Timer"
to very easy items such as
Easy Arm Deck: Answer "Chair"
Comparing the scores on easy, slightly difficult, 
moderately difficult and very difficult items of the
3-4 test (Figure 11) it turns out that the group difference 
depends on difficulty. The low N group particularly 
excelled at the easy items (group difference on these 
F = 6.787, p = 0.002, two tailed) but the F value for 
group differences then gradually decreased through 4.145 
and 2.700 until there was no significant group differences 
on the very difficult items (F = 1.941, p = 0.154,
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FIGURE ELEVEN
Scores by different groups on the 3-4 test as a 
function of the difficulty of the items.
E
SD
MD
Easy
Slightly difficult 
Moderately difficult
VD: Very difficult
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two tailed) even though these were exceedingly difficult 
to answer except by a strict Mednickian type association, 
as shown above. Hence the psychotics are worse only 
on fairly easy, obvious associative responding but are 
not inept at remote associative thinking. Like high 
creatives (Mednick 1962) easy associations are not so 
available to them.
The group by difficulty interaction in Figure 11 
does not reach significance (F = 1.67, p =0.132, two 
tailed), but the effect of ease or difficulty of item 
on score is significant (F = 122.30, p «  0.001).
Since the psychotics were expected to excel on 
the more free range easy items (see Chapter 10) and suffer 
more by constraint and hence have a steeper, not a flatter, 
slope, the pattern in Figure 11 is almost the complete 
reverse of the expected one. Clearly the difficult items, 
although they "demand" do not in associative terms 
"constrain". The result found is more in accordance 
with Hullian theory: that if the psychotics are very 
much more aroused, they should have flatter response 
hierarchies. It is also possible that even though their 
current arousal level was not clinically high, that they 
maintained flatter hierarchies initially developed at 
such arousal despite subseguent arousal drop. There 
is no reason why arousal effects on hierarchy slope should 
be commutable. It is possible that a flat hierarchy 
could be maintained even though arousal subseguently 
has been dropped by medication.
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D . Concrete and abstract thinking
With reference to critical (rather convergent) 
items on the 3-4 test which could be answered concretely 
or abstractly: the three groups were closely the same 
on the number of concrete responses they gave (group 
difference: p = 0.419, two tailed (the high N group being 
slightly more concrete)) but the low N group were markedly 
higher than the psychotics and the high N group on the 
number of abstract responses produced (at least with 
those more convergent test items): Psychotics, 2.06
(S.D. 1.73); high N, 2.10 (S.D. 1.73), low N 3.48 
(S.D. 2.56) (F = 2.929, p = 0.031, one tailed).
E . Emotion and cognition
To test the congruency principle (Bower and Cohen,
1982), i.e. that positive hedonic tone will affect positive 
cognitions and negative tone will affect negative cognitions, 
scores on Nowlis Pleasantness, Social Affection and Depression 
were correlated with scores on positively and scores 
on negatively worded test items of the 3-4 test. The 
results are shown in Table 25. Clearly these results 
offenmo support for the congruency principle. Although 
it is reasonable to argue that a positive feeling will 
facilitate retrieval of a positively toned memory, when 
the cognitive processes are totally self-paced with no 
task demands , it does not seem to assist in the f inding 
of positively toned words when the search through the
TABLE 25. Effect of hedonic tone on performance on 
positive and negatively worded test items 
of the 3-4 test
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Pleasantness
Positive
items
- 0 . 210
Negative
items
-0.252
Total 
3-4 test 
score
- 0. 110
Social Affection -0.003 -0.061 + 0. 051
Depression -0. 130 -0.038 -0. 196
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associative network has to meet certain appropriateness 
requirements. Indeed Table 25 suggests that any moderate 
measure of feeling, whether positive or negative has 
either little or no facilitating effect and may indeed 
even have a detrimental effect on efficient cognitive 
activity.
F . Physiological effects of thinking
The effect of the cognitive activity involved 
in the 3-4 test on pulse and blood pressure readings 
in the three groups was obscure. People are not usually 
at rest when they have "resting" pulse and B.P. taken 
and hence resting readings are probably too high. However, 
apart from a rise of about one beat per minute in pulse 
from resting level to that obtaining when volunteers 
were working on the 3-4 test little else of any interest 
emerged. The psychotics were neither any more nor any 
less able to relax and drop pulse after the 3-4 test 
than the non-psychotic groups). Pulses therefore went 
up and then down when considered before, during and after 
the 3-4 test. There was, from this analysis, no evidence 
of an arousal modulation problem in the psychotics.
The data was of course extremely noisy and when change 
of pulse from 'before' to 'during' to 'after' the 
3-4 test was examined by group the effect was not 
significant (F = 1.19, p = 0.317, two tailed) and there 
were no interaction effects of pulse change x group 
(F = 0.75, p = 0.613, two tailed).
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Systolic and diastolic blood pressure readings 
merely monotonically decreased from 'before' to 'during' 
to 'after' conditions. Because the diastolic data was 
rather unreliable the analysis was done of the systolic 
data. This did decrease across conditions (F = 7.97, 
p < 0.001, two tailed) but there was no interaction of 
systolic B.P. change x group (F = 0.22, p = 0.971, two 
tailed). The systolic data merely seems to indicate 
that the volunteers in all groups became gradually more 
relaxed and to pretty much the same extent as the evening 
went by.
G . Forward and backward thinking
A tendency to forward, "with the grain" thinking 
I argued in Chapter 10 was particularly the characteristic 
style of delusional thinking where back-tracking and 
the checking and undermining of previously held propositions 
is avoided. A bias to forward thinking was tested in 
two ways. It was expected that psychotics would be 
particularly adept at items on the 2-3 and 3-4 verbal 
thinking test where the answer followed the test words 
(suffix answers) but should be poor at finding answers 
which came before the test words (prefix answers). The 
suffix minus prefix score should therefore be higher 
in psychotics and the prefix score lower in psychotics.
Secondly psychotics should be worse on items in 
the 3-4 test where the answer comes after some of the 
test words but before others., e.g.
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Sweet Day Boat: Answer "Dream".
Answering such items clearly requires more flexibility 
of thought.
On the 2-3 test the prefix scores of the high 
N and low N groups were similar (9.38 and 10.19) but, 
as expected, the psychotics were worse at 6.65 (F = 4.018, 
p = 0.012, one tailed). The Suffix-Prefix difference 
is also greater in the psychotics (+1.35) than in the 
high N (+0.714) and low N groups (+0.286) but alas this 
difference is not significant (F = 0.321, p = 0.363, 
one tailed) .
On the 3-4 test the psychotics are again worse 
on prefix items (2.313) compared to the scores of the 
high N and low N groups which are closely the same as 
each other (5.048 compared to 5.476). The group difference 
is significant (F = 4.125, p = 0.011, one tailed). The 
Suffix-Prefix difference is however highest in the low 
N group^on the 3-4 test (+7.143) with the psychotics 
second at +6.50 and the high N group third at 4.476,
(F = 2.173, p = 0.124, two tailed).
On items where the solution word was of variable 
position compared to the test item words the psychotics 
were poor (2.063), the high N group second (3.000) and 
the low N group best (4.476) (F = 6.929, p = 0.001, one
tailed) . These scores are all very low, showing how 
difficult such thinking is.
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The overall picture gives mild support for the 
rather vague concept of "forward thinking" and its role 
in psychosis but the results have to be seen in the context 
of the generally poorer performance of the psychotics 
on these tests. The psychotics, for example, might have 
been expected to have been even better on suffix answers 
than the non-psychotic groups but this was not the case 
on either the 2-3 or 3-4 tests. Hence although the 
psychotics are not generally worse than the non-psychotics 
at remote associative thinking, if that thinking requires 
more flegibility other than merely remote probing they 
do seem to have difficulties.
H . Creativity,confirmation bias and perceptual accuracy
It was argued in Part One that confirmation bias 
can be a positive constructive phenomenon, indeed its 
universality is a testament to its adaptive value as 
an almost anti-entropic dynamism in nature. In Chapter 10 
I also argued that many differently named phenomena such 
as similarity perception, bisociation, overinclusive 
thiinking, assimilation and confirmation bias were basically 
manifestations of relational judgement and the accessing 
of data and ideas to current knowledge structures. If 
the above is valid we would expect to see positive 
correlations between confirmation bias and creativity 
in that creativity involves the grouping together or 
synthesising of elements from disparate realms.
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Since scores on creativity and confirmation bias 
were not independent on the 2-3 and 3-4 tests, correlations 
with confirmation bias were computed for the remaining 
tests and are presented in Table 26. Generally confirmation 
bias and creativity are indeed positively correlated 
although scores on the Drawing Completion Test depart 
from this pattern. The pattern fragments which form 
the seeds of drawings in the DCT are not really related 
to the whole as if from a different domain nor disembedded 
from one context and placed in another, they merely act 
as catalysts for any number of elaborations, the final 
products of which they have no meaningful relation to 
at all.
Although no predictions were made with respect 
to the relations between confirmation bias and accuracy, 
the overall patterns of the correlations shown in Table 27 
suggests that although confirmation bias may be associated, 
as expected, with creativity it is damaging of perceptual 
accuracy and tends to be also associated with an attitude 
of slight risk. It would seem that if a person is to 
be constructive and creative, they may have to trade 
this for some degree of loss in observational veridicality. 
(Indeed in science it is difficult to find people who are 
both good theoreticians and good observers. On Brunerian 
and Gregorian schemes the two should go together, but 
in practice they don't).
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TABLE 26. Correlations between creativity test scores 
and confirmation bias (C.B.)
Verbal C.B. Visual C.B
Uses (fluency) +0.246 +0.226
Uses (originality) +0.490* +0.140
S test (fluency) +0.131 +0.008
Drawing Completion Test -0.112 -0.275
(originality)
*p < 0.01 one tailed.
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TABLE 27. Confirmation bias and perceptual accuracy
on the Slide Viewing Task
Verbal C.B. Visual C.B
Recognition position -0.067 +0.043
d' -0.208 -0.218
e
A -0.172 -0. 266
m
B index +0.295 +0.112
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Section 4
Smoking, psychoticism and psychosis*
If nicotine has excitatory action on brain dopamine 
systems then, like amphetamine users (although no doubt 
to a lesser degree) smokers should be higher in psychoticism, 
and especially in paranoia, than non-smokers.
An independent samples t test of paranoia scores 
in smokers and non-smokers (smokers being classified 
for analysis as 2, non-smokers as 1) showed the smokers 
to be significantly higher on paranoia (t = 2.068, 
r phi = 0.264, p = 0.021 one tailed, df 57). This finding 
is robust when sex-differences are examined. Female 
smokers are higher on paranoia than female non-smokers 
(6.81 compared to 5.00, t = 1.600, r phi = 0.330, 
p = 0.065 one tailed, df 21) and male smokers are higher 
on paranoia than male non-smokers (6.86 compared to 5.68, 
t = 1.509, r phi = 0.228, p = 0.075 one tailed, df 34). 
Overall, smokers were 25.73% higher in paranoia score 
than non-smokers.
Paranoia scores were higher in smokers also across 
all three groups. In the psychotic group smokers scored 
7.13 compared to 6.11 for non-smokers (a difference of
*In this section all correlations reported are based 
on data from all 59 volunteers. In Table 28 the correlations 
which emerged from the sample of 33 volunteers are also 
shown for comparison. As can be seen, the picture which 
emerges from both sample sizes is qualitatively identical.
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16.59%); in the high N neurotic group smokers scored 
7.44, non-smokers 6.83 (an 8.94% difference) and in the 
low N stable group smokers scored 5.88, non-smokers only 
3.69 (a 59.12% difference). With the low sample size 
the psychotic group differences did not reach significance
(r phi = 0.205, t = 0.809) but this was achieved over
the two non-psychotic groups (r phi = 0.280, t = 1.845,
p = 0.036 one tailed, df 40).
Q
Considering scores on the P psychoticism scale 
devised for this experiment, smokers again score more 
highly: 15.64 compared to 12.97 for non-smokers (t = 1.785, 
r phi = 0.230, p = 0.038 one tailed, df 57).
EWhen scores on P are considered, the smokers 
are fractionally but not significantly higher (4.36 compared 
to 4.18, t = 0.248, r phi = 0.033). McManus and Weeks
E
(1982) however, studying P scores within 98 smokers 
as related to number of cigarettes smoked per day, found
E
a strong positive correlation of smoking with P of
0.275 (p < 0.01) and McManus (1983) studying 29 smokers 
versus 289 non-smokers found smokers to be significantly 
higher in P (4.38 compared to 2.09, t = 5.76, p < 0.001).
All these findings cannot be explained as an age mediated 
effect as in the present study the correlation of smoking 
with age was a mere 0.008 and the correlation of paranoia 
with age was also low and in the wrong direction at 
-0.108. McManus's subjects were all roughly of the same 
age.
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In the present study smokers were rather more 
neurotic than non-smokers, as assessed by the N scale 
of the EPQ (14.00 compared to 11.82, t = 1.431, 
r phi = 0.186, p = 0.08 one tailed, df 57) and also slightly 
more introverted, not extraverted, having a mean E scale 
score of 12.48 compared to 13.62 for the non-smokers 
(t = -0.823, r phi = -0.108).
Given the usual association of smoking with scoring 
on P^, with its many "tough minded" items, smokers were 
unexpectedly slightly higher in empathy (Em) than non- 
smokers (13.8 compared to 12.5, t = 1.627, r phi = 0.211, 
p = 0.108 two tailed, df 57). Although that tendency 
is weak paranoids were also found to be strongly higher 
in empathy than non- or low paranoids (0.439 correlation,
p < 0.01) .
Considering measures of the subjects^'reported 
feelings at the time of the experiment, which are very 
relevant to our knowledge of the effects of being a smoker 
on a person's transient state: there were lower levels 
of felt stress (a correlation between smoking and stress 
of -0.140), felt anxiety (-0.121), felt aggression (-0.172) 
and felt depression (-0.155) in smokers (see also 
Table 28). This evidence, which I would interpret as 
reflecting the slight subjective calming effects of smoking, 
is however not paralleled by pulse rate data which of 
course reflects the bodily response rather than the conscious 
experience. An independent samples t test of mean pulse 
readings of smokers and non-smokers showed that smokers'
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TABLE 28. Correlations with smoking (smoker versus 
non-smoker)
59 Volunteers 33 Volunteers
Trait measures
Extraversion 
Neuroticism 
Psychoticism (P 
Lie Score ^
Psychoticism (P 
Paranoia (Pa) 
Empathy
Venturesomeness 
Impuls iveness
-0. 108 
+ 0. 186 
+ 0. 033 
+0.042 
+0.230* 
+0.264* 
+ 0. 211 
-0.138 
+ 0. 086
-0. 294 
+ 0. 325*
+ 0. 148 
+ 0. 042 
+0.345** 
+0.405*** 
+0.423*** 
-0. 279 
+ 0. 220
State measures
MacKay et al. scale
Stress
Arousal
-0.140 
-0. 035
-0.188 
-0. 039
Nowlis scale
Aggression
Concentration
Deactivation
Social Affection
Anxiety
Depression
Egotism
Pleasantness
Activation
Nonchalance
Scepticism
Resting pulse 
Mean pulse
Resting systolic B.P. 
Mean systolic B.P. 
Resting diastolic B.P 
Mean diastolic B.P.
-0.172 
-0.197 
+ 0. 030 
-0. 197 
- 0. 121 
-0. 155 
-0. 028 
+0.047 
+0.038 
-0. 013 
+ 0. 085
+ 0. 212 
+0.245*
-0. 065 
-0.008 
- 0. 122 
-0. 069
*p<0.05 
one tailed
-0. 170 
-0. 278 
+0.046 
-0.218 
-0.173 
-0. 148 
+0.162 
+ 0. 143 
+ 0. 025 
+ 0. 124 
+ 0. 048
+0.295*
+ 0. 274 
-0. 115 
-0. 065 
-0. 208 
-0. 131
*p<0. 05 
**p<0.025
***p<0. 01
one tailed
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pulses were higher (74.81 compared to 70.03 for non-smokers, 
t = 1.906, r phi = 0.245, p = 0.028 one tailed, df 57).
A similar difference was found in resting pulse (75.14 
compared to 70.29, t = 1.634, r phi = 0.212, p = 0.054 
one tailed, df 57). The overall mean for the êntire 
sample was representative for mean pulse at 72.05 
(S.D. 9.73), and for resting pulse at 72.35 (S.D. 11.33). 
Hence smokers are activating themselves physiologically 
even though ithey feel less anxious, less aggressive etc.
The felt drop in stressful feelings and felt stress 
consequent on smoking therefore operates simultaneously 
with an autonomic activation and with increased dopaminergic 
activity. Paranoids also were not only more likely to 
smoke but also had higher mean pulses (correlation 0.280). 
Further smoking in the interests of counteracting anxious 
or paranoid feelings, in the long term, is likely only 
to make matters worse.
A similar vicious circle seems also to be operating
with reference to the commonly expressed value of smoking
in improving concentration. Given that attentional
difficulties do seem to be present in acute schizophrenic
disorders (Meyer and Salmon 1984), and may eventually
help to lead via reactions to odd behaviours etc. to
suspiciousness and delusional thinking, it was expected
that high scores on paranoia would be more, not less,
C
likely to report concentration difficulties on the P 
scale,and, with reference to the critical item, they 
did. People with reported dispositional concentration
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difficulties had a mean paranoia score of 7.43 compared 
to a score of only 4.59 for those without concentration 
difficulties (t = 4.895, r phi = 0.544, p < 0.0005 one 
tailed, df 57). However the likely use of smoking to 
improve concentration on task actually worsens it in 
periods between smoking; the correlation between being 
a smoker and reported momentary concentration in this 
study (where the relevant Nowlis state questionnaire 
measuring it was necessarily being filled in at a time 
between cigarettes) was, if anything, negative (r phi = -0.197, 
t = -1.519, p = 0.15 two tailed, df 57). The correlation 
between paranoia and reported momentary concentration 
was, of course, also negative (-0.143). Hence paranoid 
subjects may be smoking in part to improve concentration, 
receiving only transient relief from their difficulties 
and taking a drug (nicotine) whose mild withdrawal and 
activating effects may be worsening the problem between 
cigarettes and over the longer time course. Critically: 
the smokers, like the paranoids here and like schizophrenics 
generally, do indeed report more dispositional concentration 
difficulties on the scale (r = 0.226, p = 0.037 one 
tailed, df 57).
Given the physiological and biochemical effects 
of nicotine on brain function coupled with the differences 
in personality and state between smokers and non-smokers 
as found in the present study I would suggest a two way 
causal model of the relation between smoking and paranoia 
with genetic factors perhaps also present as a predisposing
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agent. Smoking may well cause paranoid ideation through 
its stimulating effects on dopaminergic pathways, 
reflected cardiovascularly in increased pulse, (bottom- 
up component), and paranoia itself could lead to smoking 
due to the letter's slight effects in reducing felt stress, 
aggression, anxiety, distraction and depression (top- 
down component). These latter benefits, however, although 
in the foreground of consciousness, conceal a hidden 
repeated strong increase in activation which produces 
mental states which require further smoking for their 
transient alleviation. The result is a positive feedback 
system which perhaps in genetically more vulnerable 
individuals, who are both smoking heavily and under stress, 
could perhaps eventually spill over into fully blown 
paranoid psychotic ideation.
A much weaker interpretation: that smoking causes 
paranoia due to smoking now being regarded as anti-social 
and thus inducing general feelings of guilt in smokers 
can be shown to be untenable. The correlation of smoking 
with responses on the guilt item of the EPQ N scale was 
low at 0.086 but the correlation between guilt and full 
scale paranoia score was, as expected, high at 0.516.
Hence smoking does not seem to cause paranoia via smoking- 
related guilt induction.
Since there are smokers who are low on paranoia 
and paranoid individuals who do not smoke clearly smoking 
must interact as a risk factor with other variables if
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it is to produce psychosis. However it is argued that 
the overall pattern of the evidence although tentative 
at this stage suggests that smoking be considered as 
such a risk factor. The research implies that the 
cigarette-filled ashtrays in psychiatric out patients 
and day hospital units - usually taken to reflect the 
self-medicating activities of schizophrenics - may now 
have an added more sinister significance.
Conclusions from the experimental study
A bias for seeking and accepting information that 
confirms ongoing ideation at the expense of that which 
refutes it is present to a greater degree in previously 
deluded psychotics than in overaroused non-psychotic 
controls and stable non-psychotics. This bias is particularly 
clear in verbal tasks but is arguably present although 
less in evidence in a visual task. Confirmation bias 
is also stronger in paranoids than non-paranoids in both 
verbal and (possibly) visual tasks, less in high N non- 
psychotics and least in evidence in low N non-psychotics.
It is nonetheless present in non-paranoids who thus are 
also conceptually, not data, driven.
Verbal confirmation bias is interpreted to be 
associated with high left hemisphere cortical activation 
(perhaps involving a capacity decrease) but with low 
left hemisphere limbic activation. Visual confirmation
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bias may be associated with low right hemisphere cortical 
activation but high right hemispheric limbic activation.
Hence the degree of balance between left and right limbic 
and cortical activation states is greater in non-psychotics 
especially those low in Neuroticism. High N non-psychotics 
and psychotics have progressively more intra- and inter- 
hemispheric imbalance.*
Although creativity and psychoticism, as measured 
psychometrically, may be associated in students (Woody 
and Claridge, 1977) this does not seem to be the case 
in working and unemployed adult men and women. If anything 
both psychoticism and neuroticism are damaging of 
creativity. However non-paranoid psychotics are comparable 
in creativity to high and low N non-psychotics but 
paranoid psychotics seem to be markedly uncreative.
Psychotics were not less able to actuate abstract 
thinking with open-ended test items but where test items 
were more convergent they did show less evidence of abstract 
thinking.
Paranoid psychotics may be more perceptually 
sensitive than non-paranoid psychotics but are not more so 
than non-psychotics with whom they are roughly on a par. 
Paranoids may also be fractionally more risky in their 
judgemental processes than all other groups but the group 
differences are all very slight. Their possible sensitivity 
however is not married with extensive creative intellectual
*This pattern of an overactivated left cortex and an underactivated right 
cortex in positive symptom patients is clearly confirmatory of Gruzelier's 
findings (1984). It is unclear whether this is a fixed structural or 
reversible dynamic pattern, however it is not eliminated by medication and 
hence it seems unlikely that it is a neurotransmitter concentration 
assymetry. Disruption of an interhemispheric activation control 
mechanism seems a likely candidate.
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resources and hence they may perceive more than they 
can rationally make sense of.
Similarly the creativity of the non-paranoids 
is not married with perceptual accuracy and hence they 
may construct outre*' interpretations which are not based 
on veridically evaluated evidence. The paranoids therefore 
may notice more than they can handle and the non-paranoids 
may dream up more than they can justify. In one sense 
then it is the paranoids that are, if anything, data 
driven, and the non-paranoids conceptually driven, the 
reverse of Magaro's (1981) scheme.
A summary of paranoid/non-paranoid differences 
in mean scores on a range of variables where differences 
were expected is shown in Table 29. A paranoid-non- 
paranoid distinction does hold up not only in the psychotic 
group but also in the high N group. Alas it is not so 
clear in the low N group.
On the 53 sets of performance scores there was 
a monotonie trend, at least judging from mean values, 
on no less than 41 of them, from low N group scores 
(highest) through high N group (intermediate) to (medicated) 
psychotic group (lowest scores). It would therefore 
seem likely that psychosis and Neuroticism have much 
in common. However the lack of equality in scores between 
psychotics and the overaroused control group of high 
N volunteers shows that psychosis is not only an overarousal 
disorder.
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TABLE 29. Differences in mean score of paranoid and
non-paranoid volunteers on seventeen variables 
where predictions were made. (Non-psychotic 
paranoids assessed psychometrically and thus
of the mean Pa score for their group)
Pa: paranoid volunteers 
V : prediction confirmed 
X : prediction not confirmed
Group
Test Prediction: P N s
S test (Pa lower) V V V
Uses (fluency) (Pa lower) V V V
Uses (originality) (Pa lower) V V V
DCT (originality) (Pa lower) V X X
2-3 score (Pa lower) V X V
3-4 score (Pa lower) V V V
Verbal C.B. (Pa higher) V V V
Visual C.B. (Pa higher) V X V
d'e (Pa higher) V V X
(Pa higher) V V X
B index (Pa higher) V V X
Backwards digit span (Pa lower) V V X
Forwards minus backwards digit 
span (Pa higher)
V V V
Lie score (Pa higher) V V X
Scepticism (Pa higher) X V X
Social Affection (Pa lower) X V V
Aggression (Pa higher) V V X
Total (T) 17 17 17
Least Common Sign (L) 2 3 8
p (one tailed) 0. 001 0. 008 0.5
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There does seem to be evidence, from the Slide 
Viewing Task, that psychotics do not perceive reality 
as accurately as non-psychotics even when the former 
are medicated. They have higher confidence in incorrect 
decisions than non-psychotics and lower confidence in 
correct decisions. In this respect the high N group, 
being intermediate between the psychotics and the low 
N group, share the problem but to a reduced extent.
Reality distortion therefore occurs in psychotics and 
high N non-psychotics even in relatively non-threatening 
tasks.
Creativity and confirmation bias are allied but 
confirmation bias and perceptual accuracy are not. The 
creative, theory building, confirmation seeking mind 
may create great novelty yet may not be so gifted at 
true perception.
The research presented in the experimental study 
also provides convergent evidence that smoking could 
well be a risk factor in paranoia and schizophrenia.
Mental distress also causes smoking which may produce 
a positive feedback system with only transient alleviation 
of problems which are likely to be exacerbated long term 
by smoking.
If my interpretation of the relations between 
smoking and paranoia is regarded as feasible, it would 
seem likely that recovering paranoid patients would improve 
more quickly and need less medication if they cut down
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or stopped smoking. It should also be found that patients 
suffering from paranoid psychotic disorders who do not 
smoke will have been discharged sooner than those who 
do and will have had fewer relapses. Clearly the evidence 
relating smoking to paranoia, being correlational, is 
tentative at this stage, however it does indicate that 
experimental and epidemiological studies might profitably 
be directed at this issue.
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CHAPTER 14
IMPLICATIONS FOR THERAPY
In an age where research has to pay and/or be 
of practical relevance to getting by and being productive 
in everyday life I see the implications for therapy of 
the research presented in Parts Oneeand Two to be critical. 
The purpose of this chapter then is to deploy the experience 
and knowledge I have gained through this research (which 
really began as a basic research project) in the domain 
of application. All of the implications described in 
this chapter are tied conceptually to issues raised 
throughout the thesis, some highlighted, some merely 
mentioned, but some linkages may seem more remote as 
they derive more strongly from my counselling experience 
over the time of this research. Essentially then this 
chapter enables me to funnel all of the skills and ideas 
developed during this sometimes esoteric research into 
helping real people in real life.
Biases in thought again
I began this thesis with a description of how 
I stumbled across the topic of delusional thinking through 
being interested in biases in human thought, biases which 
could not only distort but imprison our minds and prevent 
us from achieving deep truths and taking effective action.
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One bias which I have not so far mentioned but which 
is very relevant in the context of evaluating the causes 
and the treatments of psychotic crises is that known 
as the actor-observer divergence (Jones and Nisbett 1971) 
This is the bias we have as actors in life to attribute 
the causes of our own behaviour to external situational 
factors but to attribute the causes of the behaviour 
of others (whom we observe) to internal intrapsychic 
factors i.e. to their motives, personality, character 
structure and so on. This is especially so when the 
behaviour concerned is in some way a failure or a mistake, 
Ross (1977) proposed that observers were the ones in 
error in overemphasising internal factors and under­
emphasising external factors. This is the "fundamental 
attribution error".
On the dozen or so occasions when I have asked 
non-psychotic people if they think they could ever "break 
down and go mad" they have all replied with words to 
the effect "no I'm too strong, I have too strong a 
personality". Clearly these lay people (and many 
professionals) tacitly believe that madness is due to 
some factor internal to the psychotic such as "weak 
personality" and not primarily due to them having lived 
in a (for them) unliveable situation.
This bias is evident also in the psychopathology 
literature where there are dozens of papers on "internal" 
factors in psychosis to every one on "external" factors.
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Indeed, were it not for investigators such as Laing and 
Bateson this imbalance would probably be even greater. 
Investigators from some schools, such as psychoanalysis, 
do believe that there is indeed something fundamentally 
wrong with the psychotic (such as them having regressed 
to the oral stage) independently of their social as 
opposed to their intrapsychic context. This bias, which 
also operates in the field of personality research, has 
resulted in us knowing very little about how best to 
modify the circumstances of the psychotic's life in 
comparison to the wealth of suggestions that we have 
available on how to change the mind/brain system of the 
psychotic. In Chapter 10 however I stated that we need 
to know not only what is inside the psychotic's head 
but what the psychotic's head is inside of. Hence I 
will turn first to those manipulations of the external 
environment which would seem likely to be therapeutic.
Manipulations of the external environment
We know, for example, that it is best not to 
discharge a recovering psychotic person from hospital 
to a highly emotional, criticising, overprotective home 
environment and/or that the receiving family should be 
encouraged not to behave in those ways (from the researches 
of Brown, Bone, Dalison and Wing (1966); Vaughn and Leff 
(1976) and Leff (1976)).
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We have reason to believe then that treatment 
of a recovering psychotic may need to involve their whole 
family within which they are merely "the identified 
patient" (I.P.). The emphasis is both on change in the 
family system, for example away from scapegoating the
I.P. and on encouraging members of the family to communicate 
more clearly and less ambiguously (from the researches, 
for example, of Liem (1974); Goldstein and Rodnick (1975) 
and Norton (1982)).
Few researchers, however, believe that any 
particular forms of schizophrenogenic family interactions 
have convincingly been demonstrated. Apabt from the 
problems raised by the absence of studies of control 
families this is not a surprising state of affairs since, 
despite inspiring work especially of Bateson et al. (1956) , 
Laing and Esterson (1964) and Lidz, Fleck and Cornelison 
(1965), the interactions of a family of, say, four members 
are incredibly complex and this makes abstraction of 
salient patterns and categorisation of repetitive themes 
extremely difficult and necessarily impressionistic.
We know also that people should avoid making a 
large number of changes in their life over a short period 
such as changing their home, their lover and their job, 
all at the same time, as this is liable to greatly 
predisposeethem to some illness, perhaps even a psychotic 
crisis (from the research of, for example. Holmes and 
Rahe (1967); Paykel (1979))* We know that a lower class
*See also Brown and Birley (1968
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environment will help evoke schizophrenia in people 
genetically predisposed to it (Turner and Wagonfield 
(1967)) but we cannot as yet pin-point what factors to 
reverse or neutralise in the environments to which we 
discharge psychotic 'clients (see p. 399 on this problem).
Research in the field of memory has emphasised 
that if the same context is present at storage as at 
recall, the latter will be facilitated (Estes 1972).
This would imply that it would be unwise to discharge 
a client to the very same physical situation from which 
they came, e.g. a boarding house bedsitter, as a return 
to the same room in which their crisis occurred would 
be expected to "bring it all back". (Related to this: 
it is unwise to discuss with clients the fine detail 
of their delusions because of the danger of reactivating 
the previous state. Particularly to be avoided is the 
retrieval of the feeling of meaning associated with the 
delusion content).
Most mental health professionals know that to 
avoid biassing observers or attracting undue negative 
attention, recovering psychotics should be encouraged 
to dress reasonably well and to attempt to present an 
acceptable appearance to the world. Despite shortage 
of money this can be achieved even with jumble sale clothes 
A hair-do can do wonders for a recovering client's mood 
and confidence and need not be that expensive. An 
unkempt scruffy appearance encourage stares, knowing
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looks, smirks, frowns and comments from passers-by etc. 
which can only decrease self esteem and exacerbate a 
mild delusional state or reactivate one which had previously 
been muted. For those clients who do "stand out" because 
of a slovenly appearance but who do not think that they 
do, video feedback of their appearance in public might 
well be jolting but beneficial in the longer term.
Other environmental or "external" manipulations 
however are generally based on intuition, guesswork or 
the personal flair of hostel and group home staff who 
have to rely on their hunches as the best solution for 
the person or people concerned.*
This is a sad and devastatingly unbalanced state 
of affairs. My own experience is largely in one-to-one 
situations and I admit that I initially approached the 
topic of paranoia-’and delusional thinking with an internal 
attributional attitude. However as I hope the foregoing 
chapters have demonstrated, I personally believe that 
external factors are critically important in the genesis 
and exacerbation of the psychotic state. Indeed I would
*It is interesting but tragic that government policy 
to have recovering psychotics cared for in the community 
obtains despite minimal research having been done to 
date on just how environmental manipulations can prevent 
relapse. It also obtains despite an absence of funds 
for such research which, were it to be done, would make 
the policy more viable.
376
go so far as to make two assertions: that some 
schizophrenics have, in a sense, no intrapsychic problems 
at all (as one girl said to me "I was entirely screwed 
up by other people") and that the, in part, causal 
relationship between low social class and schizophrenia 
is a vastly underresearched problem in psychologically 
oriented schizophrenia research.
Research is also definitely needed, in this context, 
on the study of people who habitually ahd chronically 
cause mental distress in others. So far, only the famous 
(or infamous) "schizophrenogenic mother" of Fromm-Reichmann 
(1948) has received any semblance of detailed attention. 
However I feel certain that this concept has distracted 
attention away from the hoardes of dangerous people in 
many other categories of life who have egual or even 
more pernicious effects on those who live or work with 
them. Relationships with such people are weakening rather 
than strengthening, they may be sane themselves (although 
in my experience they cluster in the neurotic extravert 
quadrant) but they may help to cause even more serious 
neuroses and even psychoses in others. These "neurotogenic" 
or "psychotogenic" people are similar to L.G. Brown's 
"carriers of mental ill-health" (1934); if community 
carets to be effective, we need to know much more about 
such individuals.
Having said all this, however, I will have to 
concentrate my own suggestions for treatment into territory
3 7 ?
where I have most experience, (the positive value of 
medication is accepted and assumed), and focus on ideas 
which do derive from the bulk of the research reported 
in this thesis. The following will therefore often have 
rather an intrapsychic flavour but suggestions for the 
modification of external factors will also be an important 
theme. At all times, however, we need external manipulations 
which are sensitive to the context provided by internal 
factors and internal manipulations which are sensitive 
to the context provided by external factors. To manage 
behaviour or social situation alone or perform intrapsychic 
rearrangements alone is, in my view, isolationist 
decontextualised nonsense.
* * * * * * * * * *
Meats and poisons
Any treatment and rehabilitation programme for 
a recovering psychotic client must be rich, varied and 
flexible so as to cater for the individual's needs.
What is one person's meat is another person's poison 
and one has therefore to be prepared to waive cherished 
solutions and ideas in specific circumstances. In what 
follows I will discuss common 'meats' and 'poisons' and 
for brevity I may seem somewhat dogmatic. However my 
suggestions are in most cases only meant as guides and 
as food for thought. Just as every client is unique
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so every programme of help should be an individually 
tailored one.
Although Alana J's experience and those of many 
manic patients are exceptions to this, most delusional 
thinking involves a negative cognitive style. It is 
therefore useful for therapeutic effectiveness to encourage 
positive thinking and a reframing not only of current 
but of past negative experiences in as positive a way 
as possible. For example memories of school may be painful 
but the person can usually be coaxed to retrieve some 
positive memories, of that time in their lives, which 
they previously had taken for granted and allowed to 
become submerged. Clearly if the construing of events 
backwards and forwards in time is negative one has neither 
hope nor nostalgia to fall back on.
In the context of encouraging positivity a non- 
condemnatory and non-punitive religious outlook is also 
worth promoting. To find one's strength through relating 
to Jesus, who was an infinitude of gentleness, love and 
forgiveness produces an experience which is the very 
antithesis of malign delusional thinking. The guilt, 
anger and fear which so suffuses the mind in delusion 
just cannot obtain such an insidious hold when one allows 
God into oneself as a real living force. Guilt in 
particular should be a focus of counselling in this context 
since phenothiazine medication, although it has a major 
effect on thought disorder and belligerence, leaves guilt 
feelings virtually untouched (Klein and Davis 1969) .
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Cathartic approaches which encourage the client 
to "discharge" pent up hatred and loathing, say towards 
parents should, I believe, be discouraged.* Previously 
psychotic clients are all too aware of their negative 
emotions and having them beating cushions and pillows 
or screaming in'* sound-proof ed rooms can only rehearse 
their negative emotions even more extensively and encourage 
extremes of negative emotional experience which, really, 
the client has already had quite enough of. The psychotic 
in Jungian terms is an unbalanced personality; they have 
'pushed' their negative side to a self-harming extent.
What is needed is not further exploration of their negativity 
but an emphasis on and a development 6f their positive 
capabilities.
Similarly free association should be discouraged. 
Psychotic clients generally have quite elaborate schemata
*A lot which passes for catharsis is, I think, not genuine 
or truly honest. True and effective catharsis is more 
difficult to achieve than many people realise - particularly 
with reference to the most painful memories and feelings.
The client may tell a tale or relate an experience a 
shade too light-heartedly. They may relate it just a 
shade too intellectually. It may be related too quickly 
or too vaguely yet the dishonesty may be barely perceptible. 
Most misleading of all is what I call "over-catharsis".
The person may put themselves in too bad a light, over­
express the anger involved, over-express the fear involved. 
Rather than "going over the top" they could be said to 
be "going under the bottom". They are not releasing 
pent-up anguish etc., they are generating it partly to 
fit the theory and/or please the therapist. Over-catharsis 
seems to be very honest yet it is just as dishonest as, 
say, intellectualisation and is not therapeutically 
effective in the long term however dramatic it may appear.
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tagged or coded with negative drives/. Free association 
can only facilitate reactivation of such negative drive 
schemata and produce highly aversive states. What the 
client lacks is cultivated positive emotional schemata.
To achieve these a superior-inferior relationship is 
to be avoided as is a relationship in which the client 
trusts the therapist with many details of their private 
mental life while the therapist trusts the client with 
nothing of theirs. This form of skewed "I'm not giving 
anything away to you" attitude is humiliating and counter- 
therapeutic.
Paranoid clients, through their great sensitivity 
to non-verbal cues, require counsellors and therapists 
who are the very quintessence of a genuine up-front attitude, 
A divided counsellor whose violence only "peeps through" 
occasionally to be revealed in subtleties is liable to 
be harmful to such clients. To a paranoid "hints" on 
the surface of that kind may be taken to mean a swirling 
cess-pit of malicious loathing, detestation and malevolence 
beneath that surface.
All previously deluded clients have a strong 
tendency to go beyond the information given and to infer 
the negative behind a positive front. Hence if one talks 
negatively with them about an absent person they are 
liable to infer: "If with them, then with me too". However
this tendency to leap beyond the given can be used or 
tempted for the client's benefit so as to undercut the
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generatrix of their delusional style by inducing them 
to make inferences which counteract their negativity.
This can be done for example by only talking about absent 
people in the psychotic's presence in a positive way.
If they infer that the same attitude will be shown to 
them in their absence this is clearly trust enhancing.
This procedure I call "positive inference tempting".
Rather than directly attempting to change the client's 
cognitive style it puts it to work against itself.
A cynical or subtly cynical attitude on the part 
of the therapist is therefore highly damaging. However 
most devastating of all is a dismissive attitude to the 
client's judgemental ability. Most therapists do not 
have any great trust in a previously deluded client's 
judgement. This cynicism is catastrophically counter- 
therapeutic. After a psychotic episode a client needs 
to be gradually and gently re-built not scorned as inept 
and incompetent simply because their beliefs do not sound 
plausible. To avoid undermining the client's self regard 
even further it is useful to seek the very early cognitions 
on which the delusional system was founded. These are 
often quite plausible. The way these were generalised 
to their final bizarre form can then be criticised - 
but it is essential that the client be able to salvage 
some iotas of self pride from their episode. "Potty" 
ideas do not emerge suddenly, even primary delusions 
are probably preceded by many weeks experience of the 
meaning feeling (see p. 178). Very bizarre ideas are
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usually the result of a long sequence of actual true 
perceptions and, often, remarkable coincidences which 
might have made anyone think similarly. This is, in 
part, why they are so frequently resistant to argument 
and new disconfirmatory evidence. Hence every example 
of good judgement shown by the client should be reinforced. 
Clients are much more likely to trust therapists who 
appreciate their good performances than those who are 
cynical about every interpretation they make.
Mysticism and the paranormal as meat and poison
The mystic thinks: "reality is weird", the psychotic 
thinks: "there's something weird happening in the world,
directed at me". The mystic/creative thinks: "I suffer
my thoughts, streams of ideas just come to me". The 
psychotic thinks: "thoughts are implanted in my mind
by computers/hypnotic suggestion at a distance". The 
mystical intuitions and the psychotic cognitions are 
in ratio as music to the libretto. Mystical intuitions 
are difficult to hold or permit without giving them some 
cliche' ridden reference. This I think is what can happen 
in delusion. The greatest pain the Western mind has 
to endure is that of de-categorising, diffusing a gestalt.
Given these similarities and ideas (see also 
Chapter 8) perhaps the mystico-transcendent therapies 
such as Yoga; Zen; Sufism and Tibetan Buddhism and 
variants of Judaeo-Christian mysticism would be beneficial
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to the recovering psychotic intent on discovery and on 
the validation of their capacities? Personally I think 
this may be so but only after some time. The person 
should not be seeking "easy highs" or a mode of cognition 
which allows any thought to be "meaningful", "good enough" 
or "viable". Such "glitzy" and loose thinking styles, 
under certain circumstances I think are actually damaging 
at the hardware level. Product can influence process 
via perhaps modifying the mechanisms of similarity 
perception and arousal modulation. Also the structural 
peculiarities that these thought styles induce are themselves 
liable to lead to the very thought styles which exacerbate 
the peculiarities themselves. This is in itself a 
condemnation of the type of thinking found in some forms 
of neurotic and psychotic religiosity.
Nonetheless I believe there is a mystical slice 
between the Western rationalism and empiricism justified 
by thinkers from Socrates to Popper and ordinary human 
superstition, fable and folly, a slice which is productive 
and illuminating. However it is difficult to indwell 
there. Anyone seeking this realm needs a social, cognitive 
and emotional support network without and positive self 
regard within. It is not for the bitter loner or the 
ostracised recluse. In the latter circumstances magic 
can be "bad for the brain". One cannot reach these realms 
without some degree of suffering and this has to be faced.
We do like meaning but we do not like anxiety - but both 
are the concomitants of living within a range of alternatives.
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Determinism caters for the amelioration of anxiety and 
religion for the joy of meaning - but all that are 
the alternatives in structured relations. To positively 
find the mystical domain one needs guidance, support 
and strength.
On the positive side peripheral indulgence in 
such therapies could be useful. The narrowing of attention 
and the focussing on the subjective required in meditation 
may be of therapeutic value to people who have difficulty 
concentrating and whose attention is often hypervigilant 
to the external world. Also the relaxation and peace 
and, on the hardware side, general diminution of autonomic 
activity may well be valuable. On the negative side 
the achievement of an altered state of consciousness, 
via such therapies, in a previously deluded psychotic 
could result in an internal and external attributional 
search which could result in the retrieval and reactivation 
of old psychotic cognitions and thinking styles. Hence 
if a person is not enculturated into a societal sphere 
or is of low self esteem such therapies may be just as 
likely to harm the patient as to improve them.
Again despite the anecdotal evidence from my own 
case I believe it is generally countertherapeutic to 
encourage the client into thinking that they have any 
even marginally reliable psychic abilities. Although 
I think it is true that the psychotic episode can involve 
some paranormal factors, and so the uncanny should not
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be denied, this aspect is better played down in therapy.
The client needs to learn to get by in life without relying 
on paranormal powers, without waiting for paranormal 
manifestations and without being "guided" by paranormal 
or spiritual forces in any obvious concrete way.
Religiosity is useful as a positive attitude and should 
be calmly encouraged but a state of affairs where they 
think that 'God is sending me the messages * is to be avoided. 
Recovering psychotics are intuitively aware of this anyway 
and all of those close to me refused participation when 
I suggested running an ESP experiment. In Greyson's 
(1977) ESP experiment the psychotics there found the 
negative outcome therapeutic.*
On the other hand it is therapeutic to emphasise 
the normality and positive value of the psychotic experience, 
Delusional thinking is in many wayssa perfectly normal 
cognitive activity (Rosenhan and Seligman 1984) in which 
a person under great "uncertainty stress" tries to make 
sense out of their experiences and in doing so anticipates 
the future. Psychotics should be encouraged to appreciate 
this normality of their experience and their creativity 
and meaning seeking tendencies which manifest themselves 
in delusion and to deploy them in less self destructive 
ways and for the benefit of others.
*In the same way psychotics' transparency or translucency 
feelings can be eased by "playing parapsychology" with 
them: trying, sportively, to read their thoughts - and 
failing. (Such games are also excellent opportunities 
for humour).
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In this context the strange feelings and intuitions 
which often preceded the delusion should, if possible, 
be positively connoted and accepted perhaps as mystical 
experiences if appropriate. Therapeutic efforts can 
then be directed at changing the outre^ or outlandish 
attributions that the client has constructed to account 
for these unfamiliar and perplexing states, (see also 
Chapter 8 and Johnson, Ross and Mastria 1977).
The basis theme then to be employed in dealing 
with the negative side of the mystical and the distracting 
side of the paranormal which may have manifested in psychosis 
is that they should be overcome in the sense of incorporated 
rather than overcome in the sense of denied, defeated 
and left behind. Psychological approaches to therapy 
generally use the first sense of overcome, medical model 
approaches use the second sense above. The past should,
I think, be included not excluded, merged and transmuted, 
so that it is compossible with the present, not cut away.
Then the person can genuinely grow rather than slot-rattle 
to a different mentality, posing as having grown.
Time keeping
Emphasis on punctuality and session length is,
I feel, countertherapeutic. Some counsellors and therapists, 
(especially those who have committed themselves to too 
many clients), will spend a whole session discussing 
why the client was seven minutes late for it and will
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not relent until they have found some intellectually 
exciting "meaty" reason for the client's "misbehaviour".
This irritates, alienates and bores psychotic clients 
immensely and re-affirms to them that their therapist 
does not really have much understanding of their mental 
state. Similarly to demand that discussion last strictly 
and only for fifty minutes at a time is, in my view, 
pure nonsense and again alienates the therapist from 
the client's world.
Psychotics' thinking, feeling and behaviour is 
often unpredictable, diffuse, tangiential and easily side­
tracked to a degree that is beyond their control. In 
university departments highly creative staff members 
are similarly unpredictable and, at times, long winded 
and tangiential. That is the way they are. It is true 
that the psychotic benefits from structure andjorder 
but to push a "factory mind" attitude onto psychotics 
in which they clock-in and clock-out for therapy is monstrous 
Recovering from a psychotic crisis is usually a slow 
and arduous affair. The psychotic's inner world has 
been totally slaughtered and devastated, they have had 
to realise that they were hopelessly wrong about the 
world they constructed. They feel "down" and silly. 
Rebuilding has to begin from within from an empathie 
understanding of what they are good at and from a 
sympathetic realisation of the chaos of their mental 
state. When one's whole world and self has been 
annihilated first in one way by a pseudocommunity and
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then in another by drugs, clocking in and clocking out 
for therapy or for anything else is the depths of triviality, 
despair and humiliation. If professionals are not prepared 
to expect and for some time tolerate the inconvenience 
of unpunctuality and protracted session lengths they 
should not, I believe, be in the job of helping psychotics.
A word of qualification is in order here however: 
it does not seem to me to be true that one has always 
to treat a psychotic very gingerly. If one does behave 
towards them always in a very "charily and warily" fashion, 
they are liable to pick up unconsciously the implicit 
communication "you are very fragile" and this is counter­
therapeutic. Psychotics have to accept the consequences 
of their behaviour, like everybody else, and if their 
behaviour is, in particular circumstances, enraging, 
so be it.
The delusion as pure projection
A common tendency of helping agents is to assume 
that the client's delusional system is a projected symbolic 
mirror of their psyche. This is taking subjectivism 
to an absurd conclusion. One can only map a delusional 
system onto a client's intrapsychic dynamics with the 
aid of a great deal of intellectual acrobatics if at 
all. Delusional systems are not entirely intrapsychic 
constructions, they depend also on thousands of events 
and happenings "out there" in the world which are totally
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beyond the psychotic's control or expectation. To try 
and work back from the delusion to the client's "mental 
code" or mental structures is to collapse the understanding 
of delusional thinking with idealism. Delusions, like 
scientific discoveries, are not made from "pure thought" 
while sitting in an armchair and hence they reflect an 
external realm as well as an internal.
Having said this however, delusions do often reflect 
some of the client'-s current conflicts. This is true 
also of dreams (Hall 1966; Kline 1981). People do not 
easily give up delusions partly because to do so would 
be an admission that they have wasted months or years 
building up a belief system that is totally vacuous.
Hence the psychoanalytic and existential therapeutic 
procedures of encouraging the person to see meaning and 
personal sense in their delusions, as well as being 
personally enriching, circumvents the "wasted time" anxiety.
I think it is generally wrong however to perceive 
the projections of the psychotic always as defenses.
The psychotic projects not to deny but to anticipate.
The plotting and planning of the deluded person never 
reduces guilt and shame, it merely represents machinations 
designed to prevent their situation getting any worse.
Chronic inferences of defensive projection in 
the treatment of recovering deluded patients also denies 
the validity of their own inference-making capabilities 
and this can be very countertherapeutic. As one psychotic
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said to me "talking to him is like pissing into the wind". 
Psychotic clients, far from being chronic blunder-makers, 
can be very sensitive and perceptive. This capacity 
needs to be validated not thrown back in their faces.
"The wall test"
Although it is valuable to praise those 
demonstrations of good judgement which the psychotic 
shows and to be positive and agreeable about the cognitions 
and feelings on which the delusion was seeded, negative 
feedback is also valuable. It is quite wrong to believe 
that challenging or refuting a recovering psychotic will 
always plunge one into their delusional system. Negative 
outcomes in ESP tests (Greyson 1977) have previously 
been mentioned in this context as having been beneficial. 
Deluded psychotics do have a strong verificationist 
tendency but when recovering they are not by any means 
totally immune to refutatory evidence.
A test which I would suggest and which I refer 
to as "the wall test", although still in an exploratory 
stage, may prove to be helpful. In this a tape of two 
people speaking is played behind a partition. The client 
has to make out what they are saying as if they were 
living in a flat next door and overhearing muffled 
conversation through the wall. After they have done 
this they go behind the partition and the tape replayed 
so that they can listen to what actually was said. They
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can thus be given feedback of reality, something difficult 
or impossible in everyday life and can thus appreciate 
their own mistakes in auditory perception.
Further feedback techniques
There seems little doubt from the experimental 
investigation that previously deluded psychotics do 
operate on confirmatory evidence and ignore disconfirmatory 
evidence more so than do non-psychotics. They also have 
lower confidence in correct decisions and higher confidence 
in incorrect decisions than do non-psychotics. Related 
to this: they place higher confidence on decisions enriched 
from fantasy and lower confidence on decisions which 
are more stimulus determined, than do non-psychotics.
I believe that all of these tendencies could be counteracted 
by the provision of ongoing feedback of their performance 
accuracy and appropriateness in test.or, preferably, 
game playing situations. The slide viewing task reported 
in this thesis is amenable for use as a training situation 
of this kind. If the decisions were made within a multiple 
choice task format the confidence rating assigned to 
them could (with reference to data from non-psychotics) 
be fed back as too high or too low until the volunteer 
had learnt to match their confidence ratings to their 
decisions and to the quality of the evidence. Tasks 
of this kind would improve the reality testing capacities 
of the psychotic client, they would counteract their
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tendencies to trust too strongly in their own fantasies 
and encourage them to place more faith in strongly 
stimulus determined decisions.
Feedback techniques would be valuable in another 
quite different area. Recovering psychotics, I find, 
often feel that people, whose faces are in their peripheral 
visual field, are looking at them - for example when 
they are stood next to them in buses and trains. When 
they have the courage to "look back" at those people 
they find that they usually are not in fact doing so.
Some psychotics find this a particularly unnerving 
problem also when walking down a busy street. Sometimes 
they feel that they are walking a gauntlet of eyes and 
stares. Again a video of them so walking, taken with 
the camera behind them, would show them that people 
actually look at them much less than they characteristically 
imagine. This kind of technique could be combined with 
workmen their presentation of self. They would be likely 
to discover that people look at them a lot less or a 
lot less unfavourably, if they dress reasonably well 
and clear their faces of, say, sullen or haunted 
expressions. Shafiq would certainly have benefited from 
this as his characteristic gait and facial expression 
I suspect may have exacerbated his problems in the sense 
that the "attention" he obtained may well have fed his 
delusional preoccupations in vicious circle fashion.
Video techniques of this kind would enable the psychotic
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to break the circle and obtain unambiguous testing of 
their fears without them having to undergo all the 
stressful machinations that would be required for them 
to directly seek the evidence themselves - with of course 
all the attendant uncertainties that that would produce.
(A similar technique could of course be used, and 
occasionally has been, for transsexuals who are concerned • 
as they all invariably are - about whether or not they 
"pass" in public).
The certainty of the psychotic is a strange kind 
of "twilight certainty". It is wrong to believe that 
they would not like or benefit from real solid feedback 
such as a video could provide. The psychotic in a sense 
fears certainty yet longs for it. Rather than have their 
brains create a sense of certainty through malfunctioning 
it would be and is therapeutic for them clearly to receive 
information about the state of reality. Rather than 
mistrust this, as most professionals think they would, 
my experience is that they generally welcome it and are 
thoroughly relieved when they receive it.
A final technique on this theme which I would 
like to mention is what I call "the walk game". Often 
previously deluded psychotics feel that when couples 
approach them in the street they look at them and when 
they have walked past they then start talking about them. 
This can be tested. My method here is to go on walks 
with a client but walk about ten yards behind them.
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When couples or threesomes do approach and walk past 
I can see whether or not they are looking at the client 
and hear whether or not they are, after they have walked 
past, talking about them. So far, with reasonably well 
presented clients (and it is obviously best that clients 
be so for this game) their fears have proved unfounded 
and I have, to their relief, been able to feed this 
information back to them. Again, a clear dose of reality, 
rather than being mistrusted, is very refreshing to a 
paranoid client. (If the information had been derogatory 
I would still have fed it back. Clarity and certainty 
is, I believe, more important than whether the content 
of the information fed back is good or bad). This technique 
is obviously less than fully satisfactory because the 
feedback information depends on the followers' auditory 
acuity. Derogatory information in all probability would 
concern their appearance. If so it would be beneficial 
for them to attribute "talk-about-them-in-the-street" 
to their physical characteristics, which are to-an extent 
modifiable and controllable, than to scandal sheets, 
past moral transgressions or to the activities of a 
pseudocommunity, all of which are uncontrollable.
The use of feedback techniques obviously should 
not be rigid and predetermined. They must be tailored 
to the particular fears of the client. Alison, for 
example, as we saw in Chapter 7, slept wearing ear plugs 
because she believed that groups of young men were laughing
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at her expense and shouting derogatory remarks up to 
her window as they passed her block on their way home 
from the pub between 11pm and midnight. I offered to 
wait in the vicinity at that time to hear or tape record 
what they actually were saying and shouting and this 
could easily have been done. Alas she refused; with 
feedback techniques the client's fear of certainty is 
a problem and it does require courage on their part to 
participate in some of these procedures.* (The wall 
test is the least threatening in this respect). However 
the point is that, although still in early stages, feedback 
techniques with recovering deluded or paranoid clients 
present a flexible medium of help and may well be useful 
when deployed by helpers that they trust and are close 
to. By depicting reality with brute clarity and/or by 
changing attributions, they may sidestep the pernicious 
influence of confirmation bias and, despite the theoretical 
problem that one can never prove the negative, they may 
undercut delusional systems and calm and refresh the 
client.
*Although some readers may be rather taken aback by my 
suggestion of feedback procedures, especially perhaps 
by the walk game, I personally see no harm in providing 
a previously psychotic client with information about 
what really is going on around them. This w a s , after 
all, what they were trying to discover in their agonising 
delusional schemes. Freud long ago recognised that the 
dividing lines between delusions, phobias and obsessions 
were fine ones. Just as every therapist knows that there 
comes a time when a phobia must be faced by a client, 
so, if practicable, should it be with a delusion. As 
the ancient Chinese proverb says: "Go straight to the
heart of danger, for there you will find safety",
(Davison and Neale 1986, p.128).
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Roughage and vision
It is absolutely essential that the client reach 
and be encouraged to reach beyond the realm of psychological 
analysis. Roughage, small talk and creative activities 
all facilitate this. Small talk indeed is a welcome 
release for psychotics from their intense preoccupations 
as well as being a better sample of the kind of talk 
that obtains in the real world.
A continual emphasis on problems and "mental illness" 
makes the client feel that they are "a case" worthwhile 
only for a report in a psychiatry textbook as another 
instance of a theory of pathology. This is very bad.
Every previously psychotic client needs to feel that 
they have a worthwhile, valuable, special identity of 
their own with their own unique vision. They have to 
feel that what they are and can do has some public external 
reference beyond psychology and psychiatry. That they 
can give and be something to the world and that they 
have a valid unique place in that world. To the extent 
that therapy prevents them from achieving this it is 
harmful. Many seem to think that THE answer to this 
is "getting a job". It can be but not at all necessarily. 
Other achievements are or can be just as, if not more, 
valuable; for example: painting a picture, helping to 
mend a car, writing a rebellious letter to Forum or 
decorating a kitchen in a novel way (to cite a few actual 
examples) take the person out of the quagmire of pathology
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and into the world ina most liberating fashion since 
these efforts can in no way be reduced to psychology.*
There is no best time for the above to occur.
Indeed immediately after a psychotic crisis the best 
"treatment" is to avoid talk of mental illness and problems 
altogether. Discussion about Chelsea's latest match 
or the latest fashions on Oxford Street is more effective 
than anything deriving from a learned work on psycho­
pathology (see Sutherland (1976) on this point also).
My own personal belief is that after an acute delusional 
crisis a person should be encouraged, for at least a 
year and maybe two, to live an in-the-world life, mixing 
with people, building trust, dealing with practical 
realities and everyday issues and nbt retreating into 
any form of deep analysis. The bitter fruit of withdrawal, 
isolation and reverie is psychosis. Productive living 
after it should be sought in living an active outward 
looking life revolving around relationships and not a 
retiring one.
As the person moves into the world in a consensually 
validateable way there usually comes a time when one 
feels free even to laugh with them at their delusions
*Given the generally low scores of paranoid volunteers 
on the tests of creativity it would seem reasonable to 
encourage creative endeavour particularly in this group, 
perhaps even via "lateral thinking" exercises (e.g. 
de Bono, 1967) to help jolt them out of their singularly 
linear narrowly focussed thinking style.
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thereby helping them to store the previously distressing • 
thoughts in positive humorous schemata.
Normality and esteem
Madness is perfectly normal in the sense that, 
judging from the experimental study, many of the processes 
involved exist on a continuum with normal functioning 
without qualitative discontinuity. Many seemingly psychotic 
phenomena can be conceptualised in a perfectly normal 
and/or positive way. As we saw in the cases of David B. 
and Simon T, in Part One, it is best not to be eager 
to find evidence of "Thought Broadcasting delusions" 
and "Thought Disorder" as one can become so hooked by 
these labels that one fails to conceptualise behaviours 
that resemble them as anything other than pathological.
One may then be over-eager to suggest, say, an increase 
in medication to "eliminate" them. Similarly the Borderline 
state and Freud's related "oceanic feeling" are no more 
to be regarded as seeded on defenses producing an abnormal 
condition than is acute hearing to be regarded as a defense 
against blindness. It is a released capacity - as is 
the mystical state. Necessity mothers the realisation 
of dormant capacities.
In this vein reports of so called "Thought Blocking" 
can sometimes be normalised by counsellors rather than 
them being an occasion for panic drug taking. Alana J.
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for example, once "lost" what she was going to say twice 
in the space of a few minutes with me after having spent 
five hours being "talked at" by a female acquaintance 
with verbal diarrhoea. It could well be, I thought, 
that this was because sentence construction requires 
an assumption/prediction of output possibility. If a 
person spends hours with someone who does not listen 
to what they say and has no interest in their contribution 
at all it is likely that attention will be withdrawn 
from embryonic sentence constructions, they thus would 
not receive the "cathexis" they need and would rapidly 
decay.
Having thought of the above at the time when 
Alana J. reported that she was losing her thoughts, I 
explained this theory to her and related it to her recent 
experience. She regained her fluency of thought quite 
easily. Obviously if she had coupled this worry with 
an attribution of an external locus of control for her 
mental state a perfectly logical 'normal' delusion of 
"Thought Withdrawal" would have been conceived.
The theory outlined above of Alana's thought 
blocking suggests one cognitive underpinning of the 
link between schizophrenia and invalidating experiences. 
The experience bf mixing with people who do not attend 
to what one is saying nor digest it or show any interest 
in it may be, as mentioned in Chapter 4, a factor in 
the generation of unusual states of mind such as the
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negative aspects of the Borderline or psychotic states 
Perhaps this kind of experience is also more common in 
the lower social classes.
Smoking
My interpretation of the data relating smoking 
to trait and to state measures in Chapter 13 was that 
smoking is a risk factor in the development of paranoia 
and schizophrenia. Prevention of these conditions would 
therefore be facilitated if people did not start smoking 
and psychotics would be expected to be discharged more 
quickly, could live on less medication and would have 
fewer relapses if they stopped or cut down on their smoking, 
Heavy smoking families would also help a recovering 
psychotic discharged back to them if they too stopped 
or cut down on smoking.
Cigarette smoking, at least judging from responses 
on the state self-report inventories, does seem to have 
short term calming and state enhancing effects. However 
over the long term the boost to dopamine pathway activity 
can only exacerbate mental distress particularly in people 
with psychiatric problems. A recovering deluded patient 
who smokes to relieve stress, aggression and anxiety 
may be putting themselves in a vicious circle positive 
feedback system which will sustain smoking but produce 
no long term diminution in paranoia. My interpretation
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of the evidence is that, all other things being equal, 
if a person smokes they are more likely to go mad and 
if they continue to smoke, they will stay mad longer.
Confirmation bias
Seeking evidence or ideas which confirm a verbal 
hypothesis very much at the expense of evidence which 
refutes it seems from the experimental study to be a 
bias which strongly characterises both paranoid and non- 
paranoid psychotics and also high N non-psychotics.
It would seem reasonable therefore that a cognitive 
therapeutic intervention aimed at decreasing confirmation 
bias would be helpful for both psychotics and neurotics. 
Word games could easily be deployed for caring agents 
to work on the enhanced confirmation bias that patients 
seem to manifest.
Finally: the whole treatment programme for 
recovering psychotics will founder if their basic self 
esteem is not enhanced. Appropriate praise and listening 
attentively to what they say are both esteem enhancing 
"techniques" but, really, a person's self regard is not 
boosted by techniques. Every person's life is an unwritten 
novel: unique, unrepeatable, "unreplicable", special.
One has to have a feel for things of such quality, such 
importance. This is particularly so with psychotics, 
whose experiences are so much more poignant, vivid, acute. 
The particular ways in which a person's esteem can be
402
lifted by a therapist, although discussed by Rogers in 
the context of his client or person-centred therapy (Rogers, 
1942, 1951; Rogers et al., 1967) will probably never 
be totally known explicitly. The procedures via which 
counsellors do this are partly tacit or implicit. Whatever 
the procedures are, they are best deployed from a top- 
down attitude of care and love rather than from being 
focussed on specifically and analytically. The understanding 
of how the good or great counsellor or therapist "does 
it" is really a topic within the (much neglected) theme 
of love and cognition. This, alas, would need a third 
PhD to explicate.
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CHAPTER 15
CONCLUSIONS AND GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of the scientific endeavour is to 
discover the order in the natural world, to discover 
general principles on the basis of which we can rationally 
understand, predict and even control naturalistic 
phenomena. In this context the phenomenon of delusional 
thinking, like that of creativity, presents a tremendous 
challenge as delusions, like novel ideas and dreams have 
a certain erratic, fickle quality to them which qualifies 
them for some people as deserving of the title "irrational". 
Hermann Lenz for example (personal communication 11:11:87) 
did not believe that my experimental study was even 
appropriate in the first instance as he takes the view 
that delusions are of this irrational ilk and thus not 
assessable to scientific enquiry. Hausman (1976, 1985) 
similarly argues that creativity by its very nature involves 
breaking boundaries in unpredictable ways and hence the 
quest to predetermine creative behaviour suffers from 
a logical contradiction from the very outset.
Needless to say I am not in wholehearted agreement 
with these theorists or I would not have persevered with 
this research. My thinking in answer to them has gone 
along similar lines to that of Perkins (1988) whose 
discussion centres around the quest for the mechanisms 
mediating creativity. Although it may be forever impossible
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to predict what specific delusion or delusions a psychotic 
may construct or suffer it is possible, I believe, to 
uncover general principles which describe processes which 
bias, permit and encourage delusional thinking per se. 
Perkins refers to "enabling" factors which equip a person, 
say for creative achievement, without pressing them to 
achieve (much as fast reflexes would "enable" a person 
to be a racing driver without pressing them in that 
direction) and "promoting" factors which do have a press 
quality. I would argue that influences may be arranged 
on a series (see below) and the psychologist's task is 
to understand all of these influences, hopefully eventually 
pushing their understanding as far to the right as possible,
Influences more 
immediate to 
the act
Influences 
distant from 
the act
Permit/ Encourage/ Incite/ Impel/ Actuate/
enable promote tempt propel effect
Beyond the far left of this "causal triangle" 
are factors which merely "leave the door ajar" to an 
eventual outcome with no directional implications existing 
at all and beyond the far right is the act itself solidly 
eventuated in thought or in behaviour.
405
The causal triangle exists at right angles to 
the usual Top-down/Bottom-up categorisation of causal 
factors and in fact does not give primacy to any provoking 
factor. An actuating factor or a bottom-up process may 
indeed be temporally or structurally impotent outside 
a context of prior encouragements or needs.
As I argued in the introduction to this thesis 
I will therefore theorise from a holistic contextualist 
perspective within which individual processes have to 
always be seen in the context of other processes, procedures 
and strategies for their contribution to delusional 
thinking to be validly appreciated. Only language, lateral 
inhibition and the need for convenience segregates, basically 
we are dealing with relations in a context of other 
relations.
The theory I will articulate here, being holistic 
and multi-process, sees delusional thinking as due to 
an orchestra of factors all working together in harmony,
I will therefore refer to it as "orchestra theory".
I will start from the vantage point of bottom- 
up processes and then move on to other factors with the 
aim being to produce a fully-rounded theoretical perspective 
in which all influences are interacting.
One bottom-up component could well, of course, 
be overactivity in dopamine pathways (Snyder 1974) but 
this process , although it may tempt or incite delusions
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does not actuate them as dopaminergic activity boosters 
such as amphetamine, nicotine and L-dopa do not automatically 
produce aberrant cognitions in a one-to-one fashion. 
Overactivity in dopaminergic pathways, using an ex juvantibus 
reasoning, may also be high in highly creative non-deluded 
people given that dopamine blockers such as haloperidol 
even at doses as low as an eighth or a quarter of a 
milligram in the case of the latter drug regularly seem 
to reduce the flair of people who take them (e.g. Sacks 
1986) .
Another bottom-up component (bottom in the sense 
of local and/or mechanistic) which may permit delusional 
thinking in the sense of giving a slight push to the 
flywheel of operations that eventually culminates in 
it is slightly poor perceptual and decisional accuracy. 
Psychotics appear to be too risky in their confidence 
accompanying hypotheses enriched from fantasy and too 
cautious in their interpretations of more stimulus enriched 
scenes. They have less insight into their own perceptual 
accuracy (which even in paranoids is slightly less than 
the perceptual accuracy of non-psychotics) and are poor 
at discriminating signal from noise events. These biases 
give the slightest shift towards a cognitive style which 
is inner rather than outer directed. The biases in no 
way actuate delusional thinking but predispose''or permit 
a person to a life enriched in fantasy and a life where 
they might come to rely more on fantasising because their 
real-world judgements tend to be more often wrong than
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do those of 'normal' people and thus more often punished.
Paranoids (La Russo 1978) may be an exception 
to the above in the context of social perception but 
it seems that their high social sensitivity does them 
little good in real-time interpersonal contexts as they 
perceive more than they can rationally handle. If a 
paranoid is perceiving another person at two levels at 
once (those of the person's hidden self and their presented 
self) this is liable to complexify interpersonal interaction 
very considerably. The paranoid's social feedback reception 
points may be too closely spaced in time, a fluent rhythm 
to interaction will be difficult to sustain, their 
mentation may be interrupted by distracting worrying 
thoughts and hence the sensitive individual is liable 
to provoke discontent or puzzlement putting them in a 
positive feedback system which produces more distracting 
cognitions and even worse timing and rhythm.
Cortical overactivity is a further mechanism which 
may more than leave the door ajar to delusion. Through 
encouraging introversion and perhaps low venturesomeness 
it may amplify or reinforce the preoccupation with the 
inner realm provoked by poor perceptual judgement. All 
of these processes so far however in no way discriminate 
a psychotic from a high creative. These biases could 
just as easily permit creative novel or poetry writing 
or profound philosophising as they could eventual delusion. 
The paranoid might be inept real-time but not necessarily
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in self paced activity. The psychotic, like the high 
creative, may be better fitted for a life involving 
fantasy, inner enrichment and exploration and relatively 
sparse interpersonal engagements. There is nothing 
intrinsically 'right' about outer directedness and 'wrong' 
about inner directedness and one can indeed just as easily 
construct philosophies of life in which fantasy is the 
centre of intellectual interest rather than social 
relationships.
There does seem to be a further local mechanism 
"unusuality" in the psychotics however or at least in 
high paranoids and that seems to be a possibly filter 
related difficulty in concentrating. Sadly in the context 
of psychosis this is usually called an "attentional 
deficit" (Meyer and Salmon 1984) but in the context of 
creativity it is called merely "distractibility" 
(Martindale 1975). Creatives are renowned for needing 
solitude and quiet and freedom from uncontrollable 
disturbance, again their concentration difficulty may 
permit an openness to stimulation which could help produce 
a brilliant original painting or, via another route, 
a delusion. On its own however the defective attention 
model of the psychotic is a model without content, without 
quality.
High ideational fluency and flexibility may also 
be "encouraging" factors for delusional thinking, given 
the letter's set breaking character. Non-paranoids in
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particular seem to be quite divergent. Although the 
tests I gave did not show an acceleration of creativity 
at very high arousal this may have been because all tests 
involve some constraint and at that level it is totally 
"free range" permuting of ideas that is facilitated not 
criterion-appropriate responses. This may of course 
also explain the poor performance of the paranoids (who 
were the most aroused group) who may prefer, not just 
written rather than oral responses, but a solitary self- 
paced environment to permute their internal representations. 
The paranoids however certainly need help in the deployment 
of divergent thinking in interpersonal contexts as they 
seem to suffer from constraint even more than non-paranoids 
and produce very narrowly focussed responses. (I, of 
course, may not have been sufficiently permissive and 
may have been too intrusive with them).
A. process which may further encourage and perhaps 
even incite delusional thinking and which in the current 
research was linked to cortical activation levels was 
confirmation bias. In psychotics, especially paranoid 
psychotics, the left hemisphere may be overactivated, 
producing high verbal confirmation bias and the left 
underactivated, producing high visual/spatial confirmation 
bias, (the links with autonomic activation suggested 
a reverse pattern subcortically but these findings were 
more tentative). Whereas a balanced brain mediates processes 
involving both confirmation and refutation, the potential 
psychotic's brain, especially that of the paranoid, has
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both enhanced pattern detecting processes (right 
hemisphere advantage over a normal brain) and enhanced 
serial developing of these patterns. The result in 
psychosis is the "everything means something and everything 
fits" experience. These biases could of course be highly 
useful (say in scientific research) if the balance or 
imbalance was controllable but if in the psychotic, perhaps 
in the service of some need, they become pushed to a 
point where they are uncontrollable the result is liable 
to be a dislocation from consensually validated inter­
pretations of the world.
The psychological process accelerating at least 
verbal confirmation bias may be that of capacity decrease. 
Alas the levels of arousal reached in this experiment 
were hardly even "knocking on the door" of those likely 
reached in psychosis and hence only a slight drop in 
capacity obtained at the upper end of the arousal spectrum. 
Tendencies in the expected direction did however occur.
(In addition: confirmation bias on the 3-4 task, which 
had a higher storage load than that involved on the 2-3 
task, and thus should have made more demands on capacity, 
was indeed rather higher (9.87% compared to 8.20%)).
The lack of control of hemisphere balance could 
be a reflection of a problem in callosal modulation 
(bottom-up) or a top-down effect. The brain, to speak 
dualistically-, could be responding to strategies deployed 
in the service of some need and the person could be making
411
use of the products of hemisphere imbalance to such a 
degree that control processes break down. Evidence of 
callosal transmission unusualities are difficult to 
interpret without a creative control group but my bet 
is that there is a problem in callosal control of 
hemisphere activation in psychosis but that the form 
of imbalanced activation state is exacerbated by the 
person's thinking (global to local effect) which calls 
for high similarity perception and confirmation bias 
to sustain their style of life.
At this point we pass temporarily from 'how' 
questions to 'why' questions, from brain to mind or from 
local brain processes to global ones. Intuitive leaps 
are needed here as to try and build logically from local 
atomistic processes to qualitative executive-guided 
motivational processes is like trying to snake charm 
a rope up a mine shaft to get to the next level.
The 'why' question has of course always been central 
to psychoanalytic thinking in this domain. The 
psychoanalytic theories however seem to me to be so simple 
that the rarity of paranoia and delusional thinking emerges 
as a puzzle. Whatever motives emerge also, I think, 
cannot be seen in isolation from perceptual, biochemical 
and neuropsychological unusualities and the latter cannot 
be seen in isolation from more qualitative aspects.
From my case study work I would agree with the 
general point made by Laing that the schizophrenic attempts
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to find a solution to a, for them, unliveable situation 
although I would not agree with many of the details of 
the Laingian scheme, especially with its focus on the 
so-called schizophrenogenic mother.
Related to this I would agree with the Freudian 
view that the delusion is an attempt at productive 
integrated functioning (an attempt at "self cure"). 
Meissner's attempt to establish a process continuum theory 
linking paranoid with normal functioning is also in 
parallel, at least in intention if not in content, with 
my own approach.
As is the case in the attempt to understand 
creativity one has to understand the goals and the plans 
of the individual, studying their dopamine activity levels 
or their hemisphere activation states alone is not enough. 
We must ask, in an understanding, positive way: "What
is the person trying to do?" (The answer to this in 
life is very different from the answer relevant in an 
experimental situation, the latter totally ignores the 
real life goal and belief system context of the person's 
perceptions) .
All of my case study volunteers had "big dreams". 
Alana J . wanted to be a top dancer; Shafiq a world famous 
intellectual; Chris, rather covertly, to be an acclaimed 
artist; David B. a pop star; Alison the lover or wife 
of a top (handsome) doctor. I myself wanted to discover 
the illusions of thought itself and to go even beyond
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Kant. Big dreams mean fairly large discrepancies from 
one's current status and thus induce high drive or high 
arousal for their attainment. In the risk of failing 
in big dreams is the door opened to despair, perhaps 
even madness. Simultaneously with the high arousal induced 
by these goals all my case study volunteers found themselves 
trapped and isolated by their own behaviour as if socially 
underwater. Indeed it was so that they all, like myself, 
had difficulties in communicating. At times they were 
indeed trapped koan-like in knots by Catch 22 situations 
and double binds. There was nowhere to go, nowhere to 
move to. Special people with big dreams, trapped and 
misunderstood, uncertain and isolated, every move blocked 
and tangled with no-one they could really talk to to 
explicate their situation.
The very brain biases which had gently, over the 
years, produced this state perhaps through also encouraging 
spectacular imaginings, (contemplated with higher than 
usual confidence), high reinforceability (and hence 
sometimes sexual variation (the latter perhaps also 
related to a hemisphere imbalance)); great sensitivity 
(and hence protective "spoiling"), but at the same time 
a feeling of "difference", then operated to help solve 
the very problem they had helped create.
The delusion, whose actuation remains a mystery, 
certainly seems to relate closely to the wishes and fears 
of the psychotic, hence it is not, I think, generated
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by completely independent processes as claimed, (admittedly 
as an aside) by Argyle (1988). Indeed the delusional 
episode, with the delusion as a novel, wide, synthesising 
gestalt, but with intense uni-directional reasoning 
character, is a meaning impregnated crescendo to the 
psychotic's life, explaining and/or culminating their 
lives in one great clarifying and stupendously arousing 
and exciting vision.
The alternative but related solution to uncertainty 
and entrapment is the mystical state. David B. did not 
only suffer delusion but also attained mystical intuitions 
such as -unity experiences and distortions of the time 
sense; Alana J. also had unity experiences and loss of 
self. (Neither had transsensate experiences or (from 
their reports) ineffability). The mystical and delusional 
states may be related as are the music and the libretto. 
Perhaps mystical experiences are right hemisphere mediated 
(Fenwick 1983), hence their ineffability if focussed 
upon and their slipperiness if not attended to. Delusional 
experiences could be left hemisphere attempts to flesh 
these intuitions or brief feelings out using situationally 
derived attributions and dynamically organised 
conceptualisations enriched by external stimuli. To 
understand delusion then fully we may need to understand 
the 'language' of the right hemisphere and how it relates, 
for example, to the left hemisphere in the generation 
of the vitally important "meaning feeling". (Jungians 
would probably interpret the latter as archetype emergence 
as an archetype is a form without content).
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The loss of balance between the two hemispheres 
would account for the diminution or loss of control in 
psychosis or Borderline experiences. This may also apply 
to a reduced extent in neurosis, creative "flows" and 
sexually variant states, all of which may thus exist 
on a continuum with psychotic states. Creative people 
after all, don't have ideas, ideas have them. Neurotic 
people don't have a complex, the complex has them.
Fetishists don't have a fetish, the fetish has them and 
deluded psychotics don't have a delusion, it has them.
The mystical and delusional states, rather than 
being irrational and inexplicable, I thus see as solutions 
to an intolerable reality. Having been taken gently, 
year by year, away from a state of enculturation into 
society, the potential psychotic, like the mystic, discovers 
a new mode of brain functioning, (physiology), a new 
perception or interpretation of the world through 
enhanced relational judgement (psychology) and perhaps 
at times a new deeper dimension of reality (physics).
In this context perhaps the mystical state is not only 
a Borderline state philosophically and psychologically 
between sanity and madness, actuality and possibility, 
but an intermediate form of brain functioning.
Mode 1 
"Normal
Mode 2 
Mystical
Mode 3 
Acute psychotic
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Looking down on the brain with the two cortices enclosing 
the limbic lobes the patterns of excitation and inhibition 
in the three states might be as above - indeed it could 
be said that all three modes are special forms of balance.
In Modes 2 and 3 the paranormal is normal and 
perhaps levels of description and experience denied to 
a normal brain are attainable. In these modes spiritual 
"forces" may be able to have tangible physical effects 
(as in the episode of resolution of my taps and clicks) 
and may be able to produce major psychological effects 
on the person. These possibilities are obviously only 
highly tentative; certainty is not an addition to knowledge 
but a mode of knowledge. The certainty of the mystic 
offers no guarantees. Nonetheless the door is left ajar 
to such possibilities.
It seems then to me that in delusional, mystico- 
delusional and mystical states the brain or local processes 
in the brain, continually enriched by external stimuli, 
respond to needs or globally mediated decisions and 
processes. The psychotic in ego-weakening uncertainty 
needs certainty, in delusion and hallucination the brain 
compensates and gives them certainty; they may need 
punishment yet in doubt they fear the worst, just in 
case. In delusion and hallucination these fears and 
needs are combined multiplicatively and they are given 
punishment greater than the severity of their own conscience, 
They need confirmation of their fears to keep ahead of
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the action, uncannily they are given confirmation. They 
need to see patterns and meanings to "keep up with what 
is going on", their right hemisphere responds, they pick 
up the patterns, they see the meanings. At this stage 
confirmation bias and similarity perception, having 
encouraged delusion, now propel its continuation.
Like all masochists they also are sadiàts; they 
want control. They are given control: the "voice people" 
in their heads are tied to commenting on or echoing their 
every thought; they exist as if on strings following 
them everywhere, observing everything like nosey neighbours 
at a.wall with a listening glass. At the same time they 
punish the very person who gives them their entire 
raison d'etre. The "thought people" 6f the pseudo­
community have nothing better to do than devote their 
entire waking hours to monitoring them and plotting 
against them, making the psychotic the centre of their 
whole world. They, like the voice people, live for them.
At the same time they punish. The sado-masochistic theme 
is obvious.
Innocence is not achieved, shame is not eliminated, 
hostility is not denied but certainty, centrality, control 
and punishment are achieved.
It would be wrong to conclude this thesis with 
inferences that seem to imply that psychosis results 
only from intrapsychic and intracerebral rearrangements 
in people whose social world is much the same as for
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everybody else. The social world of the psychotic I 
believe continues to need intense study; psychosis is 
not only a medical and perceptual-cognitive problem but 
a dilemma for social psychology. The implicit rules 
of working class life and the characteristics and behaviour 
of "psychotogenic" people seem particularly worthy of 
study. The study of the consequences in social situations 
of the perceptual sensitivity of paranoids would also 
form a more fine grained and perhaps more useful starting 
point for a psychoanalytic social psychology than the 
more molar approaches of Horney and Fromm.
Also I think it would be wrong to argue that in 
research on psychosis there is some "most suitable unit 
for analysis". Different units are most appropriate 
for generating predictions in different contexts. An 
holistic theoretical approach as eventuated in orchestra 
theory seems to me to be the most appropriate coordinating 
and guiding framework as psychosis is a phenomenon which 
touches all the inter-related realms shown below, and 
more. Indeed the study of it may unify them conceptually 
as they are graphically here.
—  Psychophysiology 
Psychology of \
involuntary 1
processes Physiology
z' ;
Psychology Neurochemistry
/ /
Psychological Decision /
theory Biophysics
Consciousness
Quantum Physics
theory  --- —
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The reader can probably tell from these pages 
that I have risked madness myself to research productively 
in this field. I have had to be both IN the world and, 
like a kind of individuated pantheist, able to observe 
it as if merely OF the world. Indeed as Hokusai said:
"If you want to draw a bird, you must become a bird"
(Maslow 1967). What I^ ^as trying to do was to validate 
the psychotic and mystical experiences. Hence this thesis 
had two theoretical levels - one high level, almost 
transcendental and one low level and rooted very much 
in this world as we consensually perceive it. The 
connection between these levels is that the very 
processes which distort perception of this world of 
middle magnitudes may permit and facilitate the perception 
of the magical and mystical "purple" realm which could 
well be nonetheless real. The psychotic is therefore 
caught between distortional semi-hallucinations, compelling 
needs, misattributions and false-alarm perceiving on 
the one hand and occasional genuine extra-dimensional 
intuitions of real value on the other. One purpose of 
this thesis has been to try and disentangle these levels 
of perception and show how they could be, in real time, 
confused and mutually reinforced to produce delusional 
cognitions.
 oOo---
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APPENDIX
The pool of items (177 in all) from which 
the 53 items given in the 3-4 test were 
drawn. These were given in a pilot 
study to 35 people. The scoring scheme 
is also shown here.
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Item pool for 3-4 test
Test words Answers(s) A or Ab = Abstract
C or Con = Concrete
If no number is shown after
an answer it is scored 2.
1 Eraser Bridge Ball: Rubber
2 Ridge Blemish Tissue: Scar Wrinkle
3 Long High Cardigan: Jumper Neck(l)
4 Good Thin Art: Fine/Form
5 Exclude Gold Music: Bar
6 Ship Pole Stone: Flag Cat(l)
7 Quick Plates Element: Silver
8 Middle Spiritualist Communication: Medium Between(1)
9 Dominate Measurer Book: Rule
10 Fiddle Roast Chef : Cook
11 Advertise Ear Sink: Plug
12 Red Head Box: Letter Light
13 Main Light Walker: Street
14 Easy Arm Deck: Chair
15 Field Black Stone: Pitch/Diamond/Coal Crows(1)
16 Harden Jet Group: Set
17 High Fingered Infantry: Light
18 Near Shut Finish: Close
19 Break Jim Dip: Lucky
20 Finishing Red Ticker: Tape
21 Maker Stick Cup: Match
22 Table Face Dish: Cloth Round
23 Ice Fresh Face: Cream Pack
24 Sweet Day Boat: Dream(2)
25 Two Old Egg: Timer(2) Men( 1 )
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26 Judge Jury Law: Court (Concreted) ) Justice (Abs(2) )
Judiciary(2) Trial(l) Condemn(1)
27 Motion Chair Round: Table(2) Wheel(2) Revolving(2)
Toilet(2) Swivel(2) Carousel(1)
Rocking(1) Circular(1)
28 Wall Gate Door: Barrier (Abs (2)) House (Con(l)) Window (Con (1)
Garden(1) Access (Abs(2)) Divide(2) Side(l) 
Front (Con(l)) Back (Con(l))
29 Hole Wine Harbour: Port(2) Water(1)
30 Dirty Drab Dishevelled: Scruffiness (Abs(2)) Unkempt(2)
Appearance(2) Tramp (Con(l)) Clothes(1) 
Decaying(1)
31 Sergeant Scale Important: Major(2)
32 Egg Tea Milk: Kitchen (Con(l)) Food (Abs(2)) Cup(l) Boil(2)
Meal (Con(l)) Consumable(2) Spoon(1)
Breakfast(1)
33 Dutch Jointed Dealing: Double(2)
34 Print Accuse Limb: Finger(2)
35 Jug Pan Kettle: Receptacle (Abs(2)) Handle (Con(l))
Kitchen (Con(l)) Pot(l) Utensil(2) Vessel(2) 
Container(2) Cooking(1) Water(1)
36 Angry Double Fire: Cross
37 Walk Slide Play: Park (Con(l)) Activity (Abs(2)) Recreation(3)
Movement(2) Park(l)
38 Umbrella Coat Hat: Gentleman (Con(l)) Protection (Abs(2))
Stand(1) Covering(2) Rain(l)
39 House Church Inn: Building(2) Refuge(2) Room(l) Free(2)
40 Floor Splint Corset: Support(2)
41 Miscalculation Misprint: Blunder Error(2) Mistake(2)
42 Valid Correct Right: True(2) Sound(2) Affirmative(2)
P roper(1) Answer(1)
43 Vigilant Anticipatory: Alert Expectant(2) Watchful(2)
Ready(2) Awake(1)
44 Window Vagina Keyhole: Opening(2) Aperture (Abs(2))
Orifice (Abs(2)) Peeping Tom (Con(l)) 
Entrance(1)
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45 Newspaper Memo Letter: Medium(2) Document(2) Message(2)
Communication (Abs(2)) Office (Con(D) 
Writing (Con(D) Type(l) Note(l)
Words(1) Report(2)
46 Typewriter Telephone Calculator: Gadget(2) Device (Abs(2))
Office (Con(l))
47 Tissue Rag Towel: Cleanser (Abs(2)) Handkerchief (Con(D)
Paper(l) Wipe(l) Absorb(1) Dry(l)
48 Table Chair Cabinet : Furniture (Abs (2)) Dining room (Con(D)
Kitchen(1) Wood(1)
49 Pen Kitchen Bread: Knife Provision List(l)
50 False Hair Judge: Wig
51 Net Madam Flutter: Butterfly
52 Long Garment Queue: Jumper/Line Train(1) Tail(l) Length(1)
53 Bathing Parlour Spot: Beauty
54 Transport Smoke Dream: Pipe Car(l) Drug(2) High(l)
55 Polish Shoe Glow: Shine
56 Giving First Fighter: Prize Aid(2)
57 Asleep Track Barrier : Sound Fast(l)
58 Relief Threshold Ache: Pain
59 Land Hopper Roots: Grass
60 Tolerate Tripod Lamp: Stand
61 Crossing Stripe Quadruped: Zebra
62 Sun Clock Face: Dial Round(1)
63 Beat Ear Stick: Drum
64 View Stand Position: Opinion (Abs(2)) Football Match (Con(D)
Placed) Point (Abs(2)) Stance(2) 
Sited) Aspect (1)
65 Horse Foot Shine: Shoe
66 Kettle Tune Gossip: Sing Whistle
67 Disallow Rod Drink: Bar
68 Not Stump Ball: Cricket
69 Escape Upright Nut: Bolt
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70 Shock Light Plug: Electric
71 Strawberry Traffic: Stick Jam
72 Back Blank Bridge: Draw
73 Cold Salts Room: Bath
74 With Pull Represent: Draw
75 After Second Abstract: Thought Time(l) Hindsight(1)
76 Doomsday Worm Keeper: Book
77 Sherry Humour Atmosphere: Dry Warm(l) Party(2)
78 Sun Cross Smile: Beam
79 Car Landing Course: Crash Test(l) Race(l)
80 Fashion Style Create: Form/Model/Sculpt/Design/New/Shape/
Dressmake(1)
81 Beget Holy Parent : Father/Child/Mother
82 Edge Insult Mouth: Lip Sharp
83 Front Leader Nail: Head
84 Country Lady Mine: Land
85 Healthy Shaft Water: Well
86 Pimple Centre Detect: Spot
87 Drawing Cushion Hole: Pin
88 Light Reasonable Fun: Fair
89 Pot Sink Gap: Hole
90 House Pet Follow: Dog
91 Implication Substance Drift: Meaning/Gist/Essence
92 Test Check Display: Screen/Card
93 Sticker Law Beak: Bill
94 Fall Under Hill: Down Drop Over(1)
95 Comedy Music Ale: Light
96 House Weight Year: Light Fly
97 Divide Time Role: Part Share(l)
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98 High Sun Torch: Light
99 Quick Stone Tree: Lime
100 Line Stream Land: Main Up(l)
101 Orb Game Dance: Ball
102 Insect Paper Zip: Fly
103 Cellist Guitarist Bugler: Instrumentalist (Abs(2)) Band (Con(D)
Musician (Abs(2)) Music(1)
104 Brass Neck Group: Band/Ring
105 Railway Fashion Washing: Line
106 Tense Drunk Water: Tight Hangover(1)
107 Paint Jacket Hanger: Coat
108 Bask Star Tan: Sun
109 Strip Banana Periphery: Skin Peel
110 Drink Ghost Guts: Spirit
111 Smoking Factory Stack: Chimney
112 Collaborate Dress Politics: Party
113 High Line Diver: Sky Water(1) Life(l)
114 Throb Hit Route: Beat
115 Ship Cassette Cards : Deck Player(1)
116 Transfer Overtake Succeed: Pass
117 Charge Responsibility Ridge: Shoulder
118 Killer Nagging Unbearable: Pain
119 Hard Sand Band: Rock Man
120 Fire Socialism Anger : Red Raging(1)
121 Harlot Jam Cake: Tart
122 Note Master Hole: Key
123 Critical Skeleton Board: Key
124 Punish Cover Pile: Carpet
125 Urinate River Plant: Water
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126 Surprise Dress Line: Party/Yarn
127 Rear Shoe Kick: Boot/Horse/Foot
128 Water Fire Shock: Proof Earth(1) Disaster(1) Injury(1)
129 Chime Boxing Finger: Ring
130 Fall Bow Storm: Rain/Out
131 High Ski Bail: Jump/Water
132 Seat Compere Professor: Chair
133 Betray Milk Blade: Grass/Turn
134 Examination Wind Talk: Cross
135 Bird Stoop Nil: Duck
136 Drinking Slipper Bottle: Glass/Champagne
137 Factory Flower Embed: Plant
138 Joke Prise Strip: Tease/Off
139 Amoeba Membrane Prison: Cell Enclose(2)
140 Judge Tennis Lady: Court/Umpire
141 Mad Nuclear Game: Power/War
142 Sea Headed Crossing: Level
143 Cold Pan End: Dead
144 Tin Square Fight: Box
145 Bed Injection Nurse: Treatment (Abs(2) ) Hospital (Con(D)
146 Police Metal Coin: Copper Clink(1)
147 Baby Gun Puff : Powder
148 Ash Can Beer: Can Tin(l) Pub(2)
149 Wedding Dream Shift: Day/Night Gown(2)
150 Break Up Pot: Crack Clean(1) Tea Throw(1) Down(2)
151 Midnight Skin Painting: Oil
152 Goal Result Intercourse: Score/Consummation/Culmination
153 Empty Brain Pipe: Drain
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154 Skirt Jewellery Makeup: Adornment (Abs(2)) Ladies(1) Covering(1)
Decoration(2) Woman (Con(l))
Accoutrements (Abs(2)) Outfit(1) 
Costumed) Wear (1) Dress (1)
155 Dancing Drinking Eating: Enjoyments (Abs(2)) Hedonism(2)
Party (Con(1)) Passtimes(2)
Merrymaking ( 2 ) Socialised) Action (2)
156 Compliance Eagerness Helpfulness: Willingness/Cooperation
Traits(1) Library assistant(1) 
Positived) Benevolence
157 Carpentry Thinking Telephony: Skill/Joining-connecting/Occupation
158 Enthusiasm Fanaticism Fervour: Feeling/Keenness/Passion/Eagerness/
Wild(l) Zeal(2) Keen(l)
Interest(1) Politics(1) Energy(1) 
Drived) Dedication (1)
159 Speech Writing Drawing: Communication(2) Medium(2) Production(1)
Express ion(2) Arts(1)
160 Altruist Samaritan Saint: Philanthropist(2) Charity(1)
Selflessness(2) Christian(l)
Do-gooder(2) Benefactor(2) Good(1) 
Humanitarian(2) Paragon(1) Kind(l)
161 Bitterness Envy Spite: Malevolence/Evil/Malice Sin(l)
Jealousy(1) Hate(l) Selfishness(1)
162 Safe Warehouse Bunker: Store/Container Deposit(l)
163 Crack Unriddle Decode: Decipher/Solve/Expose Interpret(1)
Discover(1) Break(1) Code(l)
164 Overt Brazen Shameless: Undisguised/Manifest/Open Guiltless(1)
Coars e(1) Flagrant(2) Brash(1)
W anton(1) Hussy(1) Trumpery(1)
165 Insinuate Suggest Allude: Imply/Hint/Covert/Intimate
166 Potential Dormant Concealed: Latent/Hidden/Covert/Possibility(1)
167 Barge Boat Ship: Transport (Abs(2) Water (Con(l) Vessel (Abs(2))
Craft(2) Floating(1) Sailing(1)
168 Plough Tractor Harvester: Device (Abs(2) Farm (Con(l))
Agriculture (Abs(2)) Machine(1)
Field(1)
169 Spoon Trowel Screwdriver: Tool/Implement/Instrument/Utensil
170 Sofa Bed Wardrobe: Furniture
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171 Wrestling Fencing Boxing: Combat/Sport/Duel/Fighting/Match/
Contest Jousting(1)
172 Bruise Scratch Lesion: Wound/Abrasion/Injury/Pain Hurt(1)
Tumour(1)
173 Hunch Inspiration Brainwave: Intuition/Idea Genius(1) Notion(2)
174 Magazine Arsenal Armoury : Stone (Abs(2)) Army/War (Con(l))
Gun (Con(l)) Weapons(2)
175 Enlightenment Experience Understanding : Wisdom/Knowledge
Insight(1)
Revelation(1)
Illumination(1)
176 Tricks Hat Chocolates: Box Party(1)
177 Corner Fisted Fit: Tight Boxing(2) Boxer(2) Fight(2)
429
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